

these will recoil upon their deceiving leaders, or their successors. They will uproot the institutions and replace motive forces which have led them into the misery and suffering that all wars bring. A new consciousness will grow, which will teach them to do for themselves what their erstwhile leaders have so miserably failed to achieve. They have learnt the value of organisation, the technique of mobilisation, the importance of coordination. And when, in their new awakening, they are fully mobilised and properly organised, they will know we may be sure how to compel leaders to adopt policies and carry out measures which will go some way to realise the aims of this war.

The happenings in the countries liberated from the invaders' yoke provide already an unmistakable evidence of the consequences and reactions of the war, and the alignments of peoples that has taken place during its course. And though it may be premature to say anything regarding the trend of events in these and other countries after the war is over and peace restored, it is by no means out of place to take note of such happenings.

If these lessons of the War have been truly learnt, and the determination not to repeat the disaster is fully made, the axe must be laid at the root of the evil. The causes of all wars are many and complex. But there are some factors, which may well be deemed to be ultimately responsible for the outbreak of the conflict. Notwithstanding all the damage, destruction and suffering, there is among the leaders nowhere any clear indication of their resolve to strike at the very root of this repeated attack of collective insanity that periodically grips the nations of the world. In all that has hitherto been stated, even from the most responsible quarters, and in the most solemn form, one seeks in vain for any trace of intention for ever to eradicate the basic cause of armed conflict. Though the war has now lasted well over five years, there is still no specification of their aims by any of the principal belligerents,—apart, of course, from the platitudes regarding a New Order, the vague generalities of the Atlantic Charter, or the imposing array of the Four Freedoms. Platitudes are heard on either side. They are cheap, sonorous and impressive; and so they form an abundant stock-in-trade of the demagogue. Unless, however, one is prepared to take at face value the magnificent verbosity of front rank statesmen, one finds no definite indication as to the objectives for which millions of lives are being sacrificed, or for ever doomed to a

FOUNDATIONS of PEACE

By

K. T. Shah



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not been defined ; and legislation like that relating to the Jews in Nazi Germany, or practices against Negroes in certain South American States of the U.S.A., or even some legislation against Indians in the Union of South Africa, may be treated as outside the scope of the Organisation. If the logic of this principle is carried to its conclusion, it would prevent the Organisation from safeguarding the interests of minorities, whether national or communal. What happened in Czechoslovakia, or what might happen in India, would thus be outside the scope of intervention. The chances of war are thus not altogether avoided,—particularly civil wars. Once such a war begins, the chances of its extending to other neighbouring countries, on the ground of self-defence, are much too serious to be ignored altogether.

Nothing is said, moreover, regarding the right claimed by Nazi Germany to intervene in the affairs of Czechoslovakia on the excuse of protecting German nationals living in Czechoslovakia. The Article forbids the Organisation as a whole from intervening ; but any single member of it, if it chooses to do so, is not necessarily precluded from taking that course. There are, no doubt, provisions, in other parts of the Charter, which are meant to guard against situations that may lead to war ; but they would be easy to evade by any of the big powers bent upon aggrandisement, or expanding its sphere of influence.

Members of the Organisation are, no doubt, pledged to further their obligations under the Charter, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, so as to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits derived from membership of the Organisation. They are also obligated to settle their international differences by peaceful means, so that international peace, security, and justice be not endangered. But while peace and security may be fairly well understood, the question of "justice" is open to interpretation, which may vary according to the prejudices of the parties concerned. Unless, therefore, a code of international law is prepared and accepted by all members ; and a tribunal set up to administer justice according to that law, there would be no means of effectively ensuring to all members their full benefits under the Charter.

Members must refrain from using any threats in their international relations, or the use of force, against the territorial integrity or independence of any other member. But as every member has an implicit right to withdraw from the Organization at any time, there may quite possibly emerge cases where, under given circumstances, they may,

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the inhabitants of each trust territory, and the administering authority for each trust territory within the competence of the General Assembly shall make an annual report to the General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.

Voting

Article 89

1. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Trusteeship Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 90

1. The Trusteeship Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.
2. The Trusteeship Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

Article 91

The Trusteeship Council shall, when appropriate, avail itself of the assistance of the Economic and Social Council and of the specialized agencies in regard to matters with which they are respectively concerned.

CHAPTER XIV

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Article 92

The International Court of Justice shall be the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It shall function in accordance with the annexed Statute, which is based upon the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and forms an integral part of the present charter.

Article 93

1. All members of the United Nations are *ipso facto* parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
2. A state which is not a member of the United Nations may become a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 94

1. Each member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party.

TO
Dr. Rajendra Prasad
Mr. Shuaib Qureshi

Two Gentlemen of India

“The only way to have a friend is to be one.” EMERSON

“Let not man glory in this that he loves his Country, but let him rather glory in that he loves his kind” BAHĀ'ULLĀH.



PREFACE

The following pages contain, in very much expanded form, the substance of two Lectures, delivered under the auspices of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Bahais in India, on the occasion of their Centenary celebrations in Bombay (24th May, 1944), and in Ahmedabad (10th July, 1944). Needless to add, the material and argument have been brought up to date, wherever possible and necessary.

In view of momentous changes happening in the basic conception and working structure of the international system, in consequence of the war, the writing has had to be spread over a much longer period than was deemed at first necessary. Printing, too, has taken much longer than expected, with the result that some repetition or diffuseness of exposition has become inevitable.

All religions claim to stand for peace and brotherhood amongst men. But the Prophet Bahau'llah, who proclaimed this new Faith, has made prophecies regarding the form of the future world—in its social, political and economic organisation,—which seem peculiarly remarkable under present conditions. If current tendencies may be relied upon, they are also not unlikely to be fulfilled, in substance if not in the letter, by the obvious force of circumstances. Aposite and specific extracts from his writings are available in plenty ; and in plain language, needing neither commentary nor explanation. The writer, however, has avoided adducing them, as much to guard against the size of this work swelling unnecessarily, as to prevent his own opinions being mistaken for another's.

The book is presented mainly in the form of Lectures to a public audience. It was, however, unavoidable to add much to the original lectures, in order to bring the notes for the addresses up-to-date, round up the argument, substantiate the principal theme, and present the work in a readable form. The writer hopes those present at the Lectures will find in these pages nothing inconsistent with the ideas laid before them in the Lectures as delivered.

The present writer had entertained views on the Post-War Reconstruction of the existing social system on lines, which are in many respects similar to those propounded by Bahau'llah, but without any knowledge of that declaration made almost a hundred years before. For one brought up under a system of intensive, increasing, but unbridled, industrialism under capitalist impetus, setting loose the forces

of insatiate competitive greed and incessant lust for domination and exploitation, the views entertained by this writer may justly be considered neither original nor unusual. Full credit must, however, be given to the Thinker and the Seer, who, probably, had not heard even the name of Marx; whose reliance was on authority rather than on individual free thought; whose starting point was Faith rather than Reason, to have visualised a world of the future, in which social equality and economic opportunity for full self-expression would not be the exclusive privilege of the chosen or the faithful few; but would be available to every individual. If, in the Bahai view of the future social system, private property and parasitism are not to be wholly abolished, economic freedom and individual security will, nevertheless, be the basic planks of the New Order.

The present writer was, therefore, happy to utilise such an occasion as the Centenary Celebration of the Bahais to put forward views, on lines which no one now cares to challenge in principle, though he himself feels sceptic as regards the likelihood of their realisation everywhere in everyday life. In spite of the imposing array of statements and declarations of their aims by the leaders of the United Nations, the war does not seem really to have yet taught the one lesson it is absolutely necessary to learn, if the world of our dreams is ever to become a reality, viz. that recourse to armed force is not only an infallible sign of the brute in man; but that war never profits any one, victor or vanquished.

In bringing out the substance of the Lectures in book form, the writer has drawn upon contemporary thought in the West, as well as on several of his own publications in the last two decades. Where necessary, due acknowledgement has been made to all thinkers whose contributions have been drawn upon to substantiate his own views. He is aware of the futility of putting forward a definite, cut-and-dried scheme of re-ordering the world and its component units, in political constitution, social structure, and economic organisation and activities. But he thinks it would add to the clearness of thinking on the subject, if the basic principles underlying such change, and the ways and means of putting some of those principles into effect, are laid out analytically, so as to provide, if not the outlines of a constitution for the New World, at least some of the material wherewith such outlines might be built up.

The War has ended after six years of waste, suffering, and destruction. The forces of reaction, of aggression and domination, of racial exclusiveness and economic exploitation, have fought and lost. Two great nations, once in the vanguard of civilisation, lie prostrate, devastated, without means or resources, at the mercy of the conqueror.

The end was inevitable. And when that end is finally realised, the responsibility of the leaders of those who claim to have fought for freedom, justice, and individual as well as national security, will not have ended, but only just begun. The hopes of many in this world of class domination had been pinned upon the person of Mr. Roosevelt while he lived, notwithstanding momentary misgivings about his real purpose, or actual ability to realise his ideals, because of his seeming subservience to the more aggressive personality of Churchill. With his death, and with the progress of deliberations at San Francisco, a new cloud has risen on the horizon, which, it is to be hoped, the pledges the late President of the U.S.A. had given in the name of the American people would soon disperse.

On the eve of the San Francisco Conference, Mahatma Gandhi issued a statement, which contained the following courageous words, breathing the real spirit of peace upon the whole earth, and goodwill among all men :

“Peace must be just. In order to be that, it must neither be punitive nor vindictive. Germany and Japan should not be humiliated. The strong are never vindictive. Therefore, fruits of peace must be equally shared. The effort then will be to turn them into friends. The Allies can prove their democracy by no other means.

“It follows from the foregoing that there will be no armed peace imposed upon the forcibly disarmed. All will be disarmed. There will be an international police force to enforce the lightest terms of peace. Even this retention of an international police will be a concession to human weakness, not by any means an emblem of peace.”

May the spirit of the Message be heeded by those who have the making of peace and the remoulding of the world in their hands !

Bombay, 1st October, 1945

K. T. SHAH

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTORY

In one of the corners of the Times Square, New York, there is a theatre, called *The World*, which had recently some damage to be repaired. The proprietors, therefore, closed the theatre, and put up a notice reading "*The World closed for repairs.*" I do not know if the proprietors had in their mind any meaning beyond what reads on the surface. But if the reader is more critical, or more cynically inclined, he could easily read into that notice a much wider significance applicable equally to the present conditions of the whole civilised world, which is drowned in strife and turmoil, blood and violence.

In the midst of a war, in which almost every important country is involved on one side or the other, all progress has inevitably stopped. Every form of civilised intercourse and cultural communication between the peoples of the world seems to have come to a dead halt. Every institution working for international harmony and human welfare has been either interrupted in its work, or diverted, if not perverted in all its basic tasks, to serve the needs of brute force. The normal current of man's daily life is dammed; the regular channels of his activity choked and barred. Every dream of progress, every stream of development of material prosperity and spiritual growth, is arrested.

What remains of the ordinary peace-time dealings and intercourse between the nations of the world appears to be aimed exclusively at destruction—destruction of life in every form and every age; of goods of every kind; of food and material of every sort, even of all the machines, tools, and instruments of new production, and arrangements for the distribution of the recurring wealth produced by the efforts and ingenuity of civilised man. Man is busy in every corner of the globe with devising more ingenious ways of killing or wounding or maiming

his fellows ; or rendering life more difficult and distressing than it need ever be. The very conquests man has made by his intelligence over the brute forces of nature,—his science and inventions,—are employed to make man more savage than the beasts of the jungle, more noxious than the most poisonous plant or vermin to his fellows. Civilisation is being distorted and perverted, if not basically undermined and destroyed, by the very achievements which constituted the glory and the greatness of the last century ; and which made a promise of continuous advance, now denied or falsified by the havoc and horrors of total global war.

Thinkers of every race and preachers of every religion have recognised the dire tribulation that comes upon mankind in the wake of war. In the midst of the curse and the horrors we are witnessing, the more courageous and perspicacious of such souls are busy thinking out plans for avoiding the loss of life, needless waste and wanton destruction that take place before their eyes. Thoughts of this kind, however, which would aim at equity and justice to all, victors or vanquished, and all reason which goes with such thought, appear to be at a heavy discount for the moment. The very foundation for such thinking—factual material—is unavailable, or distorted by the demands of war-time propaganda to an unrecognisable degree. Anger and grief, born of passion and of prejudice, dominate all concerns, institutions, or conventions of our existing civilisation. Sane and balanced thinking, and impartial, objective judgment are thus all but impossible, for the moment. But that makes their need all the greater.

All that is not due to any failure to recognise the gravity of the situation. Leaders of the warring nations have uttered and reiterated superlative platitudes in endless monotony about the critical character of the present juncture. They have declared again and again their inflexible resolve to reshape, when the war is over, a wholly new world. In the allied countries, this war has been represented as the eternal struggle between progress and reaction ; between privilege and equality ; between authority and democracy. While the spokesmen of Democracy speak of fundamental freedoms of men and security of nations ; while they promise to establish a world in which every human being would enjoy freedom from want or fear ; of thought and expression and worship, those ranged against them blow equally loud

their trumpets of a New Order, in which, under the leadership of a chosen people (or leader), humanity will be led to material happiness, in a regime of authoritarian dictatorship and disciplined advance. In that conception of human destiny, what mankind has accepted so far as the marks of human progress, and cherished as the aim of life, seem to be utterly reversed. Progress is made backwards, into a complete surrender of human liberty, of freedom of thought, of conscience or action, to aggrandise a group, to enthrone a party, to exalt a race of the chosen and the lordly, in the vain belief of strengthening and advancing a people, so that, under its guidance or leadership, mankind may the more easily realise its destiny.

No one has defined that destiny,—perhaps because no one knows or understands the mystery of human end, or social evolution. The superficial marks, the visible symbols, however, of this evolution include the dignity of human beings, and the security of their organised units called nations. It means man's freedom from want and suffering, and emancipation from bondage of the soul or the body, social or economic, to any one else. It means, likewise, the security of man's organised groups, called nations, from wanton aggression by neighbours; and callous destruction of all that they may have so patiently, laboriously, lovingly built up. All this is, of course, of the earth, earthly; material, and evanescent. But we know only the material sphere; and can deal at all satisfactorily with the tasks of our age.

It is fruitless to go into the details of these common delusions. Those who seek to dispel them, however, do nothing concrete, to put into effect their own opposing ideals. Apart from uttering high-sounding platitudes, which rarely impress and never deceive, they carry on the same old system of greed and domination and exploitation of the weak by the strong. Catchwords of national security and individual freedom sound in their mouth but a sad travesty and a cruel mockery to those they dominate and exploit. Except high-sounding phrases, there is nothing to show they are earnest in their resolve to lay the foundations of a New World of freedom and security, of abiding peace and universal prosperity; to provide a new organisation, designed and suited to achieve and maintain those ideals; to introduce a new motive for human action for co-operation instead of competition.

No doubt the most urgent concern of the moment is to win the

war against the forces of reaction. All who stand for human liberty, equality and fraternity, must co-operate in this common cause. But the people who have had bitter experience of the professions of those in power and privilege never corresponding to practice, when the moment of emergency is ended, must be excused if they feel sceptic even on the present occasion, and decline to trust again to the word—bare word—of these habitual hypocrites and determined deceivers.

This is not, indeed, the first war, with all the suffering, damage and destruction it involves, in the history of man. But at no time in the recorded history of man was the area under war so large, the scale of hostilities so vast, the degree of human suffering so immense, the volume of damage and destruction so heavy and so widespread. A new word has had to be invented to express the nature and scope of this struggle,—a Totalitarian War. More serious even than the material damage or human suffering is the likelihood of far-flung repercussions into the future, impeding every attempt at reconstruction and rehabilitation, which can scarcely be imagined to-day, and much less provided for. The march of progress, the growth of material prosperity, the attainment of human equality, is definitely interrupted. The mere task of restoring the pre-war norm promises to occupy the utmost energy and productive resources of the most advanced countries for years to come. The resumption of the forward march will have to wait. But the foundations of enduring peace and human harmony, to ensure and facilitate normal intercourse between the several peoples of the world, must be laid at the time when the war has finally ended. Mere platitudes will be of no avail, however impressive they may be for the moment, to silence or mislead the masses, without whose support no wars can be waged.

For this very exigencies of the totalitarian war, public consciousness has had to be aroused to an unprecedented degree. The masses will not remain for ever drugged and deluded. All belligerent nations and their friends, allies, as well as neutrals, have had to mobilise the entire man-power of their several countries; as well as materials, to carry on the struggle energetically, or meet its demands for food, munitions, or equipment. When actual hostilities have ended, after years of carnage, suffering, and destruction, these individuals, with their direct personal experience of the futility of War, the loss or waste it involves to the victor as well as the vanquished, will have to

be brought back and reabsorbed in normal occupations. In these old occupations when resumed, their experience of the last few years, their chastened spirit and altered outlook cannot be altogether of no avail. If their leaders during the struggle have deceived them or betrayed them thereafter ; if they come to realise the falsehood of the assurances given them ; if they see no signs of the promised new world building, they will turn upon those leaders with a fury and determination the experience of the earlier wars provide no precedent for.

Given the modern means of inculcating ideas, and the modern technique of propaganda ; given an unlimited command over the public press and other organs for popular information and education ; given also the supreme control over public education, its basic ideals, its actual ministers, and its institutions, it may be, indeed, possible to mould public opinion, train and direct it, to a degree inconceivable in any earlier era of our present-day civilisation. The Nazis displayed their eminence in this art to a degree envied by all their enemies and contemporaries. No doubt, a part of the Fascist ascendancy in creating, directing, and controlling public opinion, in their own countries at least, was due to their power to suppress any divergence of views unacceptable to their leaders, and exclude outside influences in these fields by a rigorous censorship. But even granting their temporary success, achieved locally, the very history of the Nazi ideology, the decline and fall of Fascism, must warn the still surviving elements of imperialism against the dangers of trying to fool all people for all time. War has emphasised the need for collaboration with others,—friends or neighbours,—even as fully as Peace had demonstrated the need for co-operation, in the material as well as the cultural spheres, among the nations of mankind. With that lesson driven home by innumerable experiences and contacts of six war years in the citizen's mind, it will be impossible for popular leaders for ever to persist in their traditional ways ; for ever to dominate the mass mind, and lead it in directions which have been proved to be as futile as they were ruinous.

The forces which fought this second armageddon to a decisive end, it must be remembered, have been compulsory conscripts in most cases. They were made up of the average citizen, man as well as woman. Even if when the war is ended they are disarmed and disbanded, they will remember the tactics of underground movements ; and

life of pain, want, and sorrow.

Nothing, even like the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, for instance,—crystallising the ideals for which certain peoples professed to be fighting,—has been officially, authoritatively, categorically laid down on either side. Every country, or rather its leaders, seem to be waiting on events, to take the line most suitable for its own aims, according as the present struggle ends. However much one may dress it up for consumption by the masses, this is a policy of sheer opportunism; and bespeaks very little forethought, or desire to dig out the evil by its roots. One side speaks of the "New Order of Things". But, by that, it means only that one Imperialism will be replaced by another, probably more exacting and ruthless than the former. In the regrouping of the world, rehabilitation of its inhabitants, and reutilisation of its resources, the principle of exploitation and domination of the weak by the strong, of the peaceful by the aggressive, of the civilised by the savage hoardes of unreasoning reactionaries, still continue unabated. New taboos of blood or race may be super-imposed upon the existing advantage of privilege or exclusiveness, to provide a new name, a new facade, for the same old exploitive imperialism, in favour of one group as against another.

On the other side, the opponents of these self-styled champions of New Order claim to be fighting for Freedom, for Democracy, and Security,—both national and individual. But these are just words, not concretised into a single actual measure adopted and put into effect. Their critics cannot but scoff at such professions, and point to their record in their own day of power to demolish these imposing pretensions. The victims of their continuing exploitation and domination are justly sceptic and unconvinced of the reality of the promises. Even the neutrals, or those not directly concerned, are left cold and doubtful, as they see no evidence to justify the claims the fighters for democracy, for freedom, equality and security make.

It is unnecessary, at this stage, to analyse in fuller detail the forms and implications of these opposing professions or ideologies. Let us consider the actual position with reference particularly to the latter claims. In stark, sober reality, countries like our own, with unbroken experience of foreign domination and exploitation stretching over a century; of promises belied and professions denied, of wanton deception and bitter disillusionment, cannot but regard these claims as high-

class hypocrisy and sanctimonious humbug, showing the cloven foot of plutocracy, and every clear sign of unrepetant imperialism, which the modern type of democracy is unable to prevent even in countries where it directly operates.

It may be recognised, in passing, without any inconsistency with the main thesis, that Democracy, in the pure sense of the word, is incompatible with Empire in actual operation. The two are fundamentally poles apart. If the essence of democracy is truly summarised in Lincoln's immortal description: "Government of the *people*, by the *people*, for the *people*," the rule of one people over another is a clear negation of the very idea.

It is not the aim of these pages to obscure the shortcomings of democracy on an empire scale; nor deny its advantages where it actually functions. In the nature of things, and under the circumstances of our time, however, functioning democracy can only be delegated authority. Originally designed to operate on a municipal scale, the device of a responsible executive,—responsible, that is, to the chosen representatives of the people,—has made it possible on a national scale. Real, active, functioning democracy can only work on a village, or town scale. On a national scale, if it works at all, it must be by decentralisation and devolution. On an imperial scale, it is impossible.

But while willing to concede that experience like ours in the last 100 years may be evidence for the unworkability of democracy on an Empire scale, the only chance for modern civilisation to advance, and achieve a decent degree of material happiness lies in the universal acceptance of social as well as economic equality, of personal freedom and national integrity, of world peace and international co-operation, which are the distinguishing features of universal democracy.

There are, it must be added, definite limits to freedom, or personal liberty, for exercise in everyday life and work. Every step onward in the process of civilisation, as the term is commonly understood, must mean a corresponding restriction upon personal freedom, if it means freedom to act under the impulse of the moment, without any thought of the reaction, or recognition of the equal rights and freedom of others living in the same society. The process of civilisation consists in the gradual redemption of the undisciplined individualist or anarchic savage, into a disciplined citizen, living and working in a co-operative society for more speedily, more effectively, more abun-

dantly attaining the common ends. The savage is the embodiment of unrestrained impulse ; unregulated by any sense of responsibility. He has no conception of the reaction of his impulsive action upon the equal rights of others. The civilised man must necessarily control his impulse to live and work in co-operation with his fellow members of the same society, and so discipline himself to act in conformity with such knowledge, understanding and acceptance of the equal rights of others. Such knowledge teaches man a full realisation of his own utter helplessness without the willing co-operation of his peers. And that co-operation will not be forthcoming without the individual deliberately restraining himself to give more effective co-operation. The savage stands for ceaseless war with his fellows and neighbours, recognising no other law but the law of the jungle ; the civilised man needs peace and collaboration in the endless variety and infinite complexity of the tasks before him to meet his own increasing wants. The savage lives in competition ; the civilised lives in co-operation, without which there is no peace nor plenty.

The very fact of living in organised society thus means considerable limitation of individual freedom, at least in action. Super-imposed upon that are the nature and technique of modern Industrialisation, which requires close and constant co-operation amongst all workers, all producers and consumers ; all peoples engaged in the same or connected tasks, whether living near or far from one another. This indispensable condition of modern life must make still further inroads upon individual liberty, as understood by the savage, or demanded by those who negate the very existence of organised society, and its embodiment, the State. With the progress of enlightenment, and the growing experience of working co-operation, the time may, indeed, come, when, with the fullest possible development of every individual's intelligence, and the ascendancy of reason over prejudice or superstition, each individual will become conscious, not only of his own rights, but equally be aware of his limitations ; and so accept the corresponding or concomitant obligations. At that moment, we may dispense with the need of an imposing or controlling authority from outside, which is to-day represented by the organised might of society, embodied in its Government and the forces at its disposal. But until such time comes, it would be absurd not to recognise the intrinsic limitations on individual liberty, or working democracy ; and the consequent need

for inevitable restriction on personal freedom which the mere fact of living in organised society and co-operative civilisation involves.

Leaving aside, for the moment, the possibility in actual every-day life of the democratic order and social equality, let us note that, between these two warring groups with opposed ideologies are whole continents of vast masses of people relatively unconcerned with these differences. I am not referring to European neutrals, who cannot help being influenced by the acts or thought of their immediate neighbours. I speak rather of those millions upon millions of indigenous populations in Asia, Africa or Australasia, who are not directly or immediately affected by the war. Nevertheless, the War has made them no less insecure, anxious and apprehensive for the future, in proportion as the consciousness of their rights and possibilities deepens. They, moreover, have resources and potentialities to contribute to the well-being of mankind in general, which, in the struggle of rival imperialisms, are scarcely appreciated by even the most advanced thinkers on the face of the globe.

The fact, moreover, is undeniable that, whereas in many countries to-day there is a density of population, running into hundreds of individuals per square mile, with the consequent reduction in their standard of living, which demands some relief. For, notwithstanding all their toil and ingenuity, this heavy density cannot find support and maintenance, on any decent standard of living, from their own resources. The devices practised in the more advanced countries for a deliberate limitation of families are either too costly to be accessible to all, or too complicated to be safely practicable. Such vogue, therefore, as these methods have obtained only results in a redistribution of the age groups in the population. The same advance in science, which has devised these methods, has also led to improvements in public health, that has added materially to the average span of life. Fewer births are thus more than counterbalanced by greater survival and longer duration of life.

The pressure of population thus remains undiminished on available resources. The countries so affected seek additional means of support for their surplus population. When no such additional means are found, they claim they are driven to acts of aggression upon their neighbours as a way out of their difficulty. There are still available vast spaces of land, almost uninhabited; or with a density of popula-

tion of one per square mile or less. In Africa, South America, Australia and the islands of the Pacific, vast territories are available with untold resources, on the surface, underground, and in the waters around them, which could provide, even with our present knowledge and equipment, for the entire population of the world, a standard of living that may well compare with the best available to-day in any country. But these are all already appropriated, or claimed to be exclusively possessed. The rights of property are interpreted not only to authorise the present holders to develop the resources and potentialities of these regions for their own benefit; but also to prevent others from doing even if they themselves cannot or would not develop them with their own labour. The people now occupying these regions are either European immigrants or their descendants. Being accustomed to the climate and conditions of the temperate zone, and these regions being mostly in the torrid zone, they are themselves too few in numbers, and too unsuited to their environment, by their own efforts to develop to the maximum the land and resources monopolised by them. The necessary relief, therefore, could only be attained if the whole of the world and all its component parts join in a truly co-operative manner, recognise the primary obligation of all for each, and accept every device to develop all available resources with suitable labour and adequate equipment.

While hostilities continue, however, not only the relatively more advanced countries and better equipped sections of humanity are unable to divert their energies to a sane, rational, equitable and agreed plan for the development of these relatively backward regions, however hardpressed they may be at home. They are also driven to deny implicitly the right of these people to that full degree of development, which may not only lead to the enrichment of these peoples themselves, but also make a handsome surplus to contribute to the welfare of the rest of the world. It may be that they are lacking in what is commonly called capital resources, technical skill and experience, or the necessary manpower suited to the climatic conditions of these regions in a full measure. All that deficiency can be easily cured by a willing co-operation from the more advanced communities. Capital equipment can be provided on credit; technical skill and experience obtained on specific contracts for definite terms; the necessary and suitable manpower can be secured by facilitating free movement of

human beings from any one part to any other over the face of the earth ; with the right of permanent settlement if they find it agreeable to do so.

This is, no doubt, included in the so-called Atlantic Charter, and implied in the Four Freedoms proclaimed by President Roosevelt ; but it has yet to be translated into real fact that many, who have bitter experience of the past, believe will never come to pass. No wonder then that the relatively backward regions and exploited people are doubtful of the intentions of the more advanced and powerful countries now engaged in a life and death struggle of rival imperialisms, and of their desire to help them, once the hostilities are over. They actually apprehend obstruction, if not a new form of exploitation, against which they would safeguard themselves.

From the material as well as cultural, from the economic as well as the political, point of view, it is evident, therefore, that in this war the stakes are not merely the respective self-love of the leaders, or the immediate ambitions of the belligerents. The fate of humanity at large and its unborn generations is also involved. The future of our present-day civilisation is also at stake. When the War is over, the problem will not be to patch up some sort of a makeshift settlement of conflicting interests. That would only mean a further interlude, a breathing space for another war, as many have already begun to apprehend. If no arrangement is made to deal with the cause of war from their very roots, and to refashion an entirely new social and political system for the world as a whole, which will ensure against their reappearance at any time, the loss, damage, destruction and suffering of this war would have been in vain.

It may seem vain and incongruous for one in this country,—which has hardly any say even in shaping its own affairs,—to raise his voice in regard to the remoulding of the social system all over the world ; its redirection and remotivation towards a goal of world co-operation, human harmony, and material well-being, which to-day receives no more than lip sympathy. For all practical purposes of international relations and policies, India is a mere appendage of Britain, with effective voice not equal to the least of these self-governing Dominions. She is, for the moment, also deprived of such constitutional government, as would enable her officially to mobilise and authoritatively to express her national sentiment on the subject, for

whatever it is worth.* Ever since the outbreak of the War, constitutional government has been suspended, local Legislatures disbanded, and the leaders cast into prison, in a majority of the Indian Provinces aggregating more than two-thirds of the area and three-fourths of the population and wealth of British India. A deadly impasse stagnates all thought. A series of war-born ordinances and censorship render futile any attempt to express such free thought as exists. The Defence of India Rules make freedom of speech or expression of thought no more than a name. And so, even such leaders of thought or spokesmen of the people, as may be at liberty to express their views on this subject, and offer constructive suggestions, are heavily handicapped in making any contribution to the problems of world peace and reconstruction.

Insignificant, however, as the voice of an Indian may be on such topics, it is the simple human duty of everyone who can think on such matters, understand their implications, and realise their possibilities, to put forward what he conceives to be the right line of approach. For it is not so much the status and importance one enjoys, as the obligation one feels towards humanity at large and its unborn generations, that compels utterance on such matters. Passion and prejudice and a tangled web of misunderstanding have created such a conspiracy of distortion and exaggeration, as can only lead to a perpetuation of the hates and jealousies engendered by the War. Ours, moreover, is a position and experience, which makes us see and feel much that more happily situated people can never realise. We in India have, therefore, a claim as well as a call, a duty as well as justification, to raise our voice on the side of social justice, political freedom, and economic opportunity which must not be ignored.

There is another reason, also, why those who can see the rocks ahead better than those engaged in driving the vessel should point their finger to the dangers looming on the horizon. Unless we desire to be caught unprepared for peace, as many were caught unprepared for war, it is time that some definite programme of post-war settlement and world reconstruction were thought out and laid down. Declarations of guiding principles have, no doubt, been made; and

* While these pages were going through the press, a vigorous attempt was being made by Lord Wavell to bring about a National Government in India, at least for the duration of the war; but it has failed.

even outlines drawn up, as at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. But it is not sufficient to put forward any programme from the angle of vision only of those who have brought about this war, and are actively engaged in hostilities. They may be blinded by the passions of the moment, their judgment clouded by prejudice, their reasoning warped by suffering. It is necessary to understand the viewpoint of those who have suffered the consequences of imperialist wars, and are likely to suffer still more if their viewpoint is not even expressed. Even if such contribution as we can offer leads to no material benefit of any kind to this country or to humanity at large, we should at least have the satisfaction of having unburdened our conscience, and voiced the sentiments of those situated like ourselves, with longings, resources, and possibilities, that would effectively promote the welfare of mankind.

For the moment, however, by the domineering might of more aggressive powers, these suppressed millions remain unexpressed, their resources unexplored, their possibilities unrealised. The world as a whole remains the poorer for want of a contribution from those who know exactly where the shoe pinches. Ours is, for the time, being a thankless role; to fight battles in wars not of our seeking; to shed our blood and spend our treasure for aims we do not know; to help to gain victory from which we can expect no material gain, no compensation even for the loss we have suffered, the sacrifices we have made; and never to voice our sentiment through our own chosen representatives in the councils that would end the struggle and bring back peace. In spite of all this, we raise our voice in justice to ourselves, and in the hope that the cause of true civilisation and human welfare would be the better by a timely expression of sentiment from those situated like us, and feeling the oppression and injustice that has characterised European Imperialism in Asia, Africa, Australia, for over two hundred years.

Needless to add, that while expressing the viewpoint of the oppressed and the exploited, no claim is made of finality for the suggestions made in these pages for the radical reconstruction of the social system, and redirection of the line of progress for humanity. All that is attempted is a mere outline, not the actual picture, a general pattern, not the specific ingredients of the peace that we, and those situated like us, would desire after so much blood and material have been spent.

Speaking particularly from this platform, and on the occasion of the Centenary of a Faith whose Prophet seems to have foreseen and foretold this armageddon, and placed the peace of the world, social justice, and equality amongst men in the forefront of his programme for reconstruction, no further apology or explanation is needed. In the sections that follow, I shall analyse the root causes of all wars, and explain the general characteristics of the Foundations of Peace that is to last for ever and embrace all mankind; examine the most important statements regarding these foundations made by allied leaders in the Atlantic Charter, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Yalta meeting, and at San Francisco. While considering these, full indication will be offered of the modification or alteration, needed, in the writer's view, before each point could become acceptable from the standpoint of lasting peace. Lastly a summary picture will be added of the Post-War World,—and of India in that world,—if the ideals or objectives here set out are accepted and acted upon.

Chapter II

ROOTS OF WAR

In these pages we are concerned with the Foundations of Peace. That peace must not only end the present struggle, but also secure the abiding harmony of human society, and the indispensable conditions precedent for all-round co-operation to bring about a freer world and a fuller life.

The former is indeed much more attractive, and of more immediate value, absorbing almost entirely the attention of the leaders and spokesmen everywhere. But so long as the very basis on which Peace, which would come at the end of this war, is not carefully thought out and soundly laid; so long, that is, as the foundations are not rooted in

all-round justice, equality and security ; so long as the fullest opportunity is not provided to every country, and to every individual therein, to realise to the utmost the purpose of its being and the end of living, the Peace that we have striven for will only be a passing phenomenon, an interlude between wars, calculated only to provide breathing space, and intended to give better jumping-off ground to the more designing and the ambitious for fresh aggression, exploitation and domination.

Even, therefore, if the task of considering and securing the basic foundations of the Brave New World may be rather vague and generic ; even if it lacks the spur of particular interest in a society dominated by power politics and motivated throughout by the desire for personal profit, it is of no less importance, interest, or concern, to whosoever can think beyond the immediate interest of the moment. Unless and until a long-range analytical view is taken, both of the past which has led us into two such bloody wars in the space of a generation, involving practically the whole civilised world, and of the requirements of the coming age, we shall be unable to shape the future right, and make it of any real benefit to us whether as individuals, or as mankind as a whole. We must have courage to probe into the past, and deal with its mischief ; understanding of the needs of the present ; imagination to appreciate the requirements of the future. The task would be impossible without sympathy, without understanding or imagination.

If the settlement of international differences by armed forces is to end for ever, the root of all wars must be eliminated. But if we think only of the immediate problem at the end of the war,—and that too, from the standpoint of each single country affected by it ; if our gaze is riveted only on the specific demands of each component unit of the world, we would be sure to overlook the root causes of wars, and so misconceive the needs and requirements of World Peace as a whole, without which there can be no hope of ever putting an end to armed force as a solvent for international disputes.

The root causes of conflicts lie deep in the entire socio-political system of the world,—outside, perhaps, modern Russia. Individualist society, motivated by the desire for personal profit, is saturated with the seeds of such conflict born of competition. It would be out of place here to give a full analysis of these ultimate causes of war. But such as they are, they will have to be avoided and eliminated as much as possible, if a solid foundation is to be laid for lasting peace. The

moment, however, such a proposition is stated, one becomes aware that it sounds like the most factuous of platitudes, against which one could not be warned too often, or too strongly. And yet it is not quite so vapid and barren as might be imagined. Certain definite factors can be discovered and located as responsible for the prevailing malaise, constituting the real roots of international differences. Given the real will to mend, these can be easily isolated, analysed, resolved into their constituent elements, and remedied.

The causes of any war,—and, certainly, of a war on the present scale,—are necessarily many and complex. They are so interwoven with one another, that isolation and treatment of each one, separately by itself, is practically impossible and futile. Nevertheless if one searches deep down into the fundamentals, analysing the complex factors into their constituent elements, it would not be absolutely impossible to understand their origin and nature. Once that is grasped, it would not be difficult to provide specific and effective remedies.

What is necessary, however, as an indispensable preliminary is the desire to end these causes, and remove their roots. Those countries of the world, which are already in a position advantageous to themselves by their domination of others; and because of the opportunity such domination provides them for exploitation of those others, are not ready and willing really to forego such domination, whatever their verbal professions of the moment may be. Within each country, again, there are some classes exploiting others of the same country who would continue to be disaffected, while the inequality of life and opportunity would remain to handicap them. The goodwill needed to eliminate the root causes of the war is thus not merely the conviction for international peace, but also for internal equality in each country, so that the political equality among nations and social justice among individuals may be truly assured. For then only will the age-old conflict between the "haves" and the "have-nots" end.

Subject to this, let us then consider the causes of war. They may be divided into two main groups, the immediate and specific reasons that precipitate hostilities in any given case; and the long-range, ultimate, inherent divergence of interests or ambitions which slowly but steadily lead to it.

The immediate causes are often little better than mere excuses, only a superficial expression of the more intrinsic conflict. They are

only handy pretexts to give vent to deep-seated and long-standing differences, which may not bear expression with diplomatic decorum; but which are none-the-less the root of the trouble. The cleavage of interests may be shared by several countries as mutually opposed groups; or may be an outcome of divergent individual ambitions or interests. In the past individual ambition, like that of Napoleon, or dynastic plans like that of Louis XIV, accounted for perpetual conflict. In recent history, on the other hand, the tendency is crystallising for groups of countries to ally themselves against other groups, because of some basic difference in interests. Even Napoleon could not have sustained a twenty years' struggle, had it not been that he was the spokesman and representative of a growing cleavage of interests between insular England, rapidly mechanised and industrialised, and continental France, still remaining predominantly agricultural, with great possibilities for industrialisation, even though revolutionary in sentiment and professions.

As, however, the process of industrialisation, and the possibilities of economic exploitation through industry of class by class, within one's own country, or by more developed countries of much more backward ones, began to be perceived, the force of individual ambition receded into the background; or was useful only as embodying the basic conflict. This was true as between Britain and Spain in the sixteenth century, between Britain and France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and between Britain and Germany in the last two or three generations, whether the expression to it is given by a Philip II, a Louis XIV or Napoleon, or Wilhelm von Hohenzollern, Deutscher Kaiser, or Schiklegruber, named Adolf Hitler, Der Reichs-Fuhrer. These differences are beginning to make themselves manifest on a much wider scale between the East and the West, Europe and Asia; and unless adequate measures are taken in good time, they would precipitate yet another World War, with Russia on the one hand and the individualist States of Europe and America on the other.

Just as individual ambitions serve only to embody and concretise the more material divergences between nations, so differences in ideologies serve the same purpose. Differences in Ideologies are the outcome of the differing conditions or circumstances of different countries. They are the *creatures*, not the authors, of the cleavage. The

slogans which summarise them, are but name plates of the parent stream. Like individuals hypnotised by their own professions, ideologies are worked up to spell-bind great nations in grandiloquent phrases, making an imposing facade to an empty building. If only we had the humour to perceive it, they are essentially no more than a comic relief, where material antagonism that cannot be expressed in their true colours may be summed up and popularised without too obvious an offence.

Being essentially mere pretexts, the immediate causes of wars are often lost sight of, especially if a war lasts for any length of time. In the course of the struggle itself are created new circumstances, and released new forces; that completely alter the complexion of the original or immediate causes. In the course of the struggle and because of its intensity, people forget the precise excuse that precipitated the conflict, the root cause of which was present all the time in the background. In the last war, for instance, Britain professed to have gone into it because of the violation of Belgian Neutrality by Germany, which had been guaranteed by her equally with Germany and other nations. France got into the same struggle, because her ally, Russia, in the East was threatened by the combined might of Germany and Austria. Russia was threatened by these two, because she was reported to be supporting and encouraging the disaffected Slavic elements in Austrian dominions, particularly, the Serbs, amongst whom the heir to the Austrian throne had been assassinated.

At the end of that war, however, very few people in any country remembered the original causes; and little thought was shown to treat it specifically by the powers that had commenced the war. Austria, which had fired the first shot, was no more the Austria of the Imperial Hapsburgs. All her conglomerate of dominions had fallen apart, and kept apart, after the war had ended. Russia, which had taken up the challenge, was out of the war long before the general close of the struggle, because of a revolution within her own borders. Her Tsarist regime, whose ambitions to act as the protector of all Slavic peoples had led to the struggle, had decayed and been destroyed. France and Britain, united upto the end of the struggle, began to diverge even before the Peace Conference had completed its task. They differed apparently on the treatment to be given to beaten Germany and her satellites; the Reparations to be exacted; the territorial readjustments

to be made. In reality, however, their divergence was much deeper, being rooted in the position each wanted to occupy in the Continent of Europe as against Germany; and the fruits of victory each regarded as her own exclusive right. To France, Germany was a bug-bear because of her menace to the continental domination of France; the wedge it made between France and her feudatories; the barrier it formed between France and her ally, Russia. To Britain, on the other hand, Germany had been a political obstacle, an economic rival and a danger, because of its economic threat to Britain's world domination and exploitation. But once Germany was beaten, her navy surrendered or sunk, and her industry undermined, she ceased to be a danger to Britain; and even appeared to be a necessary counterpoise to France as well as Russia, an unwritten guarantee of her own continued lease of Imperialism in Asia or Africa.

The neutrality of Belgium was maintained after the War. But the aims of Britain, as crystallised in the terms of the Versailles Treaty, could hardly be said to be confined to that objective. The Reparations demanded by France were deemed in Britain to be as impossible to pay as fruitful of future troubles. And the demand Britain herself made in respect of war debts upon her allies like France appeared to the latter only a mask to maintain Britain's economic hold upon France, and a consequent continued subordination which the latter naturally deeply resented. The course of events upto 1939 bore out the worst apprehensions of each, and may be even said to have been the rock-bottom cause of France's collapse in 1940. Failing, as she thought, to find a loyal ally in Britain; and always dreading the German danger to her frontiers, France sought new allies farther afield, and gave a tenure to her foreign policy, which only accentuated the divergence.

America was supposed to have joined World War I, because of the indiscriminate sinking of merchant ships under the policy of unrestricted submarinism adopted by Germany as part of her grand strategy in that war. But the peace aims, formulated by the then American President, and embodied in his celebrated Fourteen Points, had little bearing upon the immediate cause of America's war upon Germany and Austria. The America of Wilson, moreover, seemed to be relatively more idealistic than the America of Roosevelt, where materialistic considerations have no less a bearing than idealistic.

When every allowance is made, however, for the changed conditions, the United States even to-day seems much more idealistic and less inclined to imperialistic adventures, than the materialistic cynicism rampant in European countries.

In the present War, history seems to repeat itself. Under different names Britain professes to have joined the War to maintain democratic freedoms, enforce sanctity of treaties, and, immediately, to protect the integrity and independence of Poland, which seems to be already sacrificed if the Yalta decisions and later developments following upon them have any meaning. Poland was not a democracy, by any stretch of imagination; she had flirted with the Nazis, and joined with them in sharing the spoils in Czechoslovakia, almost as much as Italy, or Hungary. She had never liked Russia and been the first to sign a Non-Aggression Pact with Hitler in 1934. It was only when her rulers realised the true nature of Nazi ambitions, that she thought of retracing her steps; and sought Franco-British support in her stand against Hitler, which Chamberlain and Daladier were anxious to extend in 1939 for the same reasons. And as for the sanctity of treaties, ever since Britain had winked at Japan's aggression upon China in 1931, and suffered the Nazis to denounce unilaterally the Versailles Treaty, she had no clean hands of her own to come into any court of international equity, and demand respect for treaties which she had done so little in her plenitude of post-war power to have respected. And this is besides the fact that she had followed Poland in 1935, in signing a treaty with Hitler limiting the naval armament of Germany at 40 per cent. of the British, behind the back of France. No wonder French leaders in the tragic days of 1940 could not trust all the pledges Mr. Churchill offered to continue the fight against Hitler from the Provinces, the beaches, or the Colonies.

The deeper cleavage between Nazis and the British or the French, and still deeper between the Communist Russia and the capitalist democracies of the West, are not stressed except as mere names; and may even be obscured because of the present alliance. But they are nonetheless present there, and may become new causes of conflict that can only be born when the Peace Conference is eventually at work.

In France, the growing divergence with Britain had weakened the always slender bonds with Britain forged in 1914-18; and had added to the distrust, for which some French leaders thought a remedy might

be found in a closer co-operation with continental neighbour, Germany. The immediate cause of France's entering the War was, of course, identical with Britain's—the protection of Polish integrity and neutrality. But that was no more the real cause of war with that country than with Britain. The continental rivalry between France and Germany dated from the days of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, if not from those of the Thirty Years' War. Britain had shifted sides more than once. But after the fall of the Napoleonic Terror, the two neighbours across the channel had been drawing gradually closer, culminating in the alliance of World War I. The Russian Revolution, and the rise of the Soviet Union, had created disturbances in the French Foreign Policy, which could have been neutralised, had France trusted fully her ally across the Channel. But the Imperialistic ambitions of the two countries could not always be reconciled; and the experience of the twenty years following the Peace of Versailles were anything but encouraging for France. With Russia neutralised by a timely truce with Germany in 1939, France, however, had no alternative but to cast in her lot with the British. But the unreliability of the partnership was demonstrated at the first acid test applied; and the close union of a generation was wrecked and destroyed when the Nazi hordes marched irresistibly through France in the early spring of 1940. Metropolitan France surrendered, and tried to salvage what little remained of the empire and the country from Nazi domination. The Free French under De Gaulle continued the struggle with British aid and support, till at last the country was liberated. But the War aims of France, viewed in correlation with the causes that led to it, are as mixed up as those of Britain; and perhaps no less conflicting with Britain's than was the case before.

For the United States, also, the War is not exclusively a struggle to vindicate the sanctity of treaties, to maintain the integrity and independence of smaller nations, or uphold the principles of democratic freedom. The danger to America's own independence in a world dominated by Hitler madness was growing everyday since the Nazi capture of power in Germany. The collapse of France made the doubts into certainty, especially when Britain, fighting alone against Germany, was coming to the end of her resources, in men as well as materials. It was a matter of the United States' own existence, which has really brought that country into this War, though, it must be

added, the respect for personal freedom and national integrity of countries is much greater and more genuine in America than in Europe. The War aims of Roosevelt, therefore, breathe a much deeper and truer note of idealism than those of any other country proclaiming those objectives.

Leaving aside these immediate causes, or pretexts, of war, let us consider the fundamental position. In the root causes of war, considered in the aggregate, economic factors stand in the forefront. Tradition has made us look upon political issues as much more important than any other. But the ultimate foundations for even political issues lies in economic facts. They are, therefore, the real motive springs for all international jealousies nowadays culminating in war. Suggestion is often made in certain quarters of keeping politics apart from economics. That, however, is an expression of ignorance or self-interest, which no one conversant with the problems that now demand solution can for a moment endorse. Economics is not an abstract science, like mathematics, whose laws are valid and absolute under all circumstances. It is really the dynamics of politics, or politics in action. It permeates through and through all problems of political relations between nations, as well as between individuals within the same nation, as it provides the motive spring of individual as well as organised action. The motives for collective human action become more complex as civilisation advances, and relations between human groups become more involved. Nevertheless, in the ultimate analysis, the causes of all such conflict are and can be traced to economic factors. They may not be visible on the surface, being clouded over by emotional miasma. But they undoubtedly constitute the root causes of war, and their eradication must be regarded as the surest foundation of abiding peace.

This is not to say that the political aspect of economic factors must be ignored. In fact, in the pages that follow, every endeavour is made to deal with both of these, though necessarily in a brief manner. Those, however, who would like to go deeper into the roots, or would like to trace more closely the inter-connections and mutual reactions of political and economic factors upon one another, must study more closely and analytically the history of mankind, particularly in the last two centuries, as it has shaped itself under the urge of Imperialist industrialism, and industrialist Imperialism.

It would be trite, but true, to say that the removal of these root causes would make the best Foundations of Peace. At this stage it would be profitable to add a few words as to what is meant by Peace in these pages. It is not armed neutrality, nor an interlude between two wars. Peace is something much more positive and constructive. By Peace is meant, not only the cessation of hostilities, and the resumption of pre-war international intercourse,—commercial as well as cultural,—on such terms as the successful party in the struggle might impose. Peace, real and abiding, in essence as well as in name, in substance as well as in form, is a condition of human society, wherein all parts are in harmony with one another, and in willing, ready, and constant co-operation for mutual good. Without a complete, unconditional, unreserved renunciation, by the free consent of each and all concerned, of any recourse to violence for settling international differences; without adequate, efficient machinery to settle such differences amicably should they ever arise; without effective arrangements for constant co-operation, there can never be real, abiding, universal peace.

Such a Peace is not yet in sight. The terms imposed by the Allies on Germany, unconditionally surrendered, do not make such peace. There is, indeed, no claim that this is peace. The War is still on with Japan, the last remaining partner in the Axis firm; and until Japan has surrendered equally unconditionally,—as may shortly be the case,—there can be no thought of such permanent and real peace.

Absolute and unconditional surrender of the armed might of Fascist reaction may be a military necessity, unavoidable to insist upon, under the circumstances. The complete destruction of the German General Staff is equally intelligible and excusable. But if the sentiment dictating such a demand continues to influence the final deliberations of the Peace Conference; if the policy of *Vae Victis* is to be adopted and rigorously enforced upon the present-day enemies, there can be no hope of a real peace coming in our time. There may be a dictated peace, as the phrase goes, in which the guiding principles will be rather Woe to the Vanquished, his spoliation and denudation to the last degree, if not total extermination, than due consideration of humanity at large.

The moment is, indeed, not ripe for any calm or dispassionate thought on the subject. Nor will any plea for justice or generosity be heard by the victors who have suffered so heavily, and intoxicated so deeply by victory. But that does not exonerate us,—somewhat in the

position of an unconcerned observer,—from giving a careful thought to the problem, setting aside all thoughts of vengeance, which can only perpetuate hatred.

If we consider the matter dispassionately as unconcerned observers, we shall find that none among the warring nations is free from blame for having, directly or indirectly, brought about the War. It will not do for those who live in glass houses to throw stones at others, even though for the moment they may have changed their places. If genuine peace and real harmony as well as willing co-operation are to be established all over the world, the leaders of mankind,—and particularly of the victorious allies,—must rise above the passions and prejudices of war-time; try to forget the past, however unforgettable; endeavour to forgive, if not the actual criminals, at least their entire nation charged with the guilt of the latest trespass; and gather together, with a real desire to pull out and destroy the very roots which have bred this poison, and plant a new social system which would seek the common good of all in a co-operative society for the future.

As already stated above, no declarations of war aims have been made on either side during this War. There have, no doubt, been platitudes galore. But declarations like the Four Freedoms proclaimed by President Roosevelt; or the Atlantic Charter promulgated by him in conjunction with the British Prime Minister, have no definite, official, authoritative significance. They relate to the immediate situation, and can be of little abiding value or bearing upon the ultimate foundation and structure of peace. We shall review in some detail these and like declarations, if only because they point the direction in which the mind of practical statesmen is working. For the moment, however, it is necessary to add that, even if any such declaration has a bearing on the future world, their purpose, however, is difficult to definitise, unless and until they are translated into specific forms or rules for the guidance of international relations.

A dictated peace, dictated by the winners in the field after a decisive victory, followed by unconditional surrender of the enemy, can be temporary only. The Peace that must be made should not merely be a patch on the wild and terrible need of international harmony our generation has felt twice in its life-time. If we do not desire that this Peace that must come should prove a stop-gap between two wars, as

the peace of Versailles was ; if we do not desire the period that follows the end of hostilities to be devoted to fresh preparations for revenge, and another frenzy of mass murder and blood-bath all over the world ; if we do not want that the deep-seated roots of hostility amongst nations should continue to flourish, while only the superficial weeds or off-shoots are removed, we must see to it that the Peace, which puts an end to this war, is one which destroys all deepest roots of international hatred, antagonism, or conflict ; which leaves no cause for revenge ; which offers no occasion for the Allies and the friends of to-day to become enemies of tomorrow ; and above all, which would convert the enemy of to-day, the excluded and disinherited, the out-caste and abomination, into a close associate and willing co-operator at the earliest opportunity. No ground must be left for suspicion ; no room allowed for misgivings about any people's integrity, any person's security ; no opportunity provided for exploitation of the weak by the strong, of the backward by the advanced. The lessons of the last "Peace" and the twenty years following must not be ignored. The peace imposed at the point of the bayonet only brought out Nazism and Fascism.

The task of the peace-makers at the end of this War will be essentially similar to the last occasion. It will consist at least as much in the removal of the superficial causes, or immediate excuses for hostilities amongst the warring groups of to-day, as in the elimination of any abiding conflict of interest between Allies on either side, as also between classes within each country. Then only will the waste of blood and energy by Imperialism and the search for alien domination come to an end. Just as in the last War Britain and France were said to be the best of friends, so to-day we hear the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics are best of friends. But do they really see with one eye, work with one aim, march in one step to the common goal? Hardly was the ink dry on the signature to the document that was supposed to have ended the last war and brought about peace, the Allies in the struggle of 1914-18 began to fall out amongst themselves, notwithstanding repeated Press declarations of "complete identity of views on all points." The least observant of contemporary students could see there was no common ground after hostilities had ended between the Allies of 1914-18. There was, in fact,

much that was bound to create serious differences.

The new divergence of views or interests between the principal Allies of those days was not only along the ancient lines that had divided France and Britain for a thousand years; and made them constant enemies of each other in every century since the Conquest. There were new and fundamental differences on the treatment to Germany; the volume and technique of exacting Reparations; the place to be given to her in the League of Nations, or in the concert of Europe. France soon discovered Britain had not, nor cared for, the same ends in all these matters; and Britain repaid the compliment in kind. France's fears of Germany were continental, and so largely military and political; Britain's world-wide and directly economic. While France wanted a permanently weak Germany in dread and domination of France, Britain wanted a Germany weak only in international competition; but strong enough to provide a market for British wares. France insisted on reparation from Germany to the utmost of the damage done in France, regardless of German ability to pay; Britain talked of Germany's capacity to bear the burden.

The parting of ways between them was heralded on the question of the gold deposited during the War by the Bank of France with the Bank of England, which the British Government practically confiscated, because France would not pay her war-time debt to Britain; and which France reported she could not until Britain facilitated her exacting reparations from Germany. The gulf yawned wide at Ruhr, which France occupied to obtain reparations, and persisted all through the fateful years till Hitler came to power, rearmed Germany, re-occupied Rhineland, retook Austria, and Czecho-slovakia, and, ultimately brought on a Second World War on the flimsy excuse of Danzig and the Polish Corridor.

That history may, unless good care is taken from the start, repeat itself at the end of the present War between the Allies now achieving victory. For even to-day the very basis and motive power of social organisation in the Western Allies calling themselves Democracies, and the Eastern colossus of the U.S.S.R. are so different and mutually opposed, that far more natural divergence is evident between them, than was ever likely between Britain and France in 1919. And it is much more likely to take definite shape, as the problems of peace unfold themselves. After all, in both France and Britain, the social

foundations in 1918 were the same, as also the motive-spring of human action. In the present case, on the other hand, while the economic foundations of British and American Democracies claim to rest on free enterprise and individual initiative, spurred on by the profit motive; those in the U.S.S.R. are competely free from any such motive spring, and reject the social organisation making for class divisions, which are still characteristic of Britain, the U.S.A., France, and all continental countries, China and the Far East.

Will these fundamental differences between the leading Allies not assert themselves, when the time comes for them to sit down and reshape the world of post-war age? Apart from the gatherings of the allied chiefs to settle global strategy at Newfoundland, Washington, Teheran, Cairo, or Yalta; the several minor Conferences on specific post-war problems that have taken place since the United States jointed directly in this war—e.g. to regulate post-war exchanges, trade, aviation, or the political shape of the world—the inherent differences of outlook or interest have not been altogether suppressed. The instance of the oil-pipeline through Saudi Arabia, projected by the U.S.A. and opposed by Britain, is alone sufficient to show the many, abiding and deepseated differences that sharply divide Britain and America, even in the middle of a life-and-death struggle. They may be soft-pedalled for the time being; or put into cold storage, because of the urgent demands of the war. That does not mean, however, that these differences do not exist, or that they will not assert themselves when the moment arrives to consider these matters for ensuring abiding peace all over the world.

The question of India also is by no means unknown as a cause of difference between America and Britain. When the story of the Cripps Proposals is fully known, and the part taken by the U.S.A., in inducing His Majesty's Government fully revealed; when the report of the Grady Mission published and the correspondence between the late President Roosevelt and his personal representative, Col. Johnson, in India at the time of the Cripps Proposals see the light of day; when the intrigues and undercurrents of British diplomacy and Indian officialdom against Ambassador Phillips of the U.S.A. thoroughly exposed and fully appreciated; the rumblings of the storm already lowering on the horizon will no longer be concealed.

That this is not exaggeration by perfervid Indian imagination is

evidenced by the following. Hardly was the ink dry on the declaration made at Yalta, differences between the three Big Chiefs of the Allies, of the acutest kind, were revealed regarding the resettlement of Europe. They began with Poland, and may not end even with France. The formula of the unconditional surrender of the enemy in the field will not suffice when it comes to a final deal to Germany, the Middle East, China or the colonies. The position demanded for themselves by the Big Four—or is it the Big Three only?—at San Francisco, in connection with the proposed World Security Organisation, called forth protests and opposition which were intensified by the proposal for Trusteeship of Colonies or mandated territories in which the Big Three themselves were not *ad idem*. The Good Neighbour Policy of U.S.A. towards the other Republics of the Western Hemisphere will not easily or readily apply in Europe; as there is no one on the continent of Europe in the same position as the U.S.A. in America. And all that because of the basic economic differences between the present-day principal allies.

It has been said, and not by cynics only, that the present war itself was but the direct descendant of the Peace of Versailles. The arrangement made at Versailles and Trianon provided ground for Germany to seek revenge, and may be taken to be the direct cause of aggressive Nazism evolving. At the same time, no means were taken to keep re-awakened Germany in effective restraint, even if re-armed. The League of Nations, set up at the same time, was, in real earnest, not even a consultative body. In most cases the view of the two principal Allies prevailed in the years when their concert was not publicly broken. America kept out, from the commencement, of that body to avoid European entanglements. As the League became more and more merely a registry office of Britain and France; and as victorious France was intent upon preserving her hold upon the rest of Europe, by a policy of perpetual disarmament of Germany while she herself remained fully armed, encircling the hated Hun by feudatories indebted to France, all projects of disarmament proved abortive. France may have had genuine reason to apprehend aggression from Germany. But during the years 1919-1933, when Germany could be said to have been helpless and friendless, effective organisation for collective security failed to materialise. And when the Allies and satellites of France found Germany had a military renaissance under aggres-

sive Nazism, proposals for collective security could not become effective, as the Fascist powers were more and more easily able to sabotage any such attempt.

Hitlerism, therefore, flourished unchecked. It marched from one act of aggression to another, violating treaties and discarding pledges, till the present War became inevitable, in which the whole of Germany seemed to be united as much by the terror of the Nazi Gestapo, as by the desire for revenge, emancipation, or from the encirclement France had forged against her; or opportunity for fresh exploitation.

History seems to be repeating itself on the present occasion also, if one is to judge from the protests Poland had already registered. France herself has felt aggrieved. Just as aggressive nationalism in Germany got a hearing, a slogan, and a following from Versailles, eventually culminating in a universal blood bath, it is possible that France as well as Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Turkey, might feel themselves aggrieved by the settlements going on behind their backs as it were; and may break off or underminẽ any plan of world settlement that may be forged at the Peace Conference. The exclusion of France from the conference of the "Big Three" at Yalta could not but wound that sensitive people to the quick. And even if there was some excuse for doing so in February, when Germany had not yet unconditionally surrendered; there could be none for the same policy pursued at the Berlin Conference in July.

Apart from the proposals agreed to at Yalta, France feels apprehensive of the talks that the American President and the British Prime Minister had on their return from the Crimea Conference with the Arab peoples at Cairo, where France had reason to feel her influence was being undermined; and her Empire endangered. The storm of opposition in Syria and Lebanon that followed has done nothing to soften French Imperialism, by no means out of favour with De Gaulle.

It would be unprofitable to go into similar causes of discontent with the policies and proposals of the Big Three that the smaller powers may have. Italy may be resigned to the loss of Eritrea or Somaliland, but not of Trieste or Fiume, even if we leave out Abyssinia. Greece would desire the islands across the Aegian Sea from Bari to Cyprus, which may not equare with British imperial interests; while the Secession States, carved out of the old Austrian Empire—Yugoslavia leading—will present their own bill of revenge or reparation, which

may go against the interests of the more important allies. Suffice only to conclude that the cauldron is boiling, and the Witches' Sabbath is still not ended.

Chapter III

ATLANTIC CHAPTER—ITS STATUS

Let us now consider such of the aims and intentions of the allied leaders, hitherto declared regarding the kind of post-war world they themselves desire ; and would endeavour to establish.

There are, so far, four principal documents, of more or less authority, which may be taken to lay out the essence of the war aims, and the guiding principles of peace as desired on the allied side. These are : The Atlantic Charter ; the Four Freedoms insisted upon by President Roosevelt, the Yalta Declaration, and the Dumbarton Oaks Charter as modified at San Francisco. The San Francisco Conference, though the most spectacular and impressive was more concerned with procedural matters than with formulating a Peace Plan proper.

The Atlantic Charter was promulgated soon after Russia was attacked by Germany, in August 1941. It was issued on the authority of the President of the United States, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, but is not a treaty nor an Act of their respective Legislatures. The Charter was issued, it must also not be forgotten, when the horizon was still dark and lowering for Britain ; when victory was only a hope ; when America was still a non-belligerent, if not an absolute neutral ; and when Russia, the unexpected—perhaps also unwanted—ally was being rushed to its seeming doom in a blitzkrieg. Britain needed all the moral support it could muster from the nations of the world still not in actual war ; and so she was willing to issue any pronouncement of impressive moral I.O.U.'s that the idealism of America might demand.

It has since been questioned whether there ever was in fact any such declaration, properly signed and formally executed, even by the principal parties whose names it bears. Though the reports concerning the material existence of such a document are mutually contradictory; and though both the late President and the Prime Minister have, in one form or another, admitted its authenticity and existence, it may be questioned whether it has any value or significance of an international form, binding even on the peoples whose chief representatives are supposed to have put it forth.

Admitting and accepting the existence and authenticity of the Charter, as it is commonly known,, it may be pointed out that it is a pronouncement of two unequal authorities, with different political capacities, each in his own country, and, therefore, much more so as between the two countries. Each signatory is responsible to different parts, or in a different way, under the constitutional machine of his own country. The signature of each, even assuming it is properly appended, has different constitutional value. The binding force, consequently, of this document, even individually on the signatories themselves, is questionable, let alone their countrymen, and much less their allies or associates.

So far as the United States is concerned, the Constitution does not entitle the President, who is one of the co-authors of the Declaration, to make any such engagements; and pledge his country to any consequences or implications of such arrangements with any other country, on his own sole authority. If it is a Treaty, it would require the approval and endorsement of the American Senate with a *two-thirds* majority to support it. There is no claim, however, that the document has even been submitted to the Senate, or was ever intended to be so. In that respect, therefore, it materially differs from the Covenant of the League of Nations, whose putative authorship was ascribed to President Wilson at the end of the first World War. That document, though submitted to the Senate, was rejected by that body. The United States, therefore, notwithstanding the pledges of the President, remained outside the world peace organisation attempted to be founded at the end of the last war. The Atlantic Charter, not having been submitted to the Senate, nor intended to be, must be pronounced technically to have much less force, significance, validity and authority even than the Covenant of the League of Nations signed by the President

and rejected by the Senate.

If, on the other hand, it is to be regarded as an Act of the American Government, it must be noted that it has never been enacted by the American Legislature. And even if it had been, there would be perfectly legitimate doubts about its legality or validity, if not in the U.S.A., at least with regard to the rest of the United Nations. Moreover, as an American Statute, it would also be open to interpretation by the American Supreme Court, which may not take the same view of its meaning and consequences as other parties to the engagement may adopt.

Being, therefore, neither a treaty, nor an Act of the American Government, what value could be attached to such a document so far as the United States is concerned? Admitting that the President of that country was a party to it; admitting further that that President subsequently paraphrased some of the leading points in the document as his own individual contributions to the cause of World Peace, in the shape of the so-called Four Freedoms; and assuming, finally, that the later re-election of Mr. Roosevelt as President for the fourth term to be the head of the American State,—after, that is, a direct appeal to the people, and the vote recorded in his favour,—the document nevertheless remains without any legal sanctity, which attaches either to a duly made treaty, or even a piece of municipal legislation. It is a mere declaration of the President's hopes and desires, which neither the Congress nor his successor are in law bound to honour,—let alone the people of the United States.

So far as Britain is concerned, the Prime Minister was, like the President, a party to this declaration. But while the President of the U.S.A. may claim to be the head of the State in that country, the British Prime Minister is, in the eyes of the constitution, only a *primus inter pares*, one of the Cabinet Ministers of the King, who is the official head of the State in the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister, moreover, acted in that case, rather on his personal initiative or authority, than as mandatory of the British Government. The Cabinet or the Government as a whole, had never considered the pronouncement before it was issued. It was not, therefore, an act of the British Cabinet, concluded by its chairman, who could not be said at the moment to be formally representing the political entity known as the United Kingdom, much less

the British Commonwealth.

It is not a treaty made by him with the U.S.A. The document has also not been presented to the British Parliament for approval and endorsement, if not for ratification or enactment. Neither a treaty nor a law, it was only an *ex parte* pronouncement of the Prime Minister rather than a solemn affirmation, resolution, or legislation. Parliament has, it may be added, given its vague general blessing.

So far, therefore, as the British Government, British Parliament, or the British people are concerned, the document has no binding value. The people, of course, have not pronounced upon it even indirectly, as they might be said to have pronounced upon it by the re-election of President Roosevelt in America, as there was no general election in Britain until July 1945. Parliament has not pronounced upon it, because no part of it, and, much less not the whole of it, has formed the subject-matter of a parliamentary enactment. If people in the United Kingdom are not bound by it, much less can the rest of the British Commonwealth be so bound.

Finally even the British Government, taken in the narrower form of the Cabinet in office, for the time being, can scarcely be said to be bound by it, as the declaration was that of the British Prime Minister personally, and not as an authorised agent or spokesman of the Cabinet collectively. If the then existing Cabinet cannot be said to be bound by it in law, or even in custom, how can any successor of that entity be taken to be bound by acts or words, which are in no way part of their own doings. The British Government of the day was a Coalition Government, made up of Parties who have intrinsic differences on essential points of public policy. It was a creature of national emergency, which died the moment that emergency was over. There is reason to believe that, after the general election, the complexion of the British Government may change even if the majority continues to be the Conservative. The successor of the Coalition Cabinet may not see eye to eye on the issues of policy involved in these matters. The Cabinet has, however, adopted it *ex post facto*.

The British public, in the shape of voters electing the British House of Commons, cannot be taken as a matter of course, to have recorded their approval and endorsement of the document at the new elections whether they return a Labour or a Conservative majority to power.

Under these circumstances, neither Britain nor the United States—the heads of whose Governments promulgated the Declaration,—could, as peoples, be claimed to be duly bound to maintain this declaration by their political leaders of the day. The power and authority of the two participants—whatever the practical position in point of law, is by no means equal. For while the President of the United States is the *de jurs* head of the American State, and *de facto* head of the American Government, responsible only in the last analysis to the people of the United States, the British Prime Minister is not the head of the State, even in the United Kingdom. The head of the State in that case is the King, called also the Emperor in India, who is equally the head of all British Dominions that claim to rank as equal to Britain and independent States, but loosely bound together in the amorphous entity called the British Commonwealth of Nations. Any part of this Commonwealth may be, on any point in the Atlantic Charter, or any other matter involving its own national policy, be opposed to any other part, not merely on grounds of sentiment, but also because of divergence in material interests. The authority of the British Prime Minister in the United Kingdom can, therefore, in no way be taken to bind any other part of the Commonwealth, or even of the Empire.

Even as head of the British Government, the Prime Minister's responsibility is much more direct to the Legislature than that of the American President. The American President is not simply the first amongst his equals, as the Prime Minister is in the Cabinet of the United Kingdom. The U.S. Cabinet is not, like the British, collectively responsible to the American Legislature, namely the two Houses of the Congress. Every member of it is responsible to the President alone.

In the British Constitution, on the other hand, the Prime Minister is only first amongst the Cabinet Ministers, who form collectively the Government of the day. That Government holds office, and is in power, because of a majority supporting them in the House of Commons. Unless and until the Legislature is in some way associated with any such document, and approves of it, or enacts any particular part of it, as binding law of the country, no significance can legally attach to any statements made by any member of the British Government, including the Prime Minister.

Several members of the United Nations are reported to have

signified their approval in some vague general form of this declaration. But none of these have gone beyond a general approval; none have given the material points of the declaration any more substantial binding form.

As far as the U.S.S.R. is concerned, there has been, so far, no formal acceptance of the Charter as a whole, or any of its several guiding principles. In the several conferences that have taken place between the heads of the Governments in the three great powers, now allied in the war against the Axis, matters contained in the Charter have, no doubt, figured as part of the Conference discussions. On some points decisions may have been taken jointly. But these decisions have not always been in conformity with the commonsense interpretation of the terms of the Charter when applied to specific cases. At the time the Charter was promulgated, the U.S.S.R. was much too directly menaced by the war within its own frontiers to pay close attention to such matters; and subsequently it has found no need or occasion to take any formal notice of the matter, much less accord any official adherence. The supreme realists, moreover, who make up the Russian Government, would, it may be assumed, scarcely concern themselves much with such empty but impressive platitudes.

Among other nations, again, forming part of the alliance or association waging war against the Axis, the position of the Charter is even more dubious. If we take France as illustration of the countries likely to be of dominant importance at the end of the war and in the settlement of peace; and at the same time those materially concerned in the form and structure of the peace system, that country was, at the time the Charter was issued, completely under German domination. A good many of her leaders were actually collaborating with the invader. Nominally, she had a government of her own, which had subverted the previous constitution. How far could that country be regarded as bound by the Charter, or entitled to benefit by it? Even granting that that part of the French leaders may be designated as Quislings, now that France has again been liberated, and she is being treated more and more as a leading power, on a footing of political equality with America or Britain, France has so far taken no steps to accord acceptance and adherence to the principles underlying the Charter, let alone the text of the Charter. France, it is true, has still only a provisional government. Her consti-

tution cannot be finally decided, and governmental machinery cannot be properly functioning in the normal way, until the war is ended on all fronts. But such indications as the various Conferences of the principal Allies, taking place after the Charter had been issued, show that the interests or ambitions of France in many cases would be materially at variance with some, if not all, of the ideas inspiring that declaration. France is an imperialist power, like Britain, with colonial possessions and spheres of influence scattered all over the world. If France is to recover her pre-war level of national prosperity, she will have to look to these possessions beyond the seas to make good her deficit at home. Her necessity, if not her ambitions, in these imperial possessions of hers may even be more exploitive than those of Britain. If the principles of the Atlantic Charter are to be applied sincerely and substantially, France would not be able to give a wholehearted effect to them, especially in view of the immense need she will have to rebuild her own internal economic system.

Next to France is the case of China. That country has been in war longer than any of the present Allies or the United Nations. Her territory and productive capacity has come within the domination of the enemy much more than in any other country. Nevertheless the political entity and integrity of China as an independent State seems to have been accepted by all the Allies and the United Nations. China, therefore, will rank amongst the important units at the Peace Conference. The war in China began much earlier and will end much later than that in Europe. Its problems of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and realignment would be materially different in form, if not in substance. Its future, also, in relation to the principal Allies, as well as her war-time enemies and neighbours, is difficult to forecast. The relations with America and Britain in particular, not to mention the British Dominions nearer China, like Australia or New Zealand, would be a network of complexity, that, even if not directly tackled at the Peace Conference, will provide problems for years to come. China, therefore, may find it opposed to her own interests, literally and substantially, to join without reservation in the principles of the Atlantic Charter; and give effect to the same so far as her territory, interests, and ambitions of national development are concerned.

Next after China, the nations forming the bloc opposed to the

Axis powers are of minor importance, especially if we leave out countries like Italy. India, again, ought to have a prominent place in the peace-time counsels of the world, in point of the contribution she has made in men and money to winning the final victory. But, inasmuch as this country is not a political unit, independent and integral by herself; in so far as others of the United Nations are, or are treated as, mere appendages to larger or more important countries, it is very likely that, whatever the outlook of such countries in regard to the principles and terms of the Atlantic Charter, the same may, if otherwise accepted and agreed to by the more important amongst the United Nations, be applied to these countries without their opinion or consent being asked.

Even countries like Egypt, Iran, or Turkey (now that it has declared war on the side of the United Nations against the Axis), and those of Latin America, may also have their own conflicting or divergent views as regards the Charter, its principles, and consequences. It would take us too far beyond the scope of these pages to discuss in detail each individual country's concern in this regard. Suffice it to say that, taken as a whole, the various nations and peoples of the world may not find themselves all agreed on each one of the principles dictating the Charter. Nor might they be ready to accept the consequences of putting into effect that document without prejudice to their own abiding interests, however much any of them be in general sympathy with the basic principles. And that apart from the still more important question whether all of the United Nations have taken adequate steps to make the Charter as a whole and in all its parts legally binding upon them.

Chapter IV

ATLANTIC CHARTER [Continued]

1. NO ANNEXATION NOR INDEMNITIES

Let us next consider the clauses of the Charter *seriatim*. The very first clause says:—

“Their (i.e. of the signatories) countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.”

This sounds highly reassuring. The authors of the Charter intended it as an earnest of their *bona fides*. But it is liable to considerable complications and differences, if and when it is sought to give effect, at the final Peace Conference, to this proposition.

The wording, it may be noted, is very curious. Britain and the U.S.A. “seek no aggrandisement” for themselves. But if any is forced upon, or entrusted to them, will they refuse? At the end of World War I, the slogan had also been raised of “No Annexation or Indemnities.” But the moment victory became certain, and when France and Britain were consulted by President Wilson on this principle, France categorically refused to agree to any such principle. Wilson was forced to make a specific exception regarding Alsace-Lorraine from the operation of that principle. France had always considered these as integral part of French territory that had been forced away from her in 1871; and which she insisted upon regaining as a result of her victory. In other respects, too, the principle of “no territorial annexations” was accepted with very large reservations and modifications, which in effect altogether negatived the principle. The pre-war colonies of Germany, and parts of Germany and Austria, or Turkey, were either bodily taken away or made into “mandates” for the victorious powers to administer as agents for the League of Nations. Technically, these were not “annexed” to the territories, colonies, or empires of the Western Allies; but were, for all practical purposes, part of their dominions, though in the guise of a Mandate administered on

behalf of the League of Nations. The term is now proposed to be changed into "Trust." But there is no reason to believe what happened to the Mandate may not happen to the Trust, unless we take the presence of the U.S., as an active member of the new international organisation, to be a guarantee to the contrary.

As regards the Wilsonian opposition to Indemnities, the entire chapter of "Reparations," incorporated in the Versailles Treaty, was a direct negative of his ideal. In the name of Reparation, a huge demand was made for indemnity from Germany, ostensibly to repair the damage she had wrought upon France and the other Allies in the course or on account of the war, or make compensation. But, as incorporated in the Versailles Treaty, and subsequently figured out in terms of real values, it was nothing less than an indemnity, far beyond the means of Germany as she emerged from the war; an effective disguise for perpetuating the Allied domination of Germany, and her pre-war markets. Reparations proved wholly illusory in the years that followed, except in so far as they sowed the seeds of despair, bitterness, and resentment, that ultimately cropped out into Nazism.

The demand for Reparations was not confined only to France. As and when or if received, those were to be shared out in agreed proportions among all the principal Allies and their satellites. The blame, therefore, for all the consequences of the Reparations demand cannot be placed entirely on the shoulders of France, nor of any other single country. The attempt to implement the Reparations chapter of the Versailles Treaty succeeded in creating a gradually widening estrangement between the principal Allies themselves; with the result that the old adage began ironically to come true, viz., "when thieves fall out, honest people come by their own."

In the present war, the same principle—no annexation nor indemnity—has been restated in this Article I of the Atlantic Charter in a new form. The addition after "territorial" of the words: "or other" can have no other significance. Apart from the lack of the binding character of that document itself, the issue may be joined with the categorical enunciation of the proposition, implying that Great Britain and the United States do not desire any territorial annexation "for themselves" or any other means of compensating themselves for the heavy loss they have incurred. The volume of that loss has been

computed by an American Professor to be £1,20,000 million, for all the Allies ; while a Russian economist estimates it at £1,20,000 to £1,50,000 million for the U.S.S.R. alone !

Even if the U.S.A. and Britain, or either of them, do not desire any *territorial additions* to their own domain—a highly debatable proposition, so far at least as Britain is concerned—it does not mean that they will not desire any other compensation or reparation ; nor does it mean that they would not insist upon it for their other allies, like Russia or Poland, for instance ; and aid them with all their might or influence to secure them. The Yalta Conference of the Big Three allies has definitely insisted upon Reparations in kind, which we shall notice more fully later. It may be that America has no territorial designs, at least on the continent of Europe. The occupation of Iceland may be dismissed as a war-time necessity. If she did entertain any imperialist designs on European territory, she would certainly be opposed determinedly by all European countries, including her present chief ally, Britain. If the U.S.A. want any conquests, they are rather economic or financial, in which there would be not much opposition even in Europe. Nor would there be much serious opposition if she seeks some naval or air force strategic bases for herself in the Pacific, in the guise of Trusts, if not of direct annexation. That does not necessarily mean that the United States will not ask for any compensation for herself and her sacrifices in some form other than territory or money.

Even during the war, when Britain's danger was at the highest, a deal was made in respect of 50 obsolete American destroyers in exchange for a ninety year lease of a number of islands of Britain to serve as naval bases or air stations for the United States. It may be an interesting, but academic, question of international law and practice whether sovereignty has been transferred in these islets, leased to the United States ; or is it only during the period of the lease that such transfer, or rather delegation, of sovereignty would be in effect. For the same driving force, it is by no means certain that America would not desire territorial additions in the Pacific to her own domains at the expense of the Japanese Empire, if only as a compensation for granting independence to the Phillippines ; a price for helping Britain to regain Burma and Malaya and Singapore ; or the Dutch, to recover Java, Sumatra, or other islands ; or the French to re-establish their prestige in Indo-China. The Charter was issued before Japan had

made war on the U.S.A. It is, therefore, open to argue that its terms apply only to Europe and not to the Pacific countries. Annexation may take new forms ; but it will still represent an old phenomenon of history repeated. In any case, the transaction mentioned above provides an illustration of the way in which indemnity or compensation may be obtained, without the word aggrandisement, annexation or reparation being used in any such connection.

The system of Lend-Lease, again, which embraces now practically all the United Nations, is another illustration of the same trend. It was introduced in 1941 to meet Britain's crying need for supplies without cash. It became operative on a sufficient scale really after America herself had directly come into the war. The main inducement for the American people to accept that large-scale sacrifice was the realisation that Britain had been fighting America's own battle all through the years since war had been declared between her and Germany. That sacrifice required some recognition, especially as Britain was fast losing means to continue the struggle single-handed. Lease-Lend was, therefore, introduced to enable Britain to obtain the materials necessary for carrying on the struggle, until such time as the United States themselves could join in effective numbers and adequate material on their own account.

Even then the aid provided under this system was not wholly one-sided. Nor was it ever an absolute gift. It has since been given to all the Allies, though the greater part of the output of American armaments industry, ships and planes, food and clothing, was naturally for American troops engaged on the several fronts. The countries which benefited by Lease-Lend were also expected to make some return in the shape of services and material, called reverse Lend-Lease, necessary on the spot for the American troops ; and the balance of the Lease-Lend supplies remaining after the struggle, was liable to be returned if the President of the U.S.A. so decided. The total of such aid rendered upto April 1, 1945, has been stated by President Truman to be 39 billion dollars ; and the principal beneficiaries of the system have been, in order of importance or the volume of aid received, Britain (31 per cent.), Russia (20 per cent.), China, the British Dominions, India, and the Middle East countries.

It is doubtful if the principle of this scheme would be extended

after the war, not only as between war-time allies or associates, but also as between the United Nations and the enemies. The British Prime Minister has officially declared in Parliament that the principles of the Atlantic Charter—particularly in regard to territorial annexations—are not to be so much a rule, as a guide, whatever this casuistic distinction may mean. This indicates that, even as far as Britain is concerned, the proposition I may not be enforced in all its absoluteness. The possibility of territorial annexation, in some form of mandate, perhaps known by another name, Trust, is also not to be ruled out. The decision reported to have been taken in the Crimea Conference of the Big Three points almost certainly to post-war occupation of the whole of Germany for years to come, on one pretext or another; destruction or control of German industry; and even a transportation, by force if necessary, of German labour to provide *Reparations in kind* to those who have suffered the utmost damage and destruction or atrocities through German armies. This quite clearly indicates that, even for Britain or America, under the pretext of occupation of German territory, German labour may be allowed, as part of their programme for ensuring permanent peace, even though not by way of permanent 'annexation', or pecuniary 'reparations' for themselves.

So far as France and Russia are concerned, note has already been taken that neither of these are parties to the Atlantic Charter in its initial promulgation. They are, therefore, in no way bound by its provisions. Russia certainly will no longer leave her Western flank exposed to any fresh revival of aggressiveness in Germany. 'All the Baltic States, even if not annexed, will certainly become mere satellites of the U.S.S.R. And the same may happen to Finland as well. 'All this would be with the consent, connivance, or active assistance of Britain and the United States. In any case, Polish territory forming part of Russia under arrangement with Hitler in 1939 will, of course, not be returned to any Polish State that may be set up hereafter. The

* Since these lines were written, the Big Three have been able to arrive at an agreement among themselves, resuscitating Poland, and forming there a Government of all Parties, which is recognised already by the U.S.A., Britain, and Russia. That this new Poland will be a mere puppet in the hands of Russia will not be doubted by any one who has closely followed the course of events culminating in this document.

declaration made after Yalta leaves no doubt on this matter. The British Government have already accepted the *fait accompli*; and advised the Polish Government in Britain to accept a readjustment of frontiers following the so-called Curzon Line to accommodate Russia. Whatever the prejudices of the *émigré* Polish Government in London may be, we may take it as a certainty that Russia will not relinquish possession of these territories; and none of the other United Nations will force her to do so. Russia would not regard it as any breach of the Atlantic Charter, even if she were supposed to have endorsed that document. And that quite apart from making the resurrected Poland a virtual feudatory of the U.S.S.R. Further South still, all through the Balkans to the shores of the Adriatic, and the Black Sea, the Russian influence will predominate, even if it does not go into the actual annexation of territory, except in regard to Bessarabia, part of Rumania, and other territories in Bulgaria, that Soviet Russia may deem necessary for its own proper defence.

Russia, moreover, has never made a secret of her intention to exact from Germany to the last possible ounce "reparation in kind" to make up for the damage and destruction wrought upon her by German aggression and violence. This clearly means forced labour, and material confiscation, which may be called by any other name than indemnity, but which would in effect be nothing else. Reparation in kind has been accepted as an integral part of the Allied policy in the Crimean Conference. Britain and the United States, whether they need such material for themselves or not, have accepted the principle, even for themselves; and much more for their Allies. Both France and Russia would insist upon their right in this respect, no matter what the complications arising out of the attempt to give effect to the same. France certainly would insist, both on territorial and on pecuniary compensation or reparation in kind. Apart from Alsace and Lorraine, such parts of the Rhineland and Ruhrland as adjoin French territory would very likely be demanded for occupation, if not annexation, and in the name of national security of France. She would also demand additional reparation in kind, both in terms of the industries situated in these regions, which may be made over to the French nationals or to the French Government; and forced labour from Germany to make good the mines, fields, factories, that have been in any way adversely affected by German occupation, domi-

nation, or influence.

In all this there is ample fruitful seed for future troubles. Not only would France find it much more difficult than Russia, for example, to feed such numbers as she may import by way of forced labour from Germany, but also to adjust the territory and the material that she may seek to annex to herself or occupy for a number of years. The resources of continental France would not suffice for this purpose. She may soon get into conflict, because of this very fact, not only with Italy, but also with her friends across the Channel, and beyond the Atlantic. The same difficulty occurs in her case with regard to mandated territories in Syria, Palestine, and the Near East, not to mention such cases as that of Indo-China, Siam and other spheres of French influence, or Empire. These territories, once part of the French Empire or under French influence, but now seeking complete independence like Syria or Thailand, may have to be repressed by force of arms if necessary, as was only recently the case in Syria. And if it is to the interest or in accordance with the ideals of Britain or America to encourage such aspirations for national independence, France may find it difficult to reconcile her desires or ambitions with the outlook of her Allies.

We have added these illustrations only to show how difficult it would be to give effect to the very first clause of the Atlantic Charter, even in regard to the parties who promulgated it in the first instance, and those who may have signified their adherence to it later on. The United States may have no ambitions of any territorial or pecuniary compensation for themselves in Europe. America may also be truly willing to restore the independence of the Phillippines. But whether she would be equally free from any desire to occupy parts of Japanese Empire, or Mandates or Trusts for her own Pacific possessions, may be open to question.

America's opportunity, however, lies much more in the field of industrial development in countries like China, India, Burma, or Malaya. These are, of course, not her political possessions. But the peoples of these countries, in spite of doubts and disappointments, still look to the American influence to resolve their own present difficulties, and help forward their political aspirations as well as industrial possibilities.

It is here that the post-war rivalry between Britain and America

may take a much more acute form than their present close association in prosecuting the war may permit contemporaries to perceive. It is an open secret that America has already invested considerable capital in China. The resources of that country are so vast, and yet unknown, that the possibilities of development by means of American capital and technical skill may be almost incalculable. The same will apply to Burma, Malaya, and all the other lost possessions of Britain, or of Holland in the East. Whether China would ever develop a sentiment hostile to America, because of such economic domination, as she has developed to Japan, remains to be seen. But there is no doubt that, in India, at any rate, the feeling against British domination, expressing itself in the unexceptionable desire for national independence, seeks to be buttressed, supported, and encouraged by American aid.

The Yank, however, is too shrewd to offer any such aid without compensation in some form, not necessarily territorial annexations, or pecuniary compensation. Projects, however, of new industrial developments in this country, such as the automobile or the aeroplane factories, will, in all probability, need substantial technical help from America, if these industries are at all to have a chance of existence. Even the realisation of India's vast credits locked up in the sterling balances will need American countenance to the utmost. These are only some of the ways in which American influence may penetrate into this country, and come indirectly, if not directly, into conflict with that of Britain.

Apart from such possibilities, it may be admitted that, in the crude form, territorial annexations and pecuniary reparations will not be needed nor demanded by America. On the contrary, it is much more likely that American assistance may be required and accorded to help to tide many countries after the war, both allies and enemies, over the transitional period. Certainly, the enemy countries, if they are not to be wholly struck out of existence,—and the Yalta Conference has made very clear that it is not the purpose of the Allies to destroy the German people,—America would have for years to provide the bare necessities of life—food, clothing—to these war-torn peoples. She may have to give even financial aid to restore their local economy at all sufficient to provide a living on a very much lower standard for those peoples. And even for her friends and Allies, like Britain or France; not to mention the U.S.S.R. itself, American machinery,

American technicians, plant, or equipment may be necessary for years to come for these former leaders in the van of industrialisation to rehabilitate themselves, and resume their onward march, which has been interrupted by the war.

The question is not whether America would be willing to provide such aid. The question rather is whether such aid would be provided absolutely free, gratis, and without any return, direct or indirect. Sufficient has already been said to indicate that the United States aim will not be absolute charity, in whatever name it is offered. In any case the letter as well as the spirit of Article I of the so-called Atlantic Charter will be found extremely difficult to be honoured rigorously, by the very countries whose leaders have promulgated it. What then shall we say of countries who have not even officially endorsed it!

II—No Territorial Transfers without Peoples Consent

If this very first Article is thus shown to be impracticable, in its absolute purity and fullness, those which follow would be still more difficult to implement without reserve.

Article II says:

“They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.”

The principle of one State, one people, implied in this Article is sound; but its practicability is another matter.

This may apply to Poland, Austria, or any of the countries of Central or Southern Europe which had fallen victims to the Nazi aggression. If the principle it embodies is to be, as it should be, universally enforced, countries in Asia and Africa as well as Polynesia would be affected. But actual application to even the very first case mentioned does not seem at all likely, if the signs of the times are correctly interpreted. Retrocession of territorial changes, made without the free consent of the peoples concerned, is possible to put into effect, perhaps, in cases where populations are homogenous; or territories specifically marked out as against one another. Populations,

however, which are so mixed as in Eastern and South Eastern Europe all along the line of the Polish-Russian or Polish-German frontier, and in the Balkans, will make it extremely difficult to be demarcated. It depends on what new States, if any, are to be created after the war; what peoples are allowed to have this right; and what machinery is established to enable populations to express their free choice for belonging to this or that State, as they may be enabled freely to express.

The choice is often not easy to make, even if there is freedom to express it. Taking first the example of Greece, which is relatively a homogenous people, there is already noticeable a sharp difference of opinion among the peoples themselves. The islands formerly belonging to Greece may cause complications before the final settlement is made. But the next-door neighbours of Greece in Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, or other countries of the Balkans may find it very much more difficult to draw the boundary line between one State and another in these regions, each seeking to be independent by itself—independent from outside control, or self-sufficient in matters economical—which will not harmonise with the similar and equal claims of its neighbours. The desire already expressed by their own more powerful neighbours to demand annexations all along their borders, as in the case of Russia, would be difficult to resist, even if the other Allies—Britain or America—were able to provide any machinery to record a free vote of the border peoples on such a delicate subject.

Freedom of choice in this regard will be available only to those parts of Germany which have been forced into the Reich such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other border territories on the north and west of that country. But the example of territories and peoples affected by the French, the Russian, or the Italian desire, cannot but have its influence in determining the validity as well as implementability of this Article. The Reich will be dismembered. But will the people forced into it get a real choice on this point?

In the East the same state of affairs prevails. Not only as regards the countries of the Middle East, such as the Arab States, but also farther afield as regards the peoples of the Malaya Peninsula, Burma, Thailand, and the larger islands of the Pacific, not to mention the native population of Africa, or Polynesia, the principle contained in Article II of this Declaration will be difficult to implement, however strong the desire, and the authors of the Charter. The feeling of

nationality and of national independence is not confined to Europe or America alone. It has penetrated to the deepest recesses of the Asiatic masses, even to the islanders of the Pacific, and the natives of Africa. There is very little hope, however, that in these cases the principle would be asserted even by the Allies who first declared it; and much less given effect to when the Rights (?) of the dominant Imperialisms, as represented by Holland, Belgium, France, and, the biggest of them all, Britain, or her Dominions, are opposed to weaker or more backward peoples of the Middle East, India, the Far East, and native populations in all countries or continents dominated by Europeans or those of European descent.

But even if the principle may be impracticable for the moment, it does not mean that the peoples concerned will easily acquiesce in their continued rule by alien powers, and exploitation for the benefit of others. New seeds of discontent will be sown which would upset the Peace Settlement that may be founded on such lines after this War. The record of the U.S.A., in respect of the Philippines, now declared independent, is, no doubt, very encouraging; and Russia has hitherto shown no great desire for colonial possessions. But even so, the presence of Britain among the principal allies; and active help given to her and Holland by the U.S.A. to reconquer the former's lost empires, without demanding any assurances for the liberation of these peoples constitute the most unmistakable alarm signals which those concerned cannot ignore.

III—Right to Choose A People's Own Government

'Article III deals with an even more delicate problem:

"They respect" it says "the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

There are two parts of this proposition: one the right of a people to choose their own Government, and the other, the restoration of the sovereign rights of those from whom they have been forced away. It applies obviously only to the case of European countries, conquered and dominated by Germany at the time this Charter was first proclaimed.

ed. Poland is the outstanding example, which continues to cause differences between the Allies on the very foundations of their New World Order.

The principles, however, accepted in this Article and embodied in its wording, should apply no less clearly to cases within the British Empire at least, if not also in regard to the Russian conquests, or the United States Pacific possessions. If the post-war world is to be reconstructed on lasting foundations of equity as well as equality, the right to choose a people's own Government, and the recognition or restoration of the sovereignty of all those from whom it has been taken away by force, should be the common and undisputed rights of all.

If the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they desire to live is to be a universal axiom of post-war political reconstruction, the immense difficulties of forming the peoples into political units called States, in accordance with their desire to live in separate territorial blocs, will have to be first considered and dealt with. Perhaps the present-day conception of separate sovereign statehood for each people or country may itself have to be radically revised.

There is, besides, a contradiction of the axiom with itself, especially in regard to such countries as have been Fascist or Nazis themselves, or under Fascist domination, in the last decade and more. The leaders of the United Nations have all along declared their war to be against the very principle of Fascism, by whatever name it is called. If, therefore, the peoples of Italy and Germany, after the war, desire to live under the form of government which has been described as Fascism or authoritarian regime under "Leader" principle, it is clear the principle of local autonomy will not apply, and cannot be allowed to apply, in such cases. Local autonomy of each people must be recognised and respected, only in so far as the form of government under such autonomy does not fundamentally conflict with the similar independence and integrity of other countries and peoples, their neighbours or customers.

Even if the Nazi or Fascist form of government is ruled out as universally unacceptable, it does not necessarily follow that the Allies will respect equally the desire to see the sovereign rights and self-government of Italy, Germany, or other countries or peoples, who had been their co-adjutors, being restored to them. They have introduced the condition that "these must be peoples or countries who have been

forcibly deprived of such rights." Would that include the case of this country? She has lost her independence, but not *recently*, though the loss has been brought about *forcibly*. There is no doubt, also, of this country's desire for independence, integrity and sovereignty being restored to it. It may even be added that that desire has, in principle, been accepted officially by Britain, with whatever degree of sincerity, such declarations are made in political relations.

We may take it, however, that the principle will not be questioned, but only the method by which it is given effect to, the time at which it is implemented, and the form in which such sovereignty and autonomy eventually assumed in this country.

There are similarly other countries, like Burma or Ceylon, the Arab or the Malaya States, not to mention Iran, Iraq or Egypt, whose right to self-government and national independence does not seem to have been contemplated in this article by its authors. They were concerned merely with the independence and autonomy of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, or some of those countries under German occupation or domination, which had recently lost their independence and self-government to the *Wehrmacht*. As, however, at the time the Charter was drawn up, developments which have occurred in the last three years could not be foreseen, the principle even in their case would not be easy to apply without serious modifications. The authors of the Article will themselves have to acquiesce—they already have done so in regard to Poland—in such modification when the time comes for implementing it. The difficulties they have already experienced in Greece, Yugoslavia, and other countries, as they become liberated from German rule, must be taken to be a sufficient portent of the future of this Article, and the principle it embodies, however sound and acceptable that principle may be.

The Article may, therefore, be taken to be no more than a bait to those people under the German heel for the time being, inspired by the hope that it will provide a much needed incentive for underground opposition to German domination. Given out with such motives, it is no surprise that the Article will prove difficult universally to give effect.

IV.—*Equal Opportunity For All in Trade, etc.*

Equally difficult of implementation seems to be Article IV, which says:—

"They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to fulfil the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to trade, and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their own economic prosperity."

In the wording of the Article, there are specific reservations, the effect of which cannot be overlooked. The explicit part of the Declaration is very mild, halting, tentative. The parenthesis about "due respect to their existing obligations," is highly suggestive. Mr. Sumner Welles, former Assistant Secretary of State, U.S.A., has explained in his *"Time for Decision,"* that this saving clause was added at the instance of the British Prime Minister, who had not previously consulted the Dominions before making this proclamation. Under the Ottawa Agreements, Britain had many commitments in respect of fiscal policy with the Dominions to secure Imperial Preference, which she could not disregard without previous consultation and concurrence of all the parties concerned. Similarly she may have other such commitments—secret deals—with Continental Powers, which the Prime Minister could not ignore in spite of the doctrine that War abrogates all treaties. Hence this reservation, which, however, inevitably causes suspicion.

The Article, again, promises only to "endeavour", on the part of the proclaimants, for all States to enjoy equal access to trade and raw materials of the world. It may be noted that this relates to *States*, and not to *peoples*. To make the principle attractive, or the promise tempting, it was no doubt added that it would apply to all States "great or small, victor or vanquished." The feeling against Germany or Japan is too strong to permit any such endeavour being really made for years to come. In fact, the moment one comes to the practical effect of any attempt to implement the Article, one realises that Belgium on the one hand, and the U.S.S.R. on the other, could not possibly be on an identical footing in the ability to obtain

access to the trade and raw materials of the world. There is bound to be discrimination against the vanquished peoples, whether they be Italians or Germans or the Japanese, if any unexpected revival of these threatens the trade of the leaders amongst the Allies, particularly Britain or France. Unless a totally new scheme of political organisation for the whole world is devised, wherein there is no such thing as victor States or vanquished, but in which all States are merged, so to say, in a common World State, with equal rights guaranteed to all peoples, individually and collectively, the Article will be impracticable.

A single World State and a uniform world citizenship, with the fullest freedom of movement and trading, appears to be an unavoidable corollary of these propositions. All countries, Britain included, have not finally renounced imperialist designs. The national ambitions of the larger countries are bound to react unfavourably upon the corresponding ambitions and possibilities of the smaller ones, so long as those differences continue. That is very likely the reason why the authors of the Article have been very careful and circumspect in the enunciation of these principles.

There is another aspect of the reservation which may also be remarked and commented upon at this stage. The Article is subject to the condition :—"with due respect for their existing obligations." The term "existing obligations" is wide enough to include, not merely Treaties, but less formal engagements and arrangements, many of which may arise from the present Lease-Lend system whose post-war possibilities are difficult to forecast at the moment. Arrangements, for example, in regard to an International Monetary Fund, or an International Bank for the settlement of the international balances of trade and accounts, may not be equally acceptable and advantageous to all countries forming part of the world comity of nations after the war.

Amongst closer Allies, again, "existing obligations" may include inter-State commitments, which may be necessary for one State to demand fulfilment of, but which the other State may not be in a position to do. The accumulated *Sterling Balances* of India, for example, in Britain may necessitate for years to come trade regulation between those countries, which other countries may well consider not in conformity with the spirit of this Article. On the ground of self-defence, or development of local industries in any country, any State may adopt methods which would not permit trade to be wholly free

and easy in its pre-war channels.

Other such "obligations" could also be mentioned as likely very materially to modify the substance and spirit of Article IV. One, however, which does not seem to have been contemplated,—or which, being known, has been deliberately ignored by the authors,—should be added here, if only to bring out the other side of the picture in this behalf. Not all countries of the world are equally developed in regard to their economic possibilities. Those, however, which have inherent resources remaining undeveloped; or which have possibilities, by arrangements with their neighbours, to develop much better than they have done by themselves, if only their political system was guaranteed and untouched, may need a period of transition within which to adopt measures so as intensively to develop their available resources; and thereby to take their rank in line with their fellows, who have had an earlier start in the race for industrialisation. They cannot, therefore, consent, in the interests of European countries, all at once to open their raw materials or markets to more advanced countries competing with them, if they are ever to improve the standard of living of their masses. Countries like India and China are the outstanding examples of available resources not yet fully developed; but which, if developed properly, may prove a serious threat of competition to others at present more developed in the industrial field. Such intensive development, however, of India and China may demand a fiscal policy for those countries that may be in frank opposition to the underlying principle of this Article. Would India and China be, therefore, restrained from adopting such a policy, simply because the interests of Britain, France, Germany,—or even of Europe as a whole,—may demand that they shall not impose any trade barriers, or take measures for their own local development which may in effect amount to such barriers, though not in the form of fiscal duties. Where, again, the national economy is wholly socialised; or where at least a comprehensive plan of national development is in operation under direct State control, the enforcement of this principle would mean a direct negation, not only of their local sovereignty, but also of any chance of local betterment in living conditions, and, in consequence, of political independence. The article, in brief, is conceived on the basis of private competing economy, and seems to be in direct response to curb the narrow, intense, economic nationalism of the smaller European States between 1919-1939.

The question needs but to be viewed from this standpoint to show the immense difficulty and inherent contradiction of this Article, when put into practice. If the right to a similar standard of living is to be available to all peoples of the world, and not to be an exclusive privilege of the favoured few, then it is unquestionably necessary that precedence should be given to plans of national development of the so-called backward countries, which have no lack of resources, but, which, for historical reasons, have been unable to take full advantage of recent scientific progress and mechanical inventions to develop their resources and improve their standards of living. The world cannot penalise them because of these historical accidents. If the causes of discontent in any part of the world are effectually and for ever to be removed, it is necessary to devise adequate machinery which will recognise and permit full scope for national rights of this kind. At the same time, it must reconcile such rights with an all-round improvement in world prosperity, that is supposed to come as a consequence of freedom and opportunity of access to raw materials on equal terms for all peoples in all corners of the world.

V—*Universal Economic Collaboration*

The next Article deals with International Co-operation, which, in principle, is unexceptionable. It says :

"They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security."

It has already been stated that not all countries are equally developed. Let us here note the converse of that principle, and record that not all countries have equal possibilities of development; and that there are countries in the world which have already reached that degree of material development beyond which it is not possible for them to go, with due regard to the rights of other peoples. That is to say, if it is agreed to abolish for ever any form of Imperialism—economic or political; if it is, at the same time, desired that all peoples of the world should be guaranteed a minimum measure of prosperity and security, then a degree of freedom of movement from the land of one's birth.

to another of one's livelihood as well as settlement all over the world, will have to be accepted.

This clear corollary of their own principles seems, even amongst the authors of the Charter, conspicuous by its absence. America, for instance, has restrictions on immigration of persons from other countries, and on settlement of immigrants as full citizens within its borders, which cannot but be regarded by the countries adversely affected by such legislation as utterly incompatible with the principle of this Article. The United States of America, is, no doubt, at the height of her internal development,—industrially as well as agriculturally. That does not mean that there may not be further possibilities of development with additional labour, if only it is available. For the United States is nearly twice the size of India, and yet has only less than one-third its population. The *per capita* income of a United States inhabitant is \$1,000, or Rs. 3,500 per annum, while the corresponding figure for India is less than Rs. 100 per annum. This shows the immense gulf in the standards of living of the peoples of these two countries. If the United States were populated as much as India, the average standard of living in that country need not decline, because of the possibility of tapping new resources. By her anti-immigration laws, and discrimination in the rights to acquire citizenship by settlers from abroad, America effectually prevents the infusion of peoples of non-European stock, which cannot but be regarded as a hindrance to effective co-operation which the Article requires.

There are, again, countries in the world, which are not so highly developed as the United States, but have great possibilities of such development, but have very much smaller complement of the human factor than the United States. *There is need, therefore, of a redistribution of the world's population on a very large scale.* But that cannot be accomplished, unless the leaders of the world agree, in the first place, that such a wholesale redistribution of population all over the world is desirable, necessary, and must be effected in accordance with a pre-determined plan.

For such a world Plan to be carried out smoothly, the consent as well as co-operation of the countries of emigration as well as those of immigration, would be necessary, to bring about a world-scale transfer of population, which alone can build up available resources to the requisite degree in America, Australia, Africa, and other parts of the

world. Their remaining undeveloped results in great prejudice to the material prosperity of the world, simply because the population and resources are unevenly distributed all over the world, and man and nature are not fully co-operating. While Europe, taken as a whole (minus Russia), is over-populated, and has resources hardly equal to feed half its pre-war population on anything like a level of decency, America, Africa, and Australasia on the other, are very much under-populated. The result is that immense potential resources of those Continents remain unknown, unexplored, and undeveloped, simply because sufficient and suitable labour, necessary for the task, is unavailable.

The contrast is glaring when applied to the excessive over-population of Japan or China. India, China, and Japan may find it inevitable to demand some relief of the existing population, in order to make the level of material development and individual prosperity much more comparable than is the case to-day. This, be it noted, will not be achieved by reducing in any way the standards of living of these more advanced and prosperous countries; but rather by adding to their as well as to all-round prosperity by tapping new resources, and producing new wealth. Organised labour has felt doubts in some of these countries on this score, and so opposes any relaxation of such immigration laws. But that is due to prejudice, ignorance, or a desire for exclusive enjoyment of what they have obtained by their own struggle, which can well be counteracted if only a true liberalism is inculcated in such matters in the public mind.

Though international collaboration is made a condition precedent in this Article, the main objective for such close co-operation is to secure "for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security." As noted elsewhere, the Charter when drafted was obviously addressed and designed for the peoples of European countries then under Nazi occupation. The wording of this and other articles supports the view, even though the expressions used are very general, and capable of being applied to all countries in or outside Europe.

The task, however, of securing improved labour standards, progressively rising, and joined to a sense of security to the individual through all the contingencies and emergencies of life and work, would involve such a radical reconstruction of the entire social system prevail-

ing all over the world,—except perhaps in Russia,—that one may well wonder if the authors of the Charter had realised the magnitude and complexity of the task undertaken by such declaration. For any real amendment in the Contract of Work,—including the scale of wages, conditions of work, the amenities of life in connection with such work, the provision of adequate measures for the maintenance of health and attendance, and treatment during periods of sickness, as well as upon total invalidity and superannuation through over-age, illness, or accident,—is a matter of internal legislation and regulation in each country. In these the common friends and allies of any country cannot interfere, without introducing a most dangerous excuse for meddling with local affairs by outsiders without sufficient knowledge or understanding.

This is inevitable in the absence of anything like a Supreme Sovereign, or a Universal State, in which all the various units making up the comity of nations are associated, combined, or federated. Such a World State may or may not be set up after this War. Even if set up, it may not be entrusted with adequate powers to maintain the New Order as the leaders desire and the peoples vaguely demand. But even if such an authority is established, the powers and functions assigned to it by general consent may not include the right to intervene in purely local affairs, such as these matters would be claimed to be.

All that an authority like this can at most aspire to do, in the common interest of the world as a whole, would be to lay down some general standards, some broad governing principles to regulate these matters. But even then, in their daily application in the various parts of the world, the position may not be comparable, in actual practice in all countries. The common conscience of humanity has a right, no doubt, to demand from individual members of the Comity of Nations that poverty shall be abolished, and shall not be a bar to the full realisation by every individual of the purpose of his being. A decent standard would then follow as a matter of course. Just as in the present-day world it is universally recognised that communicable disease must be prevented from spreading by agreed arrangements in all countries, and regulations regarding quarantine are imposed by common consent, which each country is entitled to administer through its own officials and machinery, for its own safety, so also similar general agreements

may be made in regard to the eradication of poverty. The only condition that could be imposed would be that the regulations agreed and designed to abolish poverty shall not be so administered as to involve any preventible danger to the guests, customers, or neighbours of the country concerned.

Given governing principles in such matters, prescribed by a common international authority,—some kind of a magnified and authoritative International Labour Office of the pre-war days,—the problem of settling wages, hours and other conditions of work, amenities of life, and security for the worker, may yet vary from country to country, even from occupation to occupation, within the same country. These variations and their resultant consequences, cannot be subject to international authority to legislate upon. They must necessarily be left to local authority, both to legislate upon and to administer.

The next difficulty for the authors of the Charter, or the makers of the peace hereafter, is even more local, in realising, in all its fullness and in daily practice, the objective enunciated in Article 5 of the Charter. The conflicting interests of classes within a given community, large or small, and, still more important, the divergence of interests and ambitions between the different nations,—neighbour or distant,—will come in the way of a full realisation of such an objective, unless the world authority uses all its power and influence to determine the policy as well as the general outlines of the administration in each unit, so as to prevent any kind of political or economic imperialism being developed.

Such an International Authority must have, no doubt, effective means placed at its disposal to make good the regulations it may lay down. The ultimate sanction for all such acts would, of course, be the consent of the majority of the nations and peoples of the world, with whose consent and agreement such a common authority itself comes into being, in the first instance. But these means or sanctions cannot be used to coerce any individual member of the Comity of Nations, which are after all its own internal concern ; and may have, if at all, a very remote bearing on the peace, security, and welfare of its neighbours.

VI—Freedom from Fear and Want

In the next Article is found a further elaboration, and clarification of the implications, of Article 5. In Article VI the President and

the Prime Minister declare:—

„After the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their countries, and which will afford the assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.”

The Declaration has been described in some quarters as being a Charter of the Rights of Nations as well as of Individuals; and here is one Article at least which applies both to nations and to individuals. The peace that the authors hope to establish, after the final defeat and elimination of the Nazi Party, would be justified and universally acceptable only if it affords to all nations, not only nominal equality and apparent integrity, but also the means to dwell in safety within their frontiers. That is to say no aggression from outside need be dreaded by any country, however small and weak it may be.

Taken in conjunction with the preceding Article for establishing collaboration, this freedom from aggression must go hand in hand with the freedom from exploitation of a weaker nation by its stronger neighbour. Many of the seeds of all wars in the last century or more will thereby be *ipso facto* destroyed. But, in order that all chances of aggression from any quarter may be finally destroyed and eliminated from international concerns, it is once again necessary that there be some common authority, entrusted with power and means sufficient to maintain that peace and security assured by this Article to all members of the family of nations, large or small, weak or strong.

Indications available so far from the leading countries now at war, and those mainly concerned in the fashioning of peace, show that they contemplate establishing some sort of a World Security Council. That is not quite the same thing as a Sovereign World State, which alone could really provide an effective guarantee against any recrudescence of aggressiveness from any quarter. This Council, however, is intended to be largely, if not wholly, a political organisation, not an economic machinery for national as well as individual security, though it has its economic appendage, too. Fuller notice will be taken of it when we consider hereafter the decisions of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which the San Francisco gathering of the United Nations was called to implement.

Meanwhile, it is necessary to add that the signs and portents already on the horizon do not show that the seeds of international discontent, divergence and rivalry will be for ever destroyed from the surface of the earth, so as to leave no room for bickering among nations. The happenings in Syria and Lebanon within a fortnight of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany provide living proofs to the contrary. The attack of France on Syrian independence is not so surprising, as the fact that Britain was actually obliged to intervene by force before France would order "Cease Fire" in those countries. Neither Britain, nor Belgium, France nor Holland, have shed finally their imperialist slough which is their real skin. To hold up "Nazi tyranny" as solely responsible for the state of fear and insecurity under which the neighbours of the Nazis have had to live may be justified by the actual happenings of the last decade or so. But to believe that, with the final disappearance of that tyranny, but with other imperialisms maintained in tact, the world will re-enter an age of abiding peace automatically, will place an unenduring strain upon man's reason or credulity.

It may also be mentioned in this connection, that the question of settling the boundaries of any given nation may cause new disputes. The case of Poland has been cited already as a living example. So long as the principle of nationality is upheld ; so long as the virtue (?) of national patriotism is exalted and inculcated in all its narrowness and crudity, this eternal source of dispute will continue. The U.S.A. could never have come into being if local patriotism was the only characteristic of a virtuous man. "My country, right or wrong" is a maxim impossible to uphold in any age or place where values other than those of the earth earthly are accepted. The boundaries of nations, besides, are not fixed and abiding. They shift from age to age, due to all kinds of factors, including wars. No specific criterion, moreover, is laid down and universally admitted as to what should constitute a nation ; and what the natural boundaries of a State should be. There is no such thing as natural or scientific frontier for a continental state.

The case of France in Europe, or of the German Reich, or of those States of the Hapsburg Empire, which were set up and recognised as independent units only on the breakup of the Austrian congerly, furnish rich illustrations of this problem. To consider such units created by acts of men as natural and immutable units would only lead to new

disputes or complications. The Congress of Vienna, guided by the Principle of Legitimism, made mistakes in ordering the resettlement of Europe after Napoleon, which the Conference of Versailles repeated a century after. If the same mistakes are not to be repeated by whatever gathering considers and determines the re-ordering of the world after Hitler, the very foundation of nationalism, the very idea of national patriotism, will need to be revised and recast. Nations cannot, indeed, be abolished, nor the nationalist sentiment, by a fiat of an international gathering. And where the sentiment of nationalism is reinforced by a consciousness of injustice and exploitation by another nation, as in the case of India, the feeling will gain in strength and sanctity in proportion to the sense of exclusion and disinheritance one feels in one's own country. To permit the basic ideal of this Article being realised, it is not enough to readjust national boundaries on what is considered at the moment to be the lines of equity. It would need a wholly new education of the youth of the world to recast these basic conceptions.

While nations still continue to be recognised as political units, however, their mutual boundaries will have to be as satisfactorily defined as possible. And adequate machinery must, at the same time, be established to maintain them without recourse to arms. If causes remain still for boundary disputes, whether territorial or otherwise, (e.g. protection of national minorities), these must be made capable of being solved by a mutual agreement to adjust, or by international arbitration in the last analysis. Under no circumstances, however, should recourse to arms be permitted to settle such disputes. Violence begets violence; and so it must be abjured and outlawed as a mark of the beast, even before nationalism is recast and patriotism revalued. It is for this reason that the creation and maintenance of a Supreme International Authority, agreed to and accepted by all, with adequate sanction, power, and resources entrusted to it, to carry out the functions assigned to it become indispensable.

So much for the *Rights of Nations*. As stated in this Article, they cannot, of course, be taken to be exhaustive. Reference to the *Rights of Individuals*, included also in the same clause, is an amplification of the preceding Article, making a little more precise the meaning of "improved labour standards." The assurance for all men in all countries to live their lives in freedom from want and fear seems not

only a guarantee against unemployment and starvation. It must also be read as a guarantee against any domination or exploitation, within a country itself, by one class or group over another. So far as individuals are concerned, fear and want are not merely due to the dread of their neighbour's aggression. They result much more from the economic system, which permits one to exploit another in the same community; or denies opportunities to some for self-realisation, under the authority of law or customs governing the lives of all those living in a given territory.

If, therefore, the clause is intended to eliminate fear and want for individuals all over the world, as the words of the Article convey, the machinery necessary to achieve that must not only require every component unit of the World Federation to change the basis of social organisation, and make and enforce laws ensuring such freedom from want or fear; it must also suffice, in the event of any single community evading or breaking such principles of international equity, to bring such an erring member back to the path of righteousness.

There may be countries, moreover, who desire to adopt this path of social justice; but who are unable, of their own resources, to maintain that standard of living for every one of their members which may be regarded as just, equal to the dignity of man, and sufficient for all the reasonable needs of the body and the mind. Not all the countries of the world are situated, in respect of numbers, resources or potentialities, on the same plane. If each of these is to be assured an independent existence, with full scope for the realisation of those standards of material well-being and cultural advancement which are held out as the objectives of the new world to be fashioned by the combined wisdom of the United Nations,—not to mention the present-day enemy countries,—there must be an active co-operation and free interchange of commodities and services as between the members of such a family of nations, without let or hindrance, without tariff barrier or currency regulation, which to-day impede the free flow of goods and services all over the world.

This would mean a further regulation of details in international administration of trade, which may infringe upon the national sovereignty, or local autonomy, of each constituent part of the family of nations. There is nothing sacrosanct, indeed, nothing absolute or immutable, in the idea of National Sovereignty. It is an outcome of the

peculiar conditions in European countries, which historians of civilisation have not yet fully analysed and appreciated ; but which at most is not more than 500 years old. The Catholic conception of the State connoted universal sovereignty, as did also the Roman Empire, and all Theocratic States of antiquity. Feudalism went the opposite extreme in exalting local allegiance over national or international. From the extreme localism of the Feudal age, the pendulum swung gradually back to the national state after 1,500, which completely undermined the conception of the universal sovereign of the Holy Roman Empire.

It was only after the Nationalist State had reached its apogee in the XIX century, and demonstrated its inherent weakness after 1920, as in the case of smaller States, that the idea of an international authority, all-pervading and all-powerful, began to gain ground. It is, indeed, even now not appreciated everywhere at its full value, mainly because the present generation has been educated in the virtues of nationalism ; and partly also because the larger and more powerful States afford no commendable model for international equity and social justice. The changing conditions of a new age, making interdependence of nations as well as individuals as marked a peculiarity of this age of universal mechanisation, rapid communications and growing trade, as local self-sufficiency was of the age preceding it, render the idea of national exclusiveness as burdensome as it is unworkable in its pristine purity. The Austenian conception of absolute sovereignty based on national independence must, accordingly, be revised fundamentally, if a proper international co-operation is to be the order of the day.

But until such basic conceptions are scrapped by common consent ; and a new conception of Sovereignty is substituted and accepted, there will be a medley, which those who desire to refashion the world must not overlook in their enthusiasm for the new order. Even if the idea of absolute national sovereignty is modified, as it should be, that need not affect the conception of the equality as between the several units or members of the World Federation. For equality and sovereignty are not necessarily mutually concomitant. In the common counsels of the world, the place or vote of each unit should be the same, though, to guard against any intransigent minority acting as obstructionists, special provision may be made permitting a given majority of units or peoples to take decisions on specified matters.

VI—FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

The next Article deals with the freedom of movement, if not also of trade and exchange. It says :

"Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance."

The language is curiously hesitating. It indicates more a desire than a design, which must be put into effect. If the freedom to move without hindrance all over the world is taken to be a natural consequence of the peace contemplated in the previous Article, it does not seem to be as an objective by itself, which the planners of the New World would strive themselves to enforce. It is not part of the international Rights of Men, but only a result of the condition of things established after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny.

The clause seems to have been dictated by the Nazi submarine war, and the consequent destruction of neutral voyagers over the high seas. Without any violence to the language or the intention of the clause, it may be taken to relate, also, to restrictions on passport facilities, and other impediments to travel as well as settlement by any citizen from any part of the world into any other. The Article, of course, speaks only of the freedom to travel. It does not say a word as regards the right to settlement and employment in any country other than the country of one's birth or ordinary domicile. If the peace of the world is to be securely founded and permanently maintained, this right of the individual is no less important than any other mentioned above, and must be assured no less effectively. But the right is not to be interpreted as confined to students or sight-seers, commercial travellers or professional globe-trotters. It must have a much wider scope and deeper meaning.

The right of movement and settlement would be little more than academic, if adequate and effective machinery is not devised to enable such movements and settlements to take place on a large scale, so as to relieve congestion of population in certain parts of the world, and add to the labour force in those countries which are to-day much too sparsely populated to be able adequately to develop their own inherent resources, and make a proportionate contribution to the sum total of the world's wealth. This point, however, has been dealt with already in connection with the Immigration Laws, as well as in regard to the

possibility of advancing prosperity all round. At the cost of repetition, it must be added that such prosperity would be attained only if and when every corner of the world is populated with the optimum numbers, and is thus made capable of developing its own resources to the maximum.

An inevitable corollary of this Article would be that there must be a Common World Citizenship for every individual, over-riding and dispensing with the claims of local allegiance and national patriotism. It is only then that a real family of nations and brotherhood of man would be evolved, wherein all men would be truly equal, free, and mutually helpful or co-operative. All the innumerable and vexatious regulations about pass-ports and visas, domicile and allegiance will then be needless, and may be safely scrapped.

VII—ABJURE VIOLENCE

The last Article of the Charter is perhaps the most didactic of all. It states

"They believe that all nations of the world, for realistic as well as for spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their own frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that disarmament in such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament."

Here is an aspiration towards a non-violent society, which has hitherto been subject more of derision than of admiration, and much less acceptance amongst the materialistic nations of the world. The authors of the Charter have advanced it for realistic as well as spiritual reasons. But inasmuch as the aspiration seems to be confined, at least in the first instance, to those countries, which, in the opinion of the signatories to this Declaration, have been aggressors, it suggests an inequality of treatment as between the victors and the vanquished, which is strangely at variance with some of the other parts of the same Declaration.

It may be, no doubt, necessary, that countries like Germany or Japan must be disarmed, and kept disarmed, for years to come. But if disarmament to the end that universal peace must follow is to be a real and lasting fact, it must apply not only to the so-called aggressors of to-day, but also to all the several nations of the world, if only to save them from the very temptation of aggression and domination. If the use of force is for ever to be adjured, and the foundations of society are to be laid on non-violence, it would not suffice merely to take away weapons of war from only one set of the belligerents of to-day, and all their neighbours, associates, and dependants. The Allies must also practice their own preaching. The date of their disarmament should not be too long deferred. The last attempt at all round disarmament failed because the Allies of World War I could not, and would not, agree to their own disarmament. They tackled the problem piecemeal, by such arrangements as the Washington Treaty of Limitation of Naval Might of three or four powers. They tried without avail to outlaw certain weapons of war, like the submarine. And though they did agree to avoid the use of poison gas or bacterial war, the Robot air bombs did no less harm to the non-combatants in this War. The French insisted on their own security being the first guaranteed before they would consent to reduce their army or air force; and Britain was unwilling to surrender her naval supremacy, oblivious of the immense possibilities of the air force. And so, it became clear beyond mistake that there was no sincerity in the attempt to secure all-round disarmament of the Allies. This mistake must not be repeated at any cost, if the foundations of peace are to be securely laid. Recourse to arms must be forbidden categorically and unconditionally, without exception or modification. The right of self-defence, recognised at San Francisco, should have no more place than occasion, if a really effective machinery is developed to prevent any outbreak of war.

If violence as a method of settling international disputes is for ever to be abandoned, it would be necessary to put an end to those industries, which in any way minister, or can be made to serve the purposes of warfare. This is a very tall order; and may mean, if not a sentence of death, at least one of life-long servitude to semi-industrialised countries. Modern industry is so closely connected and interdependent, that it would be almost impossible to distinguish between what may be called war-like industries, and those serving exclusively

the needs of peace. Industries connected with manufacture of chemicals and transport services, of power and fuel, iron and steel, food and clothing, may all be quoted as illustrations of this phenomenon. To demolish, or forbid any industry in a given country, merely because it may have a remote possibility to serve the needs of war, would be to prevent any scope for employment in such channels for the peoples of those lands, not to mention that it may mean a ban on their further industrial development. If the rule were made universal, the problem would, of course, be much simpler; but would also be more capable of effective solution by discovering and utilising alternative channels of employment; or by conditioning industries, potentially liable to be used for war purposes, so that they serve only the needs of peace. A system of international surveillance,—or, better still, an international organisation owning, working, and controlling such industries, in the different parts of the world for the use only of the central International Authority,—may not only not deprive the world of any scientific progress that has been made in these directions, but also keep up those channels of employments, and even of development, which are concentrated in such industries, and which may also be made to serve the needs of peace.

In any case, if disarmament is to be at all effective, we must not repeat the mistakes of the years following the peace of Versailles. So long as Disarmament is applied and enforced only on one set of countries, while armament is left unchecked with others, the former will only be encouraged to evade the restrictions and develop such industries in secret. This would only mean a new menace to peace and security. On the other hand, it would be disastrous to the safety as well as prosperity of man-kind, if all such industries are to be altogether banished from the face of the earth. They must be placed in charge of some international body, some sort of a World State mentioned above; and worked under the ownership, direction and superintendence of this authority, in all the several countries. By this means, while the danger of aggression at the hands of any single individual State is eliminated, the possibility to check such aggression, should it ever break out, by means of international authority, duly armed and empowered, remains unfettered.

Disarmament, indeed, is not the only means the signatories of this Declaration had in view to maintain the peace of the world. They

are aware that, to be successful, it must be all-round and simultaneous. If that cannot be, they promise to develop possible methods by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed and maintained, though they say not a word as regards what those other means may be.

International Arbitration,—compulsory and universal for all causes,—was considered, even before the War of 1914-18, to be a way out of the dilemma caused by the unequal development and irreconcilable ambitions of European powers. That system could not come into effect, not only because international law had no sanction behind it, and was itself vague and indefinite; but also because there was no single central authority responsible to enforce it. If Arbitration or adjudication of international differences is to take the place universally of a recourse to arms, its basic principles must be enunciated and agreed to by all. Its procedure in operation must also be as clearly defined. It must be the task, therefore, of the authors of a just New Order, not only to establish a World Court of Justice, but also to lay down substantive as well as adjectival law to guide such a tribunal in making its awards or passing its decrees.

Besides Arbitration, there are other ways of avoiding recourse to arms, surer either than war, or even arbitration. These are ways of preventing any cause of disputes arising, or settling them before they reach a climax. International consultation and systematic conciliation, in all cases of differences, is obviously a condition precedent to any realisation of an all-round co-operation and collaboration. This has been promised in this Charter as one of the aims the authors seem to realise in the New World. The machinery for consultation and conciliation may be devised by agreement, and reinforced by set administrative agencies, such as have already been at work in regard to the International Aviation Union, and other means of transport and communication; international standards of weights and measures, international banks and machinery for settlement of balance of accounts, and a number of other cases in which bilateral and multilateral agreements are already at force, but which only need to be developed so as to become universal. If such agreements, and the practice following thereon, are applied to as many matters as concern more than one country, the occasions for disputes or differences will be minimised, till they disappear altogether in course of time.

Chapter V

FOUR FREEDOMS

THE Atlantic Charter is thus not only vague in its binding character, and uncertain in its terminology; it does not lay the axe at the very root of the factors which have brought about the war. It has in it germs of the ideals which may provide, if properly worked up, excellent material for laying abiding foundations of enduring peace all over the world. But the way it is put forward, the authority responsible to see it given effect to, is so indeterminate that we cannot make of it a starting point for a truly new world.

Let us next consider another document or declaration, enunciating similar principles, and based upon the same ideas, but more concisely stated. These are found in a message to the American Congress the late President Roosevelt delivered on January 6, 1941.

(1) FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION

These essentials of universal peace stated in the words of the author, are:

"In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon *four essential human freedoms*.

"The first is *freedom of speech and expression*—everywhere in the world."

The right to free speech and expression is nowadays too well established and recognised as an essential condition of free society to need any elaborate argument in support of it. It is a right of the individual rather than of a community; and must include not only the right of free speech, but also of freedom of thought and expression, not only in words, in every form that modern civilisation can devise. Freedom of speech without freedom of thought is meaningless. Freedom of expression includes not only the spoken word, but writing of all kinds, pictures, photographs, cartoons, the radio and the cinema.

The Presidential statement makes this right universal, categorical, and unconditional. But, like all other rights of man, it must be subject to certain inevitable limitations, not only in the interests of preserving local peace everywhere ; but also to maintain due regard to the equal rights of others. If the Freedom of Speech and Expression is allowed to degenerate into a wordy warfare or pictorial hostilities, either between any two units of the comity of nations, or as between individuals within the same country, without regard to truth, accuracy or decency, the state of society resulting can scarcely be called civilised. The essence of civilised society lies not only in the possession of such freedoms, but also in a voluntary restriction of such freedom out of regard for the differing views or sentiments of one's fellows in the same community, a measure of self-discipline and self-control by the individual in the interests of decorum and toleration of sentiments other than one's own. And because, in our present state of education of the masses everywhere, —masses ruled by sentiment rather than reason,—we cannot always and implicitly trust the self-restraint and cultured tolerance for those who differ from us on matters where our emotions are involved or material interests at stake, we must devise some conventions or adopt laws to enforce such toleration, at the same time affording the fullest scope for freedom of speech and expression.

In the British constitution this has taken the form of laws regarding libel and slander, which impose such restrictions without calling them by that name. It is largely a judge-made law, but which is nevertheless considered to be in full conformity with the basic principles of political evolution towards a free society that is founded on individual equality and mutual co-operation. There may be vagaries or variations in judicial expositions of such unwritten laws, according to the personal predilections of even the best judges. But the scope for such variation is very much restricted by the presence of the jury in all such cases, where on the question of facts the verdict rests mainly with one's fellow citizens of reasonable convictions, commonsense, and worldly experience. And so, on the whole, the experience of two centuries or more gives every ground to believe that the judicial elaboration or interpretation of this basic freedom of the citizen has upheld the right, without any violence or prejudice to the right of other individuals affected by the exercise of any citizen's undeniable freedom of speech and expression.

RELIGIOUS TOLERATION

One of the most delicate aspects of this problem is in regard to the freedom of thought and expression of one set of individuals, who, on matters of religion, differ radically and even violently from others of their fellow citizens. This will be considered more fully in the next item enunciated in the second principle; but it is necessary to add here that any exercise of freedom of speech, thought or expression, which is calculated to offend the religious susceptibilities of any considerable section and likely to give rise to communal disturbances and breach of internal peace, will need to be guarded against by constitutional conventions or even local legislation, enacted in conformity with general rules laid down by international agreement on the subject. For while political or even social questions are capable of difference of opinion as between large sections of the same community, which may not arouse the same degree of passionate heat, however strong popular feeling on them may appear for the moment, questions affecting religion are apt to give rise to much stronger and more abiding differences impossible to bridge over, given the present basis of education in most civilised communities. It is an irony of our social evolution, that religion,—the one force which should bind us most one to another,—is also the one force which helps to most effectively divide us one from another. By claiming, as most religions do, a monopoly of truth, every organised creed implicitly declares all other brands to be false and misleading; and so wounds the *amour propre* of every educated person of a different religion that there is no reconciling possible between the votaries apparently of the same God, enlightened by different prophets. If a bond of this kind is found by scientific progress hereafter to be necessary, mankind will have to invent a new religion which may be acceptable to all. Existing religions will not serve the turn.

Such differences of sentiment being irreconcilable, and social harmony and co-operation being possible only with as little scope being permitted to such differences to assert themselves as unavoidable, it becomes imperative that the individual's freedom of thought and expression, though promised as a fundamental right of the citizen, must be conditioned by some safeguards in the interests of internal peace and constant co-operation, in cases where religious differences are apt to be intensified by an indiscriminate exercise of such freedom. This

is a difficult, but not at all an impossible task, especially if the mass mind is cultivated from the very start of education on a basis of universal toleration.

(2) FREEDOM OF WORSHIP

“The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way,—everywhere in the world.”

As already remarked, this relates to the Freedom of Conscience, which overlaps in part with what has been described above as freedom of thought. Matters of belief, which are not always capable of rational treatment on objective or scientific lines, are founded in emotion uncontrolled by reason; and, as such, provide a delicate field in which the social legislator will be confronted with the most delicate of his tasks. Unless and until the very foundation of modern popular education and its contents are settled as well as revised radically, there will be no hope of that degree of Toleration for all forms of belief and worship, which is indispensable for abiding peace all over the world as well as in every community.

The statement as laid down by the late President relates only to all forms of worship of one God. But if the principle it contains is to be rationally interpreted, and made really the foundation of a new world order, it must also include and protect those who do not believe in any God, or who may believe in more than one God. The danger is much greater for the former than for the latter category to be ostracised, and regarded as outside the pale of social protection. But the presence of the atheist, or at any rate agnostic, is by no means a modern phenomenon. At the same time the popular dislike of such a phenomenon still continues to be equally intense. The basic law, however, of the modern civilised State as well as of the international organisation founded on this principle, must secure full toleration to all forms of thought or belief, and not restricted only to matters of belief with which one conforms oneself.

In the name of freedom of religion, latitude cannot be accorded to forms of worship, ritual, or symbolism, which involve, for instance, human sacrifice, or other such forms of primitive religion incompatible with modern civilisation. There are known to be in existence today,—and not only in the admittedly savage communities,—forms of religion which offend our sense of decency and imperil social harmony... Wor-

shippers of Kali in India, for example, even today indulge in sacrifices, which, in the case of Shakti worship, are said to take obscene and intolerable forms. At the other end, there are preachers of some religion which are enjoined to go about naked as a mark of their complete renunciation of worldly goods as well as of social conventions. These may not be equally offensive or dangerous to the social organisation the world has now generally accepted. But, at the same time, given our present state of education, some restrictions would be inevitable, in the interests of social peace as well as public decency, on such exhibitions or manifestations of religious zeal.

Further instances may be quoted on the border line wherein the name of religion is used or abused to claim immunity for intolerable institutions. The institution of perpetual widowhood among the Hindus,—or of the caste, for the matter of that,—may be mentioned as real or supposed injunctions of religion that cannot be accepted in any society founded on freedom and equality. Even the institution of marriage,—a contract between individuals—is maintained in many quarters as a divine sacrament, with the indelible sanction of religion behind it. Must the progress of genuine social reform and human equality be halted because of the possible claims of spurious religion?

STATE TO BE WHOLLY SECULAR

An inevitable corollary of this situation is that no form of organised religion or established Church must be associated or identified with the modern State. The State must be entirely and exclusively a secular organisation. There must be no official religion for the State. It must look with an equal eye on all religions, notwithstanding the fact that an overwhelming majority of the population of any given country is of a given persuasion. In such matters it is not only the numbers that count. Religion has had, from time immemorial, a claim upon the loyalty of human beings, which has ever transcended the frontiers of nations, or even the bonds of classes. At the risk of wearisome repetition, it must be added that unless and until the very foundations of the modern system of education are revised and recast, this transcending loyalty will be a danger to national integrity and international peace, unless the foundation of the new order makes it imperative for universal toleration to all forms of worship and belief, with due regard to the demand of public decency, human equality, and social justice. In no

field of human activity is the necessity for toleration so great, and equality of treatment so indispensable as in this where emotion rules to the exclusion of reason. Without any violence to President Roosevelt's words, it may well be inferred from his categoric declaration that, in consistency with the rest of his ideology, he must have intended this doctrine of freedom of belief and worship to be an invariable concomitant of the corresponding doctrine of universal toleration. Municipal legislation for the due exercise of this freedom, compatible with the equal freedom of other members of the society, in following a given form of religion, and with due regard to the claims of public decency, human equality and social justice will be necessary, whether as a precaution or as a safeguard. But in order that such legislation could not err on the side of partiality, open or disguised, to any given form of religion, it may be advisable to have international agreements on this subject, too, indicating, if not perscribing, the limits of freedom of religion, belief or worship, and the degree of toleration that must be observed side by side.

In its origin this enunciation seems to be aimed at those members of the United Nations, particularly Russia, which are supposed to deny the place of religion in social organisation. Without interpolating any personal opinion on the subject, and viewing the matter purely as a social problem, the very basis and origin of this declaration must involve the corollary elaborated above. Not only must States renounce their right (?) to go to war for securing the supremacy or ascendancy of one form of religion against another, or the negation of any religion; side by side with such a renunciation there must also be an assurance that, while no religion will be impeded in its normal, legitimate, rites or expression, none will be forced in any way upon any individual or community unwilling to accept it. At the same time, public education will have to be more rational, which can only be accomplished if it is made wholly secular, scientific, and objective, without any contact with a Church, without any link with an established religion.

(3) FREEDOM FROM WANT

"The third is freedom from want,—which, translated into world terms, means economic understanding, which will secure to every nation a healthy peace-time life, for its individuals,—everywhere in the world."

This also is a right of the individual, rather than of a community or nation. But as expressed here, it is given out as a right of every nation, country, or State. It is also universal in its application as stated by the President. But its translation into actual everyday life is likely to be much more difficult, involving many more consequential changes and readjustments in national economics, and international relations,—trade as well as movements of funds,—that was perhaps not clearly visualised by the author.

On the two preceding items, there is, at least in theory, general agreement. No one will be foolhardy enough nowadays to deny the right of the citizen for freedom of speech and expression, of belief and worship. But the existence of economic classes, and the divergence between the resources as well as the possibilities, not to mention the equipment, of nations, makes it difficult to achieve agreement on this freedom from want. It is difficult to state in any objective and measurable terms what is meant by freedom from want. It is well known that standards of living vary immensely from country to country; and that nevertheless, human beings have got themselves adjusted to such variations in different countries. While the average per capita income of a citizen of the United States has been estimated to be something like \$1000-1200 per annum, that in India is less than 25 to 30 dollars per annum. In China perhaps it is even less at the present moment, while in Britain and her other Dominions it may be \$500 or more.

This variation connotes a difference in the opportunities and resources of the individual in the several countries, which reacts both on the span of life of the average individual, as also the standard of living possible to attain under those circumstances. At the same time, it does not give any measure of the possibilities to which, even in the backward or less developed countries, objective or material wealth could be available to the individual if only the social, political and economic conditions or opportunity were other than what they are.

It is for this reason that attention was drawn in an earlier chapter to the necessity of a planned programme of development for each country, so prepared and executed as to be integrated into and consistent with a World Plan of allround development, with a view to improve the standard of living all over the world. But it is just on this point that the divergent interests and requirements of the members of the

comity of nations may come into conflict. For those who have an abundance will not be willing readily to part with their surplus, or lower their higher standard of living for the benefit of others; whereas those who have not achieved a similar standard of living would be anxious for an intensive, almost aggressive, line of development that may not result in an equal advantage to those more advanced and better situated.

Some of the specific consequences of any genuine attempt to implement or make available this freedom from want have already been outlined above. We need not go over the same ground, therefore, and re-emphasise the necessity for a redistribution of population all over the world commensurate with the resources or possibilities of each country, with a view to a more intensive development of the available or unknown resources of every corner of the world, so as to secure a much greater measure of allround happiness for mankind than is available in the present circumstances. But it must be stated even at the risk of repetition that the attempt to realise the freedom from want by such devices as "economic understanding" or freedom of trade and equal access to the raw materials, as one of the Articles in the Atlantic Charter has put it, may conflict with the corresponding and much more basic right of each individual nation first to develop its own available resources so as to make up its own deficit in the standard of living of its people, and then share the surplus of speciality according to an agreed formula.

It will involve too great a diversion from the main theme of these pages to examine the several ways in which the new world economy may be reconditioned hereafter, from the point of view particularly of this universal Freedom from Want. But the essential consideration involved is that while every possible opportunity should be afforded to every community, and every individual within the community, to realise in his own person this ideal, there are certain inevitable limitations, due to the unequal development of the different countries, upon any concrete effort to realise this ideal. That does not mean that the necessary effort should not be made. Given the other conditions, preliminaries, or foundations of the new world order, the attempt is both necessary and advisable to make. But it must not proceed on any false assumption of equality as between nations, which does not exist; nor build itself upon any misconception of possibilities without commensurate human or material resources that may have to be provided.

(4) FREEDOM FROM FEAR.

"The last freedom is stated as follows :

"The fourth is freedom from fear, which, translated into world terms, means world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point, and in such a thorough fashion, that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbour—everywhere in the world."

This is also categorically stated, but is more political in conception than economic. Its economic repercussion, however, cannot be denied or overlooked. It is not stated in this Article, banning the use of force as a means to settle international differences, and accepting the ideal of non-violence which to Indian readers at any rate is not unfamiliar, as to how the goal is to be attained. Thinkers and statesmen of the West have gradually come to realise that Force is futile ; and that the only solution for establishing international peace, which would be universal as well as abiding, which would be just as well as equal to all, lies in the acceptance of the principle of non-violence, both in dealings as between individuals and as between nations.

A concrete form in which the ideal of non-violence as between nations is to be given effect to, as stated in this Article, is by scrapping armaments of every kind, so as to take away the wherewithal for waging war. We have already examined the corresponding Article of the Atlantic Charter, and will comment later on the similar attempt made at the Yalta Conference, subsequently reaffirmed in the Charter drafted at the San Francisco Conference following the Dumbarton Oaks agreement on a plan for the world peace. It would be, therefore, unnecessary to go over the same ground at this stage. But the President's views may be expressed in his own words : "It is a definite basis for a kind of world possible in our time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-called New Order of tyranny that the victors seek to create. To that new order we oppose the greater conception of the moral order. A good society is able to face schemes of world domination and foreign revolutions alike without fear."

On this as on the other Freedoms enunciated above, there are also inevitable limitations, which, the categoric form in which the President has stated them, does not make clear. Reference has already been made to the inequality of treatment between the armed nations of today in

the programme of disarmament to be given effect to progressively hereafter. If disarmament is to be real, it must also be universal. So long as some States remain armed and others disarmed, there will be always room for fear, which the President wanted to abolish from the face of the earth. Neither at the Yalta Conference nor at San Francisco has this been made as explicit and unambiguous as necessary.

The second limitation, also arising from the nature of things, is in regard to armament proper, but also in connection with the industries producing these armaments. Modern industry, however, is so integrated and interdependent that in demanding the scraping of certain industries only, and that too in certain countries only, there would be an inescapable risk of prejudicing the entire industrial organisation and development of those countries. The only way out, therefore, seems to be for industries connected with armaments to be placed under international ownership, control and operation in which all communities may have equal stake, equal opportunity, equal scope for employment, both of their materials and of their manpower.

The third limitation is a little more difficult to explain. It relates to those nations or countries of the world, which, owing to historical accident, are yet not in possession of their national independence, and are dominated as well as exploited by outsiders. If the international authority proposed to be set up fails to ensure their speedy emancipation and guarantee independence, a margin will have to be left for their seeking by their own efforts to achieve their independence which may involve the use of force. Here is not a plea for the use of force in any case. It is rather a warning to the leaders of mankind that, unless they do justice equally to all, and abide by the principles enunciated in such statements as these, the very ideals on which they seek to found the new order would be jeopardised at the start.

MEANING OF "FREEDOM" IN MODERN CIVILISED SOCIETY

Having considered the specific, categorical forms, in which certain fundamental pre-requisites of a new society are declared necessary to be embodied and enforced by the leaders and spokesmen of the victorious Allies, it would be interesting as well as instructive to add a few observations regarding the meaning and scope of "Freedom" in modern civilised society. Man, though he prides himself to be the crown of

creation, is, by the biological and physical limitations of his being, the most helpless of living animals, unable to live a moment after birth without the constant care, co-operation, and assistance of his fellows. This is not true only of his infancy ; it is true for all his life from the cradle to the grave, from conception to dissolution. These, his fellows, may be bound to him by ties of affection, of blood, or family ; or be aiding and co-operating with him for more material consideration. But they are all integral part and parcel of the existing civilised social structure. From birth onwards, his health, nourishment, education, employment, entertainment, or recreation, mental and physical growth and development in all directions, are all dependent upon the constant co-operation of the fellow members of the same social system. The difference between the animal and the savage, and between the savage and the civilised man, is the substitution of mutual co-operation for individual self-sufficiency ; the progressive elimination of the element of chance, and of the law of the jungle. The uncertainties of life and accidents in work, which are the marks of jungle life and the vestiges of primitive humanity, are effectively guarded against by organised co-operation. That co-operation facilitates division of labour and specialisation of function, which, in its turn, brings trade, increases production, and so adds to the all-round happiness of the civilised man. The law of the jungle knows only brute strength, as the ultimate arbiter ; the law of civilised society must consider the claims of justice for the weak against the strong ; and enables the principle of the *survival of the weakest* to operate on terms other than those of brute force. The latter implies and embodies much more of cultural growth and spiritual development, for which no material value can be found.

As civilisation grows, and man supersedes brute force by intellectual reasoning ; as he substitutes gradually, but more and more effectually, right to be might in place of might being right ; as the rule of law is evolved and established to protect the weak against the strong, the poor against the rich, and the supremacy of constituted authority as established to maintain that rule of law, the unregulated impulse of the individual comes to be restrained more and more effectually in every direction. What we call Order is only a synonym for the restraint and discipline imposed upon human beings. In the beginning such restraint is implied by some outside authority, whether in the name of unseen, intangible forces, which religion upholds as the ultimate sanc-

tion for all, or in the name of worldly authority established and maintained by an implied social contract between the citizen and the State, which is the final source and sanction of all laws. As civilisation proceeds; as education widens and deepens; as occasions for diaffection through injustice are minimised, man learns to evolve by himself, following intellectual conviction, the necessity to restrain his undisciplined impulse and govern his passions. A body of laws, rules and conventions grows up, and comes to be enforced, whether on behalf of a visible sovereign authority, or in the name of such invisible forces as the dictates of conscience, the fear of hereafter, or the sense of honour. A constitution grows up side by side to promulgate, interpret, and enforce these laws, customs, or conventions, which form the concrete, visible, or palpable essence of civilised society. In proportion as these laws, etc., are tested by reason and justified by experience; in proportion as their enactment or enforcement ceases to be arbitrary, and follows well established procedure; and in proportion as the benefit or burden of these laws, etc., is available and distributed in an equal measure,—man is said to have attained, and to be enjoying, political freedom.

But whether restrictions of this kind are imposed upon him by outside authority, or by his own consent and conviction, the fact is indisputable that, in civilised society, Freedom, or liberty of the individual, must be interpreted in a sense wholly different from what it would convey in primitive society, among savages, or in the jungle, where the individual himself is the sole judge as well as the enforcer of his liberty. The more complex a civilisation, the less the scope for individual freedom in the absolute sense of the right to act under unregulated impulse. We shall notice below a little more fully the true nature and real content of what is comprised in the "freedom of the individual" in a civilised community, and also of the community itself. But it must be added here that any scope for freedom that obtains in a modern civilised society is on condition that the equal freedom of one's neighbours and fellow workers must be fully respected. The result is inevitable that one's own freedom comes to be inevitably restricted. There is less and less room for undisciplined impulse till it disappears altogether. The only saving grace is that such restrictions on personal liberty are imposed by common consent under definite laws, made after proper deliberation by those who can justly claim to speak for their fellows.

This restraint is called *civilisation*, or *co-operation*. The right of

initiative, of freedom of enterprise, to the individual, which is assumed even now to be the corner-stone in the social systems of many so-called free countries, has been necessarily and inevitably restricted under the impulse of war, even in those societies. And when the fertile excuse of war-time necessity is no more, many, if not all, of those restrictions will still continue because of the very nature of modern industrial civilisation. The impact of large-scale production with the help of modern machinery had already paved the way towards far more co-ordinated effort, regulated and conditioned by the system of division of labour and specialisation of function, than was necessary in a system of individual or local self-sufficiency. When each worker worked with his own tools and materials, at his own convenience, and for his own customers, there was no great need of systematic organisation and constant co-ordination. In modern industrialised society, with mass production of machine-made standardised goods, individual freedom would result, if left free and unrestrained, in sheer anarchy, and incalculable waste. Control, supervision, regulation and direction, under a comprehensive plan, means not only organisation, co-operation, co-ordination; but also increased yield, constant progress, and improvement in the conditions of life. Competition, which is the essence of the so-called individual initiative and freedom of enterprise, is wasteful. Its allure of cheapness through plenty is deceptive and misleading. It inevitably engenders conflict of interests, and emphasises individual greed for personal gain as the only motive spring of human effort, that eventually culminates in violence, whether amongst individuals, or amongst nations. The former is called cut-throat competition; the latter is war. The champions of individual initiative and freedom of enterprise have themselves realised the wastefulness of competition, as nations, driven by the same elementary force, are realising the futility of war. They have consequently evolved a number of devices to mask the elimination of competition, such as Trusts and Syndicates making for monopoly. And so absolute freedom of competition is now no longer insisted upon wherever industrial civilisation has manifested itself. Its place must, therefore, be taken more and more by socialised enterprise and coordinated endeavour, planned activity and collective effort, not only to increase the volume of material production, but also to implant and strengthen the habit of mutual aid and allround co-operation.

It must be added that all restraints or discipline, all abiding by

the rule of law, or the regulation of the place and conditions of work as well as amusement, that a citizen in a modern civilised community has to accept, is not galling ; nor negating the right to self-expression and self realisation of the individual being. It is the result of one's own consent,—express or implied,—by which such rules, regulations, customs and usages, are evolved, enacted, and enforced. The sting is taken out of them from the very outset. This consent may be given through regularly constituted channels, like the Legislature, in which representatives or spokesmen of the people join in the deliberations that must precede the making, amending, or annulling of any law, usage or observance. As these representatives are elected by the people, they are supposed to consent to such laws, etc., on behalf of their electors or constituents. But the consent of the individual is not less frequently implied from what is called public opinion, which, however vague the term may be, is nowadays a potent factor in all well-organised communities. Any restraint, therefore, which we impose upon ourselves, by our own consent, or as a measure of voluntary self-discipline by our own conviction, is not a restriction or negation of freedom. On the contrary, it is the only condition under which a real scope for self-development may be available ; and the greatest possibility of attaining material well-being for every individual, and, through it, for self-realisation:

Failure to observe such restraints may be guarded against by specific sanctions, whether of the law, or of convention. These may be of a penal character. If not curative or preventive from the beginning, they may nevertheless suffice to deter violaters of such laws or conventions in the future. But as civilisation grows, the use of such sanction will become more and more infrequent and unnecessary, because of the willing acceptance by the individual of such restraints through laws, customs or convention. And that will be due to the perception of one's own interests being included or comprised in the common good ; and to the realisation that the common good can be accomplished to the maximum degree only if one acts in co-operation with his fellows.

This is a most intriguing paradox. The civilised man thus becomes less and less free, while his opportunities for freedom become more and more multiplied. This freedom is not only from the oppression or exploitation by his fellows ; it is much more truly freedom from the tyranny of nature, from the toll of disease, and the curse of destitution.

As civilisation becomes more and more complex ; and man's dependence upon his fellows becomes closer and closer, the right to act under ungoverned impulse is abrogated. But in its place comes the right to have a full share in all the benefits that the triumph of man's intelligence, and the might of his organisation, have achieved over the forces of nature. Man perceives both the potentialities of collective effort, and the utter futility of individual impulse, as the realisation deepens of the value of co-operation, of the division of labour, or by whatever other name it is called.

Will the enunciation, or even effective assurance, of such freedoms, or rights of nations and individuals, suffice to abolish war for ever from the surface of the globe ? We shall see how far effective steps have been, or are proposed to be, taken to make these freedoms, these rights and obligations of individuals and communities real. But at this stage it is pertinent to add that, by themselves, these declarations and assurances are incapable of eradicating the past, even if they may be pronounced to be sufficient to ensure the future. The roots of conflict, of an abiding threat to peace among nations, lie buried deep in our past. Unless these are dug out and destroyed the danger will not be for ever ended.

ROOT CAUSES OF WAR AND THEIR REMEDY

Let us, therefore, cast a glance at the root causes of war as they have manifested themselves in the last two or three centuries.

As stated already, the root causes of such conflicts lie in the inequality amongst nations, and injustice as between individuals. If the foundations of world peace are to be securely laid, every measure would have to be taken to abolish those inequalities, and remedy injustices.

The economic inequality amongst nations is mainly due to material causes which can be summarised under four main heads;

- (a) There is, in the first place, unequal initial endowment of the different countries, in respect of material resources, climatic conditions, or even of the human element. These are, to a great extent, outside human control. But the progress of science and the growth of human ingenuity has made it possible to devise counteractive agents against many of these, which can adjust the life and work in conformity with this unequal endowment. It is, moreover, possible to neutralise, in a great measure, the consequences of such unequal

endowments, not only by larger co-operation and better organisation amongst individuals, groups, or countries ; but also by a process of peaceful intercourse or trade, which is no less a mark of progressive civilisation.

- (b) The unequal initial endowment of a country may be accentuated by unequal material development, due to historical accidents. Looking at the history of the last two centuries, the advance and progress of Industrialisation, with the aid of mechanical power, has been at different times pursued with different intensity in different countries. The benefit resulting from the aid of power-driven machinery, and the consequent multiplication of wealth in those countries, and their domination over others, have brought about great inequalities in political power and influence among the nations of the world, that cannot but provoke and accentuate divergences of interests.

As the more advanced industrial nations had, further, their own economic deficiencies, in regard to their inherent material resources of food or raw materials, or their lack of markets within their own frontiers for their own finished goods, they were driven to attack, invade, annex, or acquire other territories, with less developed material civilisation or productive capacity. The process of imperialism thus went on, feeding upon the very conquests and acquisitions it had made in the first stage. The more the domination of such countries extended, the more their appetite grew for such domination, as it provided steadily increasing opportunity for exploitation ; and the wider was the range where they provoked envy, opposition, and, ultimately, recourse to arms, from those who wished for the same opportunities for themselves.

- (c) Unequal political power and influence, which resulted from these conquests, became itself an additional factor in intensifying the conflict of interests or the divergence of ambitions. International politics, when freed from the dynastic considerations of the eighteenth century in Europe, began to be coloured more and more by economic factors as applied to each individual country. So long as there were regions,

either uninhabited, or inhabited by peoples much inferior in material civilisation and mechanised industry, this conflict did not exhibit that clear cleavage of economic interests, which in the present century has become unmistakable. For there was room for all of them to annex and exploit these backward regions. Since the beginning of this century, the search for markets for finished goods and sources of raw materials for European industry has been accentuating, in ever ascending intensity, the causes of strife. It broke out twice in less than forty years on a world scale. Once it was ended by a makeshift of Versailles, but a fresh starting point for new conflict and another war. Let us hope the second eruption we are now passing through will not be ended by patching and tinkering.

Whether we describe these as political or as economic factors, the fact remains that unequal political power and influence is a cause of unfair competition in the search for markets, which cannot but endanger the peace of the world as it is.

- (d) The conflict of ideologies is only a super-imposition of form, or expression, given to radical factors, which have created the initial divergence. Once, however, such different ideologies are formulated, they become a dominating factor in themselves; and lead to conflicts by the very insistence on their difference. Differences in ideologies, it need hardly be added, are the most outstanding factors that easily catch the eye. But lest the contemporaries be misled by the insistence on these formal differences, it is important to remember that they but reflect or express differences in material factors which are the root cause of the perennial conflict.

In the long range, these four factors work out their destinies in such devious ways that we may not be able to distinguish, isolate, and consider, in its primary form, each such factor and its consequences. Their cumulative force goes to the very root, vitiating modern industrial civilisation by introducing false motives, false standards of value, false turns to the aims of human society and endeavour. Close and constant

co-operation, the indispensable pre-requisite of individual human effort succeeding, has been replaced by competition, which, by its very nature, tends to divide and not to unite. The task, therefore, of all those who would strike at the root of the evil will concentrate itself upon eliminating or remedying these initial and fundamental inequalities, even though they may appear to be the outcome of natural forces.

A full recognition of human equality in all countries, or all races, and at every stage of civilisation, must be the ultimate foundation of peace, the only means of restoring universal goodwill, that is to last for a long, long time amongst the peoples of the world. Mere expression of formal equality, however, would not be enough. It must be reinforced by an equal fullness of opportunity for every individual to live out his life free from fear or want, as the Atlantic Charter declares. It must be enjoyed by every organised community as an independent entity or State, recognised as an equal member of the Comity of Nations. For the freedom from want and fear means also freedom from aggression and exploitation. No racial or economic superiority of any kind, no power to exploit one individual by another, should be given any room in the new order, which seeks to establish permanent peace.

All this discussion has revealed the main foundations of peace, from the national as well as from the individual, angle to be :

- (a) Equality as between the sovereign nations of the world, admitted or recognised as members of the comity of nations;
- (b) Inviolable integrity of these guaranteed against aggression from any quarter by the combined might of the common world organisation.
- (c) Social justice to individuals, so as to ensure freedom from want and suffering, abolish parasitism, and ensure happiness and cultural advancement, in return for contribution by work in accordance with the ability, aptitude and training of each ; and
- (d) Social equality of all individuals in Guaranteed Rights as well as obligations, so as to eliminate exploitation of the masses by privileged classes.

Chapter VI

YALTA CONFERENCE, AND AFTER

These root evils of the present day individualist society all over the world,—bar, perhaps, the Soviet Union,—have been perceived by the leaders of the belligerent as well as the neutral nations; and the several declarations or assurances we have so far reviewed are aimed at remedying them. The greatest of their attempts was made at San Francisco, in what is called the United Nations Charter of International Peace and Security. We shall examine its provisions. At this stage, let us cast a glance at the preliminaries of that International Organisation,—the modern substitute of the League of Nations, which were made at Dumbarton Oaks, and elaborated in the Big Three Conference at Yalta early this year.

The declaration of the three great powers made at Yalta was concerned, primarily and almost entirely, with the treatment of Germany at the end of the War. With decisive victory in the field then in sight, it was immediately necessary for these leaders to lay down broad lines of their policy towards Germany on the cessation of hostilities. But inasmuch as these lines indicated a bent of mind which would cripple a great people for a generation to come, if not more, by destroying or restricting industry, but also exact reparation to the utmost of its ability for making good the damage and destruction the war had entailed upon the Allies, they may leave feelings of bitterness, and foster a desire for revenge, which will be deep and widespread in that country, however just the retribution exacted. The Allies have made it abundantly clear that they seek to reduce Germany to the level of an agricultural country. The consequences, however, of such a policy if carried out rigorously, are likely to be far more serious to Europe as a whole than seems to be realised by the victorious Allies to-day.

The Yalta Declaration, in one or two respects, differs, at least so far as the terminology goes, from its interpretation and explanation as given by the British Prime Minister, when the decisions of the Crimea conference formed a subject of a parliamentary debate. The Prime Minister has modified the destruction or restriction of German industry, which was almost unqualified as stated in the Three Powers' Declaration. In his address to the Commons, he spoke of only such industry as ministered to war, and that would be destroyed or restricted.

"All German industries capable of military production shall be eliminated or controlled ; and Germany shall make compensation *in kind to the utmost of her ability* for the damage done to the Allied Nations." (*Italics mine*)

These words are substantially identical with the corresponding terms of the Yalta Conference.

"We are determined (1) to disband all German armed forces : break up, for all time, the German General Staff, that has repeatedly contrived resurgence of German militarism ; (3) remove or destroy all German military equipment ; (4) *eliminate or control all German industry that may be used for military production* ; (5) to bring war criminals to justice and swift punishment, (6) and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans."

There can be no difference on the first three of these objectives, as being both just and necessary. As for (5), bringing war criminals to trial, while recognising and condemning unreservedly the atrocities the Nazi forces are said to have perpetrated in countries invaded or occupied by them, it may be open to question under what law these "criminals" would be brought to trial and punished. It is by no means clear under what part of the international law heads of State, or those acting under orders of their own constitutional authorities, can be tried or punished by an international tribunal. There is no positive law on the subject, except conventions regarding treatment of war prisoners or immunities of Red Cross workers. And there may be still greater uncertainty regarding the procedure before the tribunal. These, however, may be considered as mere technicalities ; and I have no desire to be narrowly pedantic on the subject. There is, moreover, ample evidence regarding Nazi excesses and atrocities, both at home and

abroad, which unquestionably demand just retribution. But the point cannot be altogether ignored that German, Japanese and Italian war leaders were not the only players in the game which has culminated in a well-merited disaster for the Axis powers. If the responsibility for war as such is to be charged on individuals, I am afraid most of the statesmen of the generation between 1919 and 1939 will have to bear their share. Those who have failed must pay the forfeit; but those who have succeeded cannot altogether be absolved at the bar of history, even if they escape altogether for the moment in the halo of their success.

Both the Tripartite Declaration of Yalta and the statement of the Prime Minister in Parliament emphasise that it was *not* the purpose of the Allies to *destroy the German people*, or leave them without the necessary means of subsistence. Stalin has again and again stressed the same view. The general treatment shown to the German people by the conquering Russians after the surrender of Germany amply bears out this policy. But the place for the German people in the Comity of Nations will only be found, when they are purged completely of Nazism and militarism, and have made reparation for all the damage they have inflicted.

The wherewithal for such reparation obviously cannot be found from existing German material resources, or future production for years to come. The desire to eliminate or control all German industry may be restricted only to such industries as minister to war production. But inasmuch as, at the present day, industry is so inter-dependent in all its forms that it is impossible to distinguish between what may be called industry supplying war material, and that devoted exclusively to peace-time requirements, this demand is likely to prove unduly onerous. The totalitarian war of today is co-terminous with all human needs in normal life. Those, therefore, who insist upon the elimination or control of German industry, will have to deal with the entire German industrial structure. And if, as is very likely, they are unable clearly to distinguish between war-industry and peace-time production, but seek to control or eliminate the entire system, they will be open to the suspicion of ulterior designs, especially if German peace-time industry has been a serious rival to their own industry in international markets, whose competition or revival they have reason to dread for their own natural standard of living. The Allies have made

it abundantly clear that they seek to reduce Germany to the level of an agricultural country. The consequences, however, of such a policy if carried out rigorously, are likely to be far more serious to Europe as a whole than seems to be realised by the victorious Allies today.

On the other hand, the demand for "Reparation in kind" to the utmost of German capacity,—especially under a regime of elimination or control of German industry, and consequent crippling of German productive capacity,—can only mean forced labour of German nationals, taken in many cases by force to the countries invaded during the war by Germany and damaged by her forces. Forced labour of this kind and under these conditions would negative the very ideal of democracy and freedom, for which the Western nations are supposed to have fought.

There would be also material reason to object to any such forced labour, at least for Britain and the United States. The Labour Market in their own countries would be gravely affected and prejudiced by the use of such labour in any of the principal countries,—except Soviet Russia,—claiming to have been damaged by German invasion and atrocities. The Soviet Union may be the loudest in insisting upon this form of reparation. But it has an economic system which can without any strain absorb large numbers of forced labour in the vast projects of reconstruction and development it is likely to take in hand after the war is ended. For the others, it would be a form of revenge, which will, psychologically speaking, have the worst possible reaction. In so far, therefore, as these Declarations indicate such lines of policy, at variance with the governing ideals enunciated earlier, we may take it that they will carry in themselves seeds of discontent and disruption, which does not augur well for the maintenance of universal and permanent peace in the world.

The institution of a modernised substitute for the League of Nations,—proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, agreed to at Yalta, and worked out in detail at San Francisco,—with the United States as an active and effective member of that organisation, may be welcomed as a step in the right direction. But here, again, the trend of events to-day suggests the domination, as in the old League of Nations, of two or three countries, which may not always be in conformity with the basic ideals leading to the establishment of such a body. The British Prime Minister, speaking on the Crimea Conference decisions, has, indeed, eschewed

any desire to introduce a dictatorship of two or three powers, under the guise of a new League of Nations called the World Security Council. But the force of national interests, and the demands of economic imperialism, on which some countries have been nurtured so far, may eventually prove stronger than any sentiments expressed in parliament, or at international conferences. Looked at from every point of view, one comes back to the essentials, viz., that unless and until the axe is laid at the root cause of evil,—the conflict of interests or ambitions culminating in warfare,—there will be no complete and permanent outlawry of war, no renunciation of force for settling international disputes.

Wiser by the lessons of the inter-war period, and sobered by the American aloofness from the League of Nations, President Roosevelt has declared that, after the end of this War, it would be impossible for America to avoid responsibility for the maintenance of world peace. In his inaugural address to the Congress, as President for the fourth term in succession, he declared :

“We have learnt that we cannot live alone at peace, that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned that we must live as men, not as ostriches, nor as dogs in the manger. We have learnt to be Citizens of the World, members of the human community.”

And in his address to the Congress on the Yalta Conference, he observed :

“This time”, he has said, “we shall not make the mistake of waiting till the end of the War to set up the machinery of peace. Responsibility for political conditions through thousands of miles overseas can no longer be avoided by this great nation. As I have said, it is a smaller world, the United States now exert a vast influence in the cause of peace throughout the world. It will continue to exert that influence only if it is willing to continue to share in the responsibility for keeping peace. It would be our own tragic loss were we to shirk that responsibility.”

In the message to the Congress, the President added :

“Twenty-five years ago American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which

they had fought and suffered. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world again to survive. The Crimea conference was a successful effort by three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells the end of the system of unilateral action, and exclusive alliance and spheres of influence, and all other expedients which have been tried for centuries and have failed. *We propose to substitute for all these a universal organisation in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join."*

President Roosevelt is dead. But his spirit endures and the meaning of his message has been taken to their heart, it seems, by the American people. Americans are not the only people, who have made sacrifices in this War. But theirs is, after Russia's, the greatest single contribution to victory. Their suffering may not compare to that of China or Russia; the damage and destruction of material values may be greater as suffered by Britain. Theirs would still be the loudest voice, the most considerable influence in reshaping the peace that humanity needs, and which our civilisation requires for its very existence.

Such a peace necessarily cannot be a peace, either of one party, or even of one nation. It must be a peace that will be acceptable to all; in which all will concur, and to which all will contribute. It must be a peace which should solve the problems immediately following the War; but the structure of which may change as the conditions change, leaving, however, the foundations intact. It must be a peace, finally, which will endure as long as humanity demands it, and the nations of the world associated in maintaining it see in its continuance their only salvation; and so see to it that the foundations on which that peace rests are maintained untouched.

It is these foundations, however, which have to be carefully considered and accurately laid. As stated repeatedly above, so long as the root causes, which have led to political imperialism and economic exploitation by certain more advanced, more developed, or more powerful nations, of the less developed and backward regions and peoples, continued, there can be no hope of permanent peace and real goodwill amongst mankind. The first foundation of such peace must, therefore, be sought in a real sense of full equality and independence amongst the

peoples of the world, subject to such conditions, and limitations of their independence and integrity as are indispensable for the system of all-round cooperation to work, and replace the present system of universal competition, inevitably leading to conflict. No room must be left for any sense of inequality or futility in the common councils of the world for any nation, state or people, no matter how small the country or slight the number. No ground must be given for any economic relations between countries leading to only one-sided advantage out of such intercourse. All must cooperate for every one's benefit; and all must share equally in the same.

Another equally important basis for lasting peace will be found in the provision of equal opportunities and facility for each country to develop its own resources to the utmost possible. In this process of development the first claim to contribute as well as to share in the result is that of the peoples of that region. This must be unambiguously stated and unconditionally recognised. This does not mean that there will be no cooperation between the people of one region with those of their neighbours, even in the process of this development. But such cooperation or exchange must be on equal terms, provided under a sort of international covenant regulating such items; and not on the pattern of the cooperation (sic) which the European nations of to-day extend to Asiatic or African peoples.

By such equal and agreed lines of cooperation, the surplus as well as the deficit among countries or communities will be readily shared, and fairly distributed. No country need, accordingly, lag behind for want of adequate resources in raw materials, technical skill, or capital equipment; nor need any be condemned to destroy the surplus of its produce, simply for want of a market.

This would need a Master Plan of alround world development, without which such constant and effective cooperation may not be easy to provide. It will also need a comprehensive Plan for each component unit of the Comity of Nations, coordinating its effort and adjusting its resources to its requirements. The World Plan will be an integrated whole of all such national plans for development, which will, each, pay full regard to the natural endowment of each region and its human complement in skill, or equipment; and which will also give effect to the requirements of a decent standard of living guaranteed to each individual in every country. The system of colonies and depen-

dencies must go. And even if mandates or Trusts replace them, they must be treated not for the benefit of the Mandatory or the Trustee, but for those who make up the mandate or trust. The claims of Social Justice, as between individuals in the same country, must also be extended and enforced on the same ground as claims of equality, integrity, independence, and opportunity, as between nations. Just as political integrity and independence, coupled with the economic well-being and advancement, of each component unit of the World Federation should be the concern of all ; so also the Rights of Citizens or of human beings within each country, and social justice as between their several groups, should be guaranteed, maintained and enforced, if necessary, by the authority of the supreme World Council, if and when any such organisation is evolved and established.

A world organisation of international security has indeed been promised in the so-called Dumbarton Oaks Conference ; its conclusions and recommendations are to be advanced a step further towards final establishment of a World Security Organisation by the San Francisco Conference held in April 1945. That gathering, it may be pointed out in passing, was not a Peace conference proper. As President Truman said in welcoming the Delegates :—

- “It is not the purpose of this Conference to draft a Treaty of Peace in the old sense of that term. It is not our assignment to settle specific questions of territories, boundaries, citizenship and reparations.
- “This Conference will devote its energies and its labours exclusively to the single problem of setting up an essential organisation to keep the peace. Justice remains the greatest power on earth. To that tremendous power alone will we submit.
- “Man has learned long ago that it is impossible to live unto himself. This same basic principle applies today to Nations. We were not isolated during the war. We dare not become isolated in peace.
- “We must make certain that another war will be impossible. We represent the overwhelming majority of all mankind. We hold a powerful mandate from our people. We must prevent, if human mind, heart and hope can prevent it, a

repetition of the disaster from which the entire world will suffer for years to come.

"We must not continue to sacrifice the flower of our youth merely to check mad men who in every age plan world domination."

Mr. Truman recalled his address nine days before to the United States Congress, in which he had said that while the great powers have

"a special responsibility to enforce peace, their responsibility is based upon the obligations resting upon *all* States, large and small, not to use force in international relations except in defence of law. The responsibility of the great States is to serve, and not to dominate, the peoples of the world."

"We fully realise today," he added, "that victory in war requires a mighty united effort. Certainly victory in peace calls for and must receive an equal effort."

Until, however, a super sovereign World State is evolved, generally accepted and armed with the necessary powers, Peace should be founded on two main bases relating :

- I. to the nations or countries of the world ; and
- II. to the individuals making up humanity at large.

For the former it has been premised :

- (a) equality of status in the councils of the world, and opportunity for the development of inherent resources, as also to procure the wherewithal needed for such development ;
- (b) integrity or security against aggression, after such readjustments of frontiers, if any, as any section of the country concerned might desire ; or which may be necessary for undoing the acts of aggression committed in the recent past ; provided that freedom must be reserved for the inhabitants of any region, included in any given country or unit of the World Federation at the time of the settlement, to join any other neighbouring unit for better cooperation after seceding from the unit in which it was included at the

time of the Settlement, in accordance with the procedure laid down for the purpose ; and

- (c) independence from outside interference or dictation, provided the Rights of Men and Citizens, of communities or Minorities, declared, agreed to, and guaranteed by common consent of the nations of the world, are strictly observed and duly enforced in each and every such country forming part of the World Federation.

The principle of national integrity and independence is subject to considerable reservations. In a world of all-round mutual co-operation, independence of a country cannot be interpreted to mean exclusiveness, or refusal to co-operate in the agreed framework, or on accepted lines. Much less can it mean the right of any country to adopt and pursue any policy of exclusive benefit to itself at the expense of the rights or interests of other countries. The ultimate object, the real foundation of such peace and reorganisation, remotivation and reorientation of human society, human activity, human civilisation, is the happiness of every individual human being. If local integrity or independence should be exercised by any country, so as to come in the way of the legitimate pursuit of happiness by any considerable action of its inhabitants, or be prejudicial to the corresponding interests of others in neighbouring lands, such freedom of action by any unit may necessitate collective action of other members of the Comity of Nations to prevent such abuse of local sovereignty.

Another limitation of this principle lies in the form of the new political organisation. Every country forming part of the federation of the world must be organised on democratic basis. According to the Crimea Conference :—

“They (Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin) jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert, during the temporary period of unstability to liberated Europe, policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite States of Europe to solve, by *democratic* means, their present political and economic problems.”

There are obvious limitations to the principle of democracy working on a large scale, in practice. But, despite the possibility,—the very

great probability,—that the government of the people by the people will not always be by the best of the people, with the best of the motives, and for the best of ends, we must trust to the democratic principle as the only available solution of the future political organisation of mankind. The advent of the Philosopher-King, contemplated by Plato, or assumed in the *Civitas Dei*, is unlikely in the near future. Working democracy may be safeguarded by what the political thinkers have called “checks and balances of the constitution.” It can function fairly adequately and satisfactorily through responsible executive. Its justice and efficiency may be assured by a division of powers and functions between the several organs of the State, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial. It may involve, also, a certain delegation of sovereign authority, as between the Federation and the federating units; or as between the Legislature and departments of Government under what a Chief Justice has called “the New Despotism”. But, in the last analysis, it must be, in every unit of the World Federation, government of the *people*, by the *people*, for the *people*.

The individual must be assured freedom of thought and expression, of movement and organization, of belief and worship, and, above all, right to economic well being and social security. Consideration is given later on in some detail to defining these Fundamental Rights of Men and Citizens, as well as their obligations. But speaking generally in this place, it must be realised that without ensuring the economic well-being of the individual, social discontent and human misery will not be eliminated from the world. The seeds of unrest thus left in individual hearts may at any time blaze out into a conflagration which may envelope the whole world. The equality of status and opportunity for all individuals, irrespective of birth, wealth, race or sex, creed or complexion, is an indispensable condition precedent to this political reorganisation.

This equality to the individual must be available in daily life. The State must endeavour to the utmost to guarantee its actual enjoyment in real life. It is not merely political equality, as exemplified by the right to vote for public bodies or offices, and to hold the same, on a par with one's fellows; nor the equality before all public bodies,—including tribunals of law, departments of government, or public utilities and social services,—without any privilege arising from birth, or creed, or sex. It is, much more truly and objectively, the quality of

individuals or citizens for earning a living, for occupation and employment, suited to the training and aptitude of each individual, which the State must guarantee and provide, so as to make the enjoyment of real equality a fact, and not an abstraction.

To enable the individual to appreciate fully the New Order of things thus established, it is absolutely necessary to redesign Public Education from the bottom upwards. Education of the youth as well as the adult in every country must be freed from the prejudices and superstitions that have befogged our minds, and facilitated the rise of such fetishes as "race superiority", or the "Führer Prinzip." The content as well as the technique of education will require to be recast. Not the least of the tasks of the authorities in the New World Order shall be to enunciate and prescribe the basic principles of the New Education; nor the least important function of the authorities in each State to see to it that this New Education is available and provided for every individual. The desire for display, domination, or exploitation will only disappear from the face of the earth when men and women are trained in these new ideals of human brotherhood and cooperation. The exclusive class or denominational school, must go, as well as private enterprise for personal profit in the starting or running of educational institutions.

The shape of the International Security Organisation outlined at Dumbarton Oaks, was finalised at San Francisco. It does not establish a super Sovereign World State, suggested in these pages; nor furnish the United Nations Organisation with the powers, functions or attributes deemed needful by us. Its place and function in relation to the nations and peoples of the world have been laid down. They remain to be tested by experience. But this much seems to be quite certain, as promised by the professed leaders of the most powerful countries today, that such an Organisation must not be the creation and dependent of any two or three or four of the most powerful countries of the world, even though Russia, America, Britain and China were the sponsors of the San Francisco conference. It must be an organisation in which every component part is equally interested, equally entitled, and fully associated, with equal rights and possibilities, even though, for the time being, the leading countries of the world may have a predominant position and influence. But that is to facilitate the evolution of World

Security, and lay down sure foundations of peace, not to aid them in self-aggrandisement.

Let us, therefore, consider, in the next chapter, the nature and function of the World Security Organisation framed by the Delegates of 50 United Nations at San Francisco between April 24, and June 25, 1945.

Chapter VII

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The ideals and principles, enunciated in the declarations of leaders, considered in the earlier Chapters, would be of no avail unless and until a definite organisation is set up, and charged with responsibility of carrying these ideals into effect. For this purpose, a preliminary Conference was held at Dumbarton Oaks, U.S.A., between four of the principal Allies,—Britain, Russia, China and the U.S.A,—to outline a concrete scheme for such an international organisation. The representatives of these States completed their discussions in October, 1944; and the specific proposals prepared by them were submitted to the four Governments for their adoption, and eventual implementation.

The heads of the Three Big States, Britain, U.S.A. and Russia, met at Yalta early in 1945, generally approved of the lines sketched at Dumbarton Oaks, leaving the careful scrutiny of these proposals in detail to a full Conference of all the United Nations, through their accredited representatives, at San Francisco, U.S.A. The Conference was held as scheduled, with the four original signatories of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals,—France being added subsequently to their number,—serving as hosts. Forty-six countries were represented at this gathering, which lasted for nearly ten weeks. After long deli-

berations, and many differences, the Charter was finally agreed to, substantially as follows :*

PREAMBLE

In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, there was nothing like a preamble ; but in the final draft agreed to at San Francisco, the Charter opens with a preamble :

"We, the people of the United Nations, determined

- a. to save the succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our life-time has brought untold sorrow to mankind ;
- b. and to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and value of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women, and of nations, large and small ;
- c. and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained ;
- d. and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom ; and, for these ends,
- e. to practise tolerance, and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours ;
- f. and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security ;
- g. and to accept principles, and to institute methods to insure that armed force shall not be used save in the common interest ;
- h. and to employ international machinery for the promotion of economic and social advancement of all peoples ;

have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the City of San Francisco, who exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations, and do hereby establish an international organisation to be known as the United Nations Organisation.

* The textual quotations in the following pages are taken from "The New York Times" (almost complete Charter) June 12, 1945, as the full, official text of the Charter was not available in India while these pages were going through the press.

It may be noted at the very outset that the Charter sets up an "Organisation" of the United Nations, which is by no means the super-sovereign World State contemplated in the preceding pages. The authority vested in this Organisation, and the functions entrusted to its several organs, viewed conjointly, fall far short of the essential prerequisites of enduring peace, and for replacing incessant competition by all round cooperation amongst the peoples of the world. The ideals professed by the authors and sponsors of this new organisation are substantially the same as those held out in these pages ; but their concrete instrument for realising the ideals is different.

The proposed Organisation differs from the old League of Nations, also. The United States is an active associate in this, whereas it had completely repudiated the League, which, consequently, easily became a mere tool of France and Britain. The League, moreover, had none but economic sanctions to make good its suggestions ; but something much more than a mere boycott of an offender is to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations Organisation. There are other differences, also, in the two products of war ; but they will be noticed more fully later on.

The several purposes defined above are in many respects different from the purposes of the Organisation as stated in Chapter I of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The most important of these differences are :

The words "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law" as well as "disputes" or "situations leading to disputes" have been added.

Respect for "the principles of justice and international law" may be welcomed. But as there are no codified principles of justice, nor any defined body of laws that can be indisputably taken as International Law, the addition may cause more embarrassment than help effective action.

The same may also be said with regard to the addition of "situations" after "disputes". For situations may shape so as to be short of an actual dispute, and yet lead to acrimonious differences that may well threaten a breach of peace. If one of the purposes of the Organisation is to prevent such situations from working out into their logical conclusions, the provisions made by the Charter for preventing them cannot but be accepted.

It may be pointed out, at this stage, that, on a collective view of the Charter as a whole, it becomes clear that the success of the Organisation to attain the objectives mentioned in the preamble, or the Purposes of the Charter, will depend very much on the maintenance of friendly relations as between the United Nations ; and, particularly, the so-called Big Three, or Big Five,—Britain, Russia, U.S.A., France and China. It is open to question whether the close cooperation between the Big Three, forced by the exigencies of the war against a common enemy in Europe, would continue, in view of the obvious divergences of material interests, and basic outlook between the Soviet Union and the Western Democracies, after the war, in such a degree as seems implicitly assumed to be necessary in this Charter. As will be pointed out more fully while reviewing specific provisions, if any one of the Big Powers are minded not to abide by the ideals of this Organisation ; if any of them decide to resort to arms to settle their differences, there is nothing in the provisions of the Charter to prevent a major war breaking out once again.

Other reasons for this apprehension lie in the lack of any clear definition of an "act of aggression", the immunity from any intervention by the United Nations in what are called the "domestic affairs" of each member-State, the absence of any precise definition of what are the equal rights of men as human beings, and their fundamental freedoms, and, lastly, because of the peculiar procedure provided for taking any decision by any body under the Organisation.

It must also be noted that, for the moment, the Organisation will be made up of only those who participated in the San Francisco Conference as Foundation Members, plus such others as may be admitted hereafter. These are assumed to be "peace-loving" States ; and must pledge themselves to the principles of the Charter. No clear indication, however, is given as to the chances of countries, which were, during the war, regarded as enemies, or those under their domination, though the Potsdam declaration does show some solicitude for Eastern European States. These occupy a considerable block of the earth's surface, and include a fair proportion of the population. The enemy countries mean Germany, Italy and Japan as the leaders ; and if we add to that the countries occupied by them, or those under their influence,—Austria, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Manchuria, Thailand, Burma and Malaya, not to mention Spain, a very con-

siderable part of Europe and Asia would be excluded. Neutral countries, moreover, like Sweden, or Switzerland, are out of the list of members. While Spain continues under the Franco regime, its "peace-loving" character may be questioned; but no one can question the devotion to peace of Sweden or Switzerland. These cannot be treated for all time as out-castes from the Comity of Nations. So long as they remain outside the pale of the Organisation, the success of the Organisation itself may be jeopardised.

The implicit claim of some important members of the United Nations today to be "peace-loving" themselves is historically inadmissible. The Soviet Union may claim a complete break with the history and traditions of Czarist Russia. But not so Britain or France, whose record in the last three centuries is by no means an index of their "peace-loving" disposition. No imperial nation can, in fact, afford to be peace-loving.

Those who are inclined to exaggerate the strength of the United Nations hold that, even as things stand, they comprise something like 85% of the world's population. This can be conceded only if one regards that countries like India and China are truly equal members of the Organisation; and that their whole population may be taken as included. There are hardly 200 million persons in Free China* while India's present place in the United Nations Organisation is more due to the grace, or policy, of Britain, than to the recognised sovereignty of the people of this country.

It may be noted in passing that the term used in the Charter is more often "States" than "Peoples". The distinction is noteworthy as indicating the turn of mind which has drafted the Charter.

Not only is this Organisation not a Super State or World Sovereign; it lacks executive power, force, or authority, which every State still insists upon having for itself. The military might of the Organisation will be only such as the United Nations, or the Big Ones amongst them, choose to place at its disposal. No armed force to police the world has been created, and placed at the disposal of the Organisation, though there is a Military Staff Committee which may be expected to function as the International General Staff. Nor is any care taken that the industries which minister directly to war be brought under some

* This figure would be much greater since the end of war with Japan.

sort of international control, if not directly under international ownership and management.

The development of friendly relations amongst the nations "is based on the respect for the principle of *equal* rights and self-determination for peoples." This condition, lacking in the original proposals put forward at Dumbarton Oaks, is open to misinterpretation, being inaccurate and indefinite. Equality between member-States is not even nominal, considering, for instance, the distinction between permanent and elected members of the Security Council; or the differentiation in voting rights. "Self-determination of peoples" has a peculiar significance in countries like India, where the demand for partition has appeared recently and gathered strength. In countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia and the like, it has a somewhat different meaning. What, again, is meant by the term "people"? Do the Muslims of India, or the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia, constitute a people in the sense the term is used in here?

The last clause regarding "human rights and the fundamental freedoms" is a welcome addition, even though no definition is given anywhere in the Charter of what is meant by "human rights and fundamental freedoms." The addition of "without distinction as to race, sex, *language*, or religion" is intriguing, particularly on account of the term *language* in that clause. Mention of "language" would be intelligible if it is intended to conform to the doctrine of a common world citizenship, as envisaged in the preceding pages. If, on the other hand, it refers to the difference of language in one and the same State, it might necessitate intervention in, or indicate influence upon, any State making discrimination as between its citizens on the ground of language, say in its educational institutions, which would not be in conformity with the principles of this Charter. As, however, domestic matters are to be strictly excluded from the jurisdiction of the Organisation, such a construction of this clause in the Charter would be difficult to sustain.

PURPOSES OF THE ORGANISATION

The Organisation is established for the following purposes:

- (1) To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention

and removal of threats to the peace and suppression of acts of aggression, and other breaches of the peace, and to bring about, by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes, or situations which may lead to a breach of the peace.

- (2) To achieve international cooperation in the solution of international problems of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character, and promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, language, religion, or sex ; and
- (3) To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends.

These are all laudable objectives ; but their realisation in everyday life by every person in every land will be matter of the utmost interest to the average citizen. Comment has already been offered above on some of the defects or shortcomings of the purposes thus stated ; and so we need not repeat them here.

To achieve these aims, members are pledged to act in accordance with certain definite *principles*.

The first of these is the "sovereign equality" of all members. While there is no question about the "sovereignty" of members, at least in their internal administration, "equality" amongst members is only nominal. In the Security Council, while certain important members have got permanent seats, others have to elect six representatives for all of them, for a term of two years each. The voting procedure for such elections and other acts of the several bodies also shows no equality as between the members of the United Nations. "Enemy States" of today and some others being excluded from membership, at least for the time being, equality in their case is non-existent.

Article 8, Chapter II of the Charter, is very explicit. It forbids any intervention by the Organisation "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State." What these matters are has

employ force to secure their objective, *after* withdrawing from membership of the Organisation. Unless, therefore, the Organisation has its own armed forces to prevent any such recalcitrant member becoming aggressor and carrying out its threats, this abjuration of force may turn out to be of no avail, particularly so long as universal disarmament of member-States is not enforced. The only force at the disposal of the Organisation is the collective might of all members ; or the pledge of all members to place this might at the disposal of the Organisation. But what will be the real value of this, when one of the Big Three becomes the threatening party ?

Article 6 requires members not to give any assistance to any State against which preventive or enforcement action is being taken by the Organisation. But the danger envisaged in the preceding paragraph may occur, long before the Organisation makes up its mind, if it ever does so, to take preventive or enforcement action against a given member, especially if the dispute arises from internal differences threatening to culminate in a civil war, or revolution.

As regards States who are not members of the Organisation, for the time being, the Organisation must insure their acting in accordance with these principles, so far as it may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. What would be the methods, instruments, or technique, by which this insurance undertaken by the Organisation will be made effective, is not stated. Needless to add that the States which are not members of the Organisation are not pledged to any of its principles or purposes, and so not bound to act in accordance therewith. That does not, of course, mean that the Organisation must sit tight, and look upon with indifference any action or policy of non-member States, which may endanger the peace and security of the world. But until some definite methods are devised to prevent such activity or policy of non-member States, the danger would remain, and must be guarded against.

ADMISSION, SUSPENSION & EXPULSION OF MEMBERS

Admission of new members is left to the General Assembly, but it is conditional upon recommendation of the Security Council. The procedure for securing that recommendation is sufficiently complicated and

restricted to make admission of new members a difficult proposition. We shall review this more fully when considering the functions of the several bodies under the Organisation. So far as the States meeting at San Francisco are concerned, they, having signed the Charter, would automatically become members. Says Article 3 of Chapter II : "The original members of the United Nations shall be the States, which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on international organisation at San Francisco, or having previously signed the declaration by the United Nations, of January 12, 1942, sign the present Charter and ratify it."

By article 2 of Chapter III, membership is made open to all "peace-loving States", with the further qualification that they should be able and ready to accept and carry out the obligations contained in the Charter. Every State claims to be peace-loving. Except for sporadic outbursts of Mussolini, no State in recent times has claimed to be organised for war. War is assumed to be only as an incident in international relations, which is professedly regrettable, and which nevertheless has to be carried on with as much efficiency as the State concerned can command.

The description "peace-loving" as a qualification of membership, would apply much more appropriately to some of the States now not members of the Organisation, e.g. Switzerland, than to some of the most important members who have already signed and accepted the Charter, e.g. Britain. No imperialist nation can in fact really claim to be peace-loving, no matter what excuses or explanation it offers for any particular use of force by it in recent past. Czarist Russia was also in the same category, though the U.S.S.R. today may claim, with a degree of justice, to be peace-loving. Even in that case, episodes like the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-40 will have to be explained away; while dealings with border States in the course of the European War would require very hard justifying, if this description of "peace-loving" is to fit the present regime in Soviet Russia.

The United States may, with greater justice, claim to be peace-loving, though even in her case the Mexican war may require some explanation. About France and Britain, it is useless to offer any further comment, as their record, right upto the eve of the last war, is eloquent testimony to the contrary. Even now, if colonial peoples or Indians

were to speak freely, Britain certainly would not get full credit for being peace-loving ; while the Syrian episode of only a few months ago would affect France in the same manner.

If the leading members of the Organisation are thus tainted in respect of their "peace-loving" pretensions, this qualification for membership in the Organisation will have to apply only to States which are admitted subsequently ; and which would, therefore, have to produce credentials to comply with this Article. The defeated enemy States of today, Germany, Japan, Italy and their satellites, will take long to come within the category, however profuse their professions in regard to the second qualification, namely, ability and willingness to accept and carry out the obligations under the Charter. States like Sweden and Switzerland will not find great difficulty in being admitted ; but the case of Spain or Portugal would have to be differently judged. If, however, the Charter is to provide a World Organisation, in which every State, nation, or people is included, emphasis on such conditions or qualifications would be unwise to stress beyond a certain degree. It would be just as well to forget or ignore the past, if adequate assurances and guarantees are available that, for the future, members would be peace-loving, and do their best to accept and carry out the obligations under the Charter.

A member once admitted has the implicit right to withdraw from the Organisation. The General Assembly has the right to suspend or expel any member, against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken, or "which has persistently violated the principles contained in the Charter", upon recommendation of the Security Council. It may be added that the power to expel a member, persistently violating the fundamental principles of the Organisation, was at first dropped from the Draft Charter ; but it was reinstated in the final form of the Document on the recommendation of Russia. It is a salutary addition.

PRINCIPAL BODIES UNDER THE ORGANISATION

The organisation has five principal organs, namely

(a) The General Assembly,

- (b) The Security Council,
- (c) The Economic and Social Council,
- (d) The International Court of Justice, and
- (e) The Secretariat.

There may be established other subsidiary agencies as and when found necessary. The Military Staff Committee has been mentioned in the Charter itself.

The Charter insists that "the United Nations shall place no restriction on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in the principal and subsidiary organs."

(A) GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly may, at first sight, be taken to correspond to the American Congress, or the British Parliament. In reality, however, it is not a law-making body for the Organisation, whether as absolute or limited sovereign legislature. The Organisation is itself not a super-sovereign World State; and so its General Assembly cannot assume, or be charged with, functions of a Sovereign Legislature. At best it may, therefore, be taken to be an international forum, where questions of international interest may be discussed, general policy formulated, and, under certain circumstances, definite recommendations made.

As the main purpose of the Organisation is to preserve international peace and security, matters to be discussed and recommended upon by the Assembly will naturally have direct relation to these basic purposes. The General Assembly has been denied any initiative, even in making recommendations, especially where a given matter is being dealt with by the Security Council.

The General Assembly consists of representatives of all members of the Organisation, each member having not more than five seats. Here is one more evidence of inequality in the status of the several members, which may be justified by the varying strength, resources and population of the several members; but which nevertheless goes

against the basic principle of the "sovereign equality" of all members. Representation, moreover, of new members, when they are admitted, may also follow the same principle. Unless definite rules are laid down to regulate the number of representatives for each member; and unless these follow some tangible standards, such as resources, population, geographical distribution, etc., it would be a source of discontent amongst the members themselves.

The functions of the General Assembly are mostly of a deliberative character. Not being a sovereign legislature, it has no right to make any regulation on its own initiative. At the very most it can make recommendation to the Security Council, but take no action on its own authority. In most cases it has not even this right, except on a request from the Security Council. The only instances, in which the Assembly may be taken to have some initiative of its own, are in regard to (a) the approval of the budget for the entire organisation; (b) election of non-permanent members to the Security Council; (c) as also of all the 18 members of the Economic and Social Council, (d) supervision over all subsidiary organs, and (e) promotion of cooperation in political, economic social or cultural fields.

The following summary of its functions and powers will serve to give an idea of the importance of this organ.

It has the right to discuss any matter within the sphere of international relations. Subject to exceptions given below, it can make recommendations to the members of the Organisation, or to the Security Council, or to both, on any such matters. Without prejudice to the general character of the preceding, the Assembly has the right to consider the principles of cooperation for the maintenance of international peace and security. Special mention is made of the "principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments", as well as "to make recommendations to the Governments or to the Security Council on such principles." Until the principles, however, are carefully defined, this intention would remain more academic than ever.

The Assembly has also the right to discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, brought before it by any member or members of the Organisation, or the Security Council. While the right of a member to bring such matters before the Assembly is individual, that of the security Council appears to be collective. The Assembly is entitled to make recom-

mendations on such matters to the Security Council, or to the Government concerned, or both. But on any question where it would be necessary to take some action, it must be referred to the Security Council, either before, or after, discussion in the Assembly. If the reference is made after discussion, it may throw light on the points involved; and thus serve to guide the Security Council in the final action that it decides to take on the subject. On the other hand, if such reference is without any discussion in the Assembly, it would only mean that the Assembly desires to take no responsibility in the matter, but just passes it on to the Security Council. If this is not satisfactory, the Assembly is "given" the right to call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security. The effective power vested in that body under all these provisions is thus very limited.

The Assembly has no right to make any recommendation to the Security Council, on any dispute or situation which is already being considered by the latter in accordance with the functions assigned to it under the Charter. The only exception to this is in cases where the Security Council itself requests some light or guidance from the Assembly. The Secretary General is required, with the consent of the Security Council, to notify the General Assembly, at each of its sessions, in regard to any matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council, as well as in regard to matters which the Security Council has ceased to deal with.

The General Assembly can admit new members, but only "upon the recommendation of the Security Council." The latter body, therefore, can block the admission of any member to the General Assembly, whom it continues to believe either not "peace-loving," or unwilling to accept or unable to carry out obligations under this Charter.

As a corollary of the right to admit new members is the right to suspend or expel any member from the Organisation, under certain specified conditions. "The Organisation may at any time suspend from the exercise of the rights or privileges of membership any member of the Organisation against which preventive or enforcement action shall have been taken by the Security Council, or which shall have persistently violated the principles of the Charter in a persistent fashion." It is curious to note that this power is given to the "Organisation" as

a whole, and not to its General Assembly, though the function is included under the Chapter dealing with the functions and powers of the General Assembly. The restoration of the rights and privileges to any suspended member seems, from the wording of Article 4, Chapter V, to be also a function of the Organisation as a whole, and not of the General Assembly. The right to elect six non-permanent members of the Security Council, and all the 18 members of the Economic and Social Council, is vested exclusively and unconditionally in the Assembly. The right, however, to elect the Secretary-General is conditioned "upon the recommendation of the Security Council made by an affirmative vote of 7 members." The Security Council has thus a much greater say in the election of the Chief Executive Officer of the Organisation. The right, on the other hand, to elect judges of the International Court of Justice is concurrent with the Security Council, and "must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the Court."

Apportionment of expenditure among the members of the Organisation is vested exclusively in the Assembly. It is also entitled to consider the Budget for the Organisation as a whole, and any financial and budgetary arrangements for specialised agencies, which are brought into relation with the Organisation under the provisions of Chapter IV, Section B.

It sounds an academic right only to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purposes of promoting international cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and educational fields." But this may have very considerable consequences in practice, if such studies result in devising or improving policies in regard to such matters or specific measures to give effect to the agreed policies. The same may also be said in regard to assistance "in the realisation of human rights and basic freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, language, religion or sex."

Finally, the right vested in the General Assembly of "encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification" should be welcomed, though suitable machinery will have to be first established for compiling and codifying international law. Today it is to be sought in innumerable and mutually contradictory treaties, conventions or doctrines, variously interpreted according to their convenience by the tribunals concerned.

Power is also given to the General Assembly "to recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations amongst nations." This is subject to the condition that the matter must be within the sphere of international relations, or concerns "situations resulting from a violation of the purposes and principles set forth in this Charter." It can also make recommendations "for the coordination of the policies of international, political, social, economic, and cultural fields, and other special agencies," which are brought into relation with the Organisation under special agreements with those agencies. The administrative field of every specialised agency is open to examination by the Assembly with a view to enabling it to make recommendations to the officers concerned. It is not clear what kind of recommendations are to be made under this, or whether the agencies would be bound to give effect to them.

A much wider power of the General Assembly concerns its right to receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council. Such reports are also to be received from any other body or special agency under the Organisation. The reports from the Security Council will include an account of measures the Council has adopted to carry out the main purposes of the Organisation. The assembly is entitled "to approve or disapprove, in whole or any part, of the report from the Security Council, and to make any recommendation or observations thereon." If a report is approved by the Assembly, it will, no doubt, obtain special authority and importance, but it is not clear what would happen in the event of the report, being wholly or in part, unfavourably dealt with. The only modification of the position is in the next paragraph, which entitles the Assembly "to submit recommendations to the Security Council, with a view to ensure complete observance of the duties of the Security Council inherent in the responsibility to maintain international peace and security." This means that the Assembly may suggest specific courses of action, or lines of policy, which the Security Council would be bound to consider if they pertain to the duties entrusted to the Council, and arising out of the main purposes of the Organisation.

The powers of the General Assembly, such as they are, are very considerably circumscribed by the rules of procedure and voting laid down in the Charter in respect of the several functions entrusted to it.

Each member of the Organisation has, of course, one vote in the General Assembly. But a member in arrears as regards its contribution to the Organisation will be debarred from voting, so long as these arrears amount to contributions for two full years. In case the General Assembly is satisfied that the arrears were due to reasons beyond the control of the State in question, this disability may be waived. All important decisions in the Assembly, including recommendations with regard to the main purpose of the Organisation, election of non-permanent members of the Security Council and of the Economic and Social Council, admission of new members, suspension of existing members, have to be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. On other matters a simple majority of those present and voting will do. The condition with regard to a two-third majority of vote required in certain categories of questions is noteworthy in contrast with the constitution of the League of Nations Assembly, where in certain matters absolute *unanimity* was insisted upon. Though this may be taken to be a progressive improvement, the Assembly is nevertheless unduly restricted in its activities, and must be pronounced to be neither so powerful nor effective as the Security Council.

The Assembly must meet in regular sessions once a year. Special sessions may be convened as occasions require. The Secretary General is entitled to convene a special sessions at the request of the Security Council, or of a majority of the members of the Organisation. Once convened, the General Assembly has the right to regulate its own procedure, and elect its own President for each sessions. It is likewise free to set up such bodies or agencies (e.g. Standing or Select Committees)) as are thought necessary for the performance of its duties.

SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council is the most important body in the Organisation and may be described as its Executive organ. It consists of 5 permanent, and 6 non-permanent members, the former ex-officio, so to say, and the latter elected by the General Assembly. The permanent members are the U.S.A., Britain, Russia, China, and France. Except for the leading part taken by these countries in World War II, the logic of the discrimination is difficult to understand. India has been in the war longer than any other country, except China. She has contributed

more in blood and money than France, and has resources and potentialities, greater than those of Britain and France, considered each by itself. And yet she is to take her chance along with 40 or 50 other countries in securing a seat on the Council.

As regards the mode or proportion of election of these non-permanent members, the Chapter requires "due regard" to be paid to the contribution of members of the Organisation towards the maintenance of international peace and security; towards furthering the purposes of the Organisation, as well as to equitable, geographical distribution. These conditions provide some hope that the Security Council will not prove, as its counterpart in the League of Nations did, to be a mere registry office of the Big Five.

The permanent members are, however, given a very considerable influence in the working of the Council, even though at any time they may happen to be in a minority. Three of these are in Europe, one in America, and one in Asia, with no representation to Africa, South America, or to Australasia, amongst the permanent members. No mention is made, in the rules regarding the distribution of seats, of a country's resources and population; nor is any account taken of the actual and potential contribution to the cause of peace and maintenance of world security.

The point becomes much more significant when one considers the functions and powers of the Council. The Security Council is charged with the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." It is to act on behalf of the Organisation, and in accordance with the general purposes and principles laid down in the Charter. The Council is required to make annual and special reports to the Assembly, the latter having the right to approve or disapprove or make recommendation on any such report.

With a view to make the Security Council respected and its action effective, all members of the Organisation are obligated to accept its decisions, and to carry them into effect in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Does this mean that, in any case where a decision of the Council is open to doubt, the parties concerned would be entitled to have a clear interpretation obtained from the International Court of Justice? If so, the course would not be improper; but it may weaken the authority of the Council.

The authors of the Charter seem anxious that, in achieving their

objectives, there should be the least divergence of human or economic resources of the world, particularly in armaments. For this purpose the Security Council, with the aid of the Military Staff Committee, is charged with the responsibility "for formulating plans for the establishment of a system of regulation of armaments for submission to the members of the Organisation."

This does not make universal disarmament obligatory. It only provides a systematic regulation of armaments, if accepted and followed by the members concerned. If the Organisation is really to function so as to bring about a final elimination of war and violence from the face of the earth, the discretion left to individual members by this wording in regard to armaments, would be incompatible with the primary objective. As this Organisation, however, is not a Super-Sovereign World State, it can only persuade the several members, each a sovereign State in itself, to cooperate for maintaining international peace and security, and avoiding war. So far as history goes, it is a vain hope that all the member-States will, by the simple fact of being members of the Organisation, immediately scrap their past traditions, forego all ambition, and turn overnight non-violent cooperators with their fellows.

Each member of the Council has only one vote, but its decisions on procedural matters must be made by an affirmative vote of at least 7 members. This means that, unless at least one of the permanent members joins the elected members, no such decision can be validly taken. On all other matters, again, its decision "shall be made by an affirmative vote of 7 members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members." The five permanent members have thus a sort of veto on all other matters. The only relaxation of this veto is in regard to the decisions under Chapter VIII which relates to arrangements for the maintenance of international peace and security, including the prevention or suppression of aggression, where a party to a dispute cannot vote. If one of the permanent members is a party to a dispute, it would be excluded from voting; but, even then, if it has one other of the permanent members inclined in its favour, the Security Council can take no action in a most vital of the functions entrusted to it.

The Security Council will function continuously, and has power to make its own rules of procedure, as well as to select its Chairman. Each member of the Council will be permanently represented at the headquarters of the Organisation. Meetings of the Council

may be held at the headquarters, or at such other places as in its judgment may best facilitate its work. Periodical meetings are also required, at which each member of the Security Council could, if desired, be represented by a member of its government or by some other representative.

Like the General Assembly, the Security Council is entitled to establish such bodies or agencies functioning under it as it thinks necessary for the due performance of its functions.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

Side by side with the Security Council, the executive of the Organisation, there is to be an International Court of Justice. The Statute of the Court forms an integral part of the Charter, and contains the procedure of the Tribunal. Recourse to the Court is, however, not compulsory. For not every dispute or difference between nations is required to be brought before it. Nor is any sanction clearly provided for failure to submit to the tribunal. By Clause 3 of Chapter VIII the parties are made expressly free to entrust the solution of their differences to other tribunals, under existing, or new specific agreements for that purpose. Nothing is said about disputes involving a State's national honour which were previously excluded from the competence of the Court. But that does not mean, necessarily, that such disputes must be submitted to the tribunal. All parties to the Charter are, no doubt, pledged to the Statute of the International Court; and, as such, its jurisdiction extends over them all. Those who are not members of the Organisation today may become parties to the Statute of the Court, under conditions which will be determined *in each case* by the General Assembly. The conditions for admitting different States to the membership of the International Court may, therefore, differ in different cases. A loophole is thus provided for some sort of a discrimination against particular States, which is not in harmony with the general spirit of the Organisation. The General Assembly, moreover, cannot admit those who are not members today to become parties to the Statute *except on a recommendation* of the Security Council. In that smaller body, therefore, the room for discrimination is much greater.

*The text of the Statute was not available in this country while these pages were going through the press.

Members, no doubt, are bound to comply with the decisions of the Court ; but no sanction is provided for default. Article 8 of that Chapter provides that if a State fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment of the Court, the other party to the dispute may resort to the Security Council ; and that body may make recommendations, or decide upon measures to give effect to the judgment. It is not clear to whom such recommendations are to be made. As, however, these recommendations or decisions cannot be of a penal character, the State failing to obey the decisions of the Court will have more or less immunity. Elsewhere in the Chapter provision is, no doubt, made for taking action against States which consistently fail to carry out their obligations upto the point of expulsion from membership, and even punitive action ; and that may serve as a corrective of the omission in this Chapter.

Notwithstanding the lack of any definite sanction behind the judgment of the Court, it is a Court of judicature, and not of arbitration. It may act as an advisory body in the event of the General Assembly and the Security Council together requesting it to give its opinion on *any legal question*. On questions of fact, or the points involved in a dispute, the Court would, therefore, have no jurisdiction.

PREVENTION OR SUPPRESSION OF AGGRESSION

That the International Court of Justice is only an ancillary body of the entire machinery established by the Organisation is evidenced by Chapter VIII of the Charter. It deals with specific arrangements for maintaining peace and security, and preventing or suppressing aggression. No definition is provided in the Chapter of what will constitute an act of aggression. If such an act emanates from one of the Big Three, it will probably be impossible to put all this machinery into operation.

Apart from this shortcoming, the arrangements are complicated but adequate.

If the parties concerned so desire, the Security Council can recommend to them some definite course to settle the dispute, in accordance with the principles of the entire Organisation given above. The Council can also investigate into any dispute, or any situation which is likely to lead to a dispute, so as to determine whether its continuance is likely

to endanger international peace and security. The process of investigation may result in isolating the specific issues, and thereby facilitating the pacific settlement of the same.

Any dispute may be brought before the Security Council, or the General Assembly, by any member or non-member of the Organisation. But a non-member bringing the dispute before the General Assembly or the Security Council will have first to accept all the obligations in regard to pacific settlement of disputes laid down in the Charter, so far as that particular dispute is concerned. If the continuance of any dispute is likely to endanger the peace and security, the parties concerned must pledge themselves to try and solve it by negotiation between themselves, by mediation by a third party, by conciliation, or judicial settlement, or by some regional arrangements, or any other peaceful means of their own choice. It is only when the parties fail to settle by themselves that they would have to pledge themselves to refer it to the Security Council. And if that body is convinced that the continuance of the particular dispute is really likely to endanger the peace or security, it must decide whether it should take action itself, or recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate. The parties to the dispute, in such a case, *would be bound* to accept such a recommendation only in the sense that they have pledged themselves to solve it by peaceful means. Only when all peaceful means of settling disputes have been exhausted, would the Council have to recommend action,—political, social or even military,—which will bring a recalcitrant disputant to its senses.

SECTION B

ACTION RE. THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE

If the parties to a dispute do not choose to refer or submit any dispute between themselves to the Council or to the Assembly, the Security Council should first determine if any threat to international peace exists, or whether it is likely to lead to any acts of aggression. If in any case it so determines, the Council can make recommendations, or decide upon other measures which should be adopted for the maintenance or restoration of peace and security. Before making such a recommendation, however, or deciding upon the measures, the Council

should call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it may deem necessary or desirable to prevent aggravation of the situation. These provisional measures are, of course, without prejudice to the rights of the parties concerned. It can determine of its own authority what diplomatic, economic or other measures, short of armed force, should be employed to carry out its decisions.

Having made this decision the Council can call upon the *members* to apply those measures. These measures may consist of breaking off of transport and communications with the offending parties, severance of diplomatic and economic relations, and other such steps as would so isolate the party concerned and make its normal life unworkable as to bring it to a more accommodating frame of mind.

Only if and when these measures prove inadequate, the Council can resort to armed force. The Council has, of course, no standing armed force at its disposal; and the only force it can dispose of is that of the members. Hence if any of the bigger members choose to disregard the decision or recommendation of the Council, and its friends, or some of them join it in such a disregard the Organisation would be helpless. The only chance for the Organisation to be effective, and its military action against recalcitrant States to be effective, lies in the entire armed forces, and the industries ministering to these, being placed at its disposal; and every constituent member being barred from having separate armed forces and industries providing armament of its own.

Every member is, no doubt, required to make available to the Security Council its own armed force and any other assistance or facilities for maintaining peace and security, when called upon to do so, and in accordance with any special agreement that may obtain in this behalf. But this is so hedged round with conditions and restrictions that its prompt and effective employment is doubtful in the extreme.

In planning and carrying out military measures, the Security Council will have the aid of a Military Staff Committee. That body will advise and assist the Council on all questions relating to its military requirement for maintaining international peace and security, dealing with the employment and use of the forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments and also disarmament. The Committee is responsible to the Security Council for the direction of any armed forces placed at its disposal. It will consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the five

permanent members or their representatives. Any member not permanently represented on the Committee is entitled to be invited by the Committee to be associated with it, when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires such a State to participate in its work.

Any State, member or not, confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of the measures decided upon by the Security Council, may consult the Security Council, in regard to a solution of these problems.

Regional arrangements may be made by any States to minimise disputes or differences between them which might lead to a breach of the peace. These arrangements or agencies should be consistent in their activities with the purpose of the Organisation; being designed to achieve peaceful settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council; and the Security Council should encourage them to do so. The Council should utilise these agencies, wherever appropriate, and must be kept informed at all times of any activity undertaken or contemplated by any such regional arrangement or agency. *No enforcement action*, however, can be taken by regional arrangements or agencies, without the authorisation of the Security Council. Measures against the present-day enemy States are expressly excepted from this provision.

In spite of all these provisions and arrangements, the right of self-defence of every member-State is admitted. "Nothing in this Chapter impairs the inherent right of its members to take measures for collective self-defence," if an armed attack occurs against a member-State, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." Any State, which can successfully make the excuse of local self-defence for resorting to arms, would automatically be outside the operation of the Charter. Its authors may not desire this exception to be abused. But in almost every war in the past those resorting to violence have always made their local self-defence to be the immediate excuse. Military experts are also not wanting who have declared offence being the best form of defence. Purely domestic issues are also excluded from the jurisdiction of the Organisation; and so civil wars, like that in Spain, cannot be avoided by any act of the Organisation. In the present state, however, of public opinion on these matters in all countries, it would be perhaps impossible for the framers and

workers of the new Organisation to deny altogether the right of self-defence, and internal revolution. We must, therefore, leave it to the growth of a new education to achieve complete non-violence and abiding peace without any exception.

That, however, the right of self-defence may not be abused altogether, the Charter requires every measure taken in the name of self-defence to be reported immediately to the Security Council. Nor shall such action in any way prejudice the right and authority of the Security Council to take such additional or alternative action as it may deem necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Next in importance to these is the Economic and Social Council, whose main function will be to arrange for international cooperation. It is directly subject to the General Assembly, who elects all its 18 members for a period of three years. One third of the total members must retire every year, but there is no bar to the re-election of any member. Each member has one representative and one vote on the Council; and its decisions are taken by a simple majority of those present and voting.

Its main purpose is to create conditions of stability and well being all over the world, which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations amongst nations. L

The Economic and Social Council is specifically meant to develop higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development. This would obviously affect individuals within each State. But it has no power to impose any solution of any such problem upon any State, since the internal affairs of every State are free from any interference by the new Organisation. But the objective would be impossible to attain unless every State in the Organisation prepares a comprehensive Plan of its own, and coordinates that plan with the world plan, which may be, so to say, under the general supervision of and coordination by the new Organisation. By this means, the Organisation would be much more able effectively to promote its main purpose, so that the deficit of one area is made good by the surplus of another and vice versa.

Another aim of the Council is to solve international economic, social, health and other related problems, and establish international

cooperation in cultural and educational matters. This is a collective function, which can only be in regard to, and through the existing States, and not the individual subjects of any State. The same must also be said with regard to the third purpose of this body, namely "universal respect for, and observance of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, religion, language or sex." If, however, respect for "human rights and fundamental freedoms" is to be truly promoted, it is necessary to define clearly these rights and freedoms, as also the ways of making them actually realised in daily life. The Charter, however, is silent on that point.

As the Council is designed to be mainly a consultative body, any executive action on its part can only be through the executive bodies of the Organisation, such as the Security Council or the General Assembly. The General Assembly is responsible for the proper discharge of the functions of this Council; and to make it a success, members are pledged to take joint as well as several action, each by itself, in cooperation with the Organisation, to achieve the purpose of this Council.

The Council is put into direct relationship with the various specialised inter-government Organisations and agencies having international responsibility in economic, social and other related fields. The terms and conditions on which this relationship is to be established will be determined by agreements between the Economic and Social Council and the appropriate authorities and the specialised organisations or agencies initiated by the Organisation.

FUNCTIONS & POWERS OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

In addition to their functions, enumerated in that connection, the Council has power to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly, and to make recommendations on its own initiative to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It can also initiate studies and reports in regard to international economic, social, cultural, health, and other related matters, and to make recommendations on its own initiative on such matters to the Assembly, or to the members of the Organisation, and to other specialised agencies concerned. The Council must coordinate the activities of the economic, social, cultural health, and other specialised

agencies, which are brought into relationship with the Organisation, by consultation and recommendation to such agencies, as well as to the General Assembly and to the members of the Organisation. It is entitled to obtain regular reports from specialised Organisations or agencies, as well as from members of the Organisation, on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations or those of the General Assembly. On any report it can make its own observations and submit them to the General Assembly. It can call international conferences on matters falling within its sphere of activity, in accordance with rules prescribed by the Organisation; prepare draft conventions on such matters for submission to the General Assembly; furnish information to the Security Council when required; and for such other functions, within the general scope of its competence, as may be assigned to it from time to time by the General Assembly.

The Council would work through special committees or commissions in the field assigned to it. Any member of the Organisation, who is not a member of the Council, may be invited to participate in the deliberations of the Council; but it will have no vote on any matter of particular concern to that member. The Council is authorised to make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-government organisations, concerned with matters within the sphere of its activities. There will be a permanent staff of this body, which will constitute part of the secretariat of the whole Organisation. The Council will have its own rules of procedure, select its own President. It will meet as often as required in accordance with rules adopted by the Council itself, though a meeting of the Council must be called on a request of a majority of the members of that body.

SECRETARIAT

The most important administrative officer of the Organisation is the Secretary General and such other staff as may be required. The Secretary General is selected by the General Assembly, on recommendation of the Security Council. The appointment is for three years, without any bar on re-election after that term. This is one more instance of the excessive importance attached to the Security Council in the general scheme of the Organisation. As it is expedient that this officer should have the confidence of the permanent members of the

Security Council, his selection would be made very likely on political grounds.

The Secretary-General acts in this capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. In addition to these duties, he also will be charged with such other functions as may be entrusted to him by the Organisation. He will have to make an annual report to the General Assembly on the working of the Organisation, and is empowered to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, might threaten international peace and security. This is a power of initiative, in marked contrast with the general powers given to the Assembly which has hardly any initiative.

The Secretary-General is independent of any Government, whether member or not, and so cannot receive instructions from any State or other authority outside the Organisation.

A certain vague responsibility in regard to behaviour is charged upon the Secretary-General and his staff. They are international officials; and that character every member is pledged to respect. No one should seek to influence them in the discharge of their respective responsibility.

The Secretary-General is given the sole right to appoint his own staff, subject to such regulation as the General Assembly may have made in that behalf. The Assembly, in its turn, would be guided in making those recommendations by the requirements of efficiency, competence and integrity. The Charter requires the Assembly at the same time to pay due regard in recruiting the staff to as wide a geographical distribution as possible.

RATIFICATION

Before the Charter can come into operation it must be ratified by the Signatory States in accordance with each its own constitution. The ratification must be deposited with the Government of the United States, who shall notify all members of such deposit.

The Charter will come into operation when all the five big States, entitled to permanent seats on the Security Council, have ratified it; and when a majority of the other States have also done so. For all

others, it will come into operation on the date of the deposit of their ratification.

AMENDMENT

Amendments of the Charter can be made, and can be brought into force, for all members of the Organisation, when they have been adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the General Assembly, and ratified, according to the constitution, by the permanent members of the Security Council and a majority of other members of the Organisation. So also for revising the constitution.

A wholesale review of the Charter must be made at a general conference of the members of the United Nations, which will be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly, and with the concurrence of the Security Council, with a majority of at least seven members of that body. At any general conference every member has a single vote. Any changes in the Charter recommended by a majority of the Conference shall take effect, when ratified by the permanent members and a majority of other States.

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS

During the transition period, all the United Nations are to consult one another, and, as occasions arise, with other members of the Organisation, to take joint action, when necessary, to maintain international peace and security. No provision of the Charter would preclude the action taken or authorised in relation to the present-day enemy States.

LEGAL STATUS OF THE ORGANISATION

The Organisation will have definite legal status in every member-State, adequate to the exercise of its functions and fulfilment of its purpose. Such privileges and immunities as are necessary in the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes would also be

allowed to the Organisation, its representatives and officials in the territories of each member-State. The details of these privileges and immunities will be regulated by rules made by the General Assembly.

Every treaty and international agreement, entered into by any member of the Organisation, after the Charter has come into operation, must be registered with the Secretary-General of the Organisation and published as soon as possible. No party to any treaty or international agreement can invoke that treaty or agreement before any body of the Organisation, if that treaty has not been registered. As between obligations under this Charter of any State, and the corresponding obligations of that member under any other international agreement, the former will prevail.

TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

For peoples like us, a most significant chapter in the Charter is that dealing with Trusteeship. It is new terminology, for the pre-war Mandate system, evolved after the last way. If, however, it functions in accordance with the spirit of these provisions, it may prove materially different from its predecessor of 1919-1939.

Members of the United Nations, who hold territories inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves, "accept the general principle that it is a sacred trust of civilisation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories". It is not clear whether by this is meant backward peoples, included in the general population of member-States, e.g. Britain, or the Union of South Africa, Australia or Holland. By the mere acceptance of the "sacred trust" to promote the well being of the native population it by no means follows that they will be treated as equal citizens in these units. Hitherto they have not been so treated; and there is nothing in the Charter to show that they must be so treated on pain of any sanctions provided in the Charter in this behalf.

The specific duties or responsibilities arising out of the Trust are:

- (a) "to ensure the economic and social advancement of the peoples concerned";
- (b) "to develop self-government in forms appropriate to the varying circumstances of each territory," and
- (c) "to further international peace and security."

Reading carefully these three, it is by no means clear that, in the process of ensuring the economic and social advancement of those

peoples, their cultural as well as political independence will be secured, if they are at present under the domination of alien races. Even (b) may be fulfilled,—that is to say, institutions of local self-government may be developed,—without the full status of nation-hood, or independent state-hood being accorded to the people concerned. The excuse regarding “the varying circumstances of each territory” leaves a very large margin of discretion to the dominating power, which the Charter does not in any way gainsay.

The same holds true of the next paragraph under which member-States agree that their policy in respect of such territories will be based on the general principles of good neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well being of other members of the world federation in social, economic and commercial matters. This relates, very probably, to dominions or colonial possessions outside the metropolitan area of each State, with which the dominating State is to cultivate a policy of good neighbourliness. Even if we grant that such provisions may not preclude altogether any force of arms being employed for achieving the independence or self-government, and economic advancement of the subject peoples, as against the dominating power, it does not by any means follow that the ideal of complete local independence will be achieved for any people who are now subject to any European power.

TRUSTEESHIP—WHERE APPLICABLE

The territories to which the Trust will apply are : (a) those now held under mandate ;

(b) those which may be detached from an enemy State as a result of the war and put specifically under Trusts ; and

(c) those voluntarily placed under the Trust system by States now responsible for their administration.

As regards those territories which are not at present under the domination of any member-States, the Charter evolves the system of Trusteeship as a substitute for the old Mandates. Just as in the previous case the League of Nations assigned the Mandates, so under this Charter the international Organisation will establish trusteeship for the administration of such territories as are placed thereunder. For any territory to be placed under trusteeship, there must be separate agree-

ments and specific suitable machinery set up for the purpose. The trustee would aim at furthering international peace and security, promoting the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the Trust territories, and their inhabitants, as well as "their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory, of its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."

On this provision there was considerable difference in the San Francisco conference. The final wording makes it possible for such peoples to attain to the status of an independent State with full local autonomy, with or without complete sovereignty. The modifying clause, which makes it conditional upon being appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory, and its peoples, leaves great discretion to the Trustee power, which may so handle the administration of these territories as to make the evolution of complete independence and full sovereignty of any such people a very remote possibility. No time limit is imposed on the duration of the Trust.

Provision is made in such Trusts for due respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms, irrespective of difference as to race, language, religion or sex, and the recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world. The inevitable interdependence of the peoples of all civilised countries and the consequent necessity to cooperate is not stressed, either in this Chapter or elsewhere, as fully as it ought to have been. The Trust system is charged with the responsibility to insure equal treatment in the Trust territories in social, economic and commercial matters, to all members of the United Nations, as well as their nationals, as also for any foreign citizen in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the demand for self-government or complete independence by any territory or people under the Trust.

Every Trusteeship arrangement is to be made under specific agreement approved by the Organisation. Until such agreements have been concluded, or subject to any special provision in any agreement, the present rights of dominating States will continue, but without prejudicing the demand for independence or self-government already promised to any such territory. The actual wording of the addendum in this paragraph is significant and may be quoted. "This paragraph would not be interpreted as giving ground for delay and postponement of the negotiations and conclusion of the agreements for placing mandated and

other territories as provided for above under the trusteeship system." Without any violence to this language, it may well be taken to apply to the case of India particularly. In Indian opinion, the delay in carrying out the promise of independence is already too great.

Every Trusteeship arrangement must include the terms under which the Trust territories will be administered, and designate the State which is to administer them. In default of the latter, the United Nations as a whole would be responsible for the administration of such Trust territories.

STRATEGIC AREAS—AND TRUSTS

A significant exception is made in regard to "strategic areas," which may include part or whole of the territory under a Trust. These may be administered somewhat differently for reasons of military necessity. The Security Council is entitled to approve all arrangements in regard to the Trust of such strategic areas; but the basic objective is the same. Without prejudice to considerations of international peace and security, the Security Council shall avail itself of the Trusteeship Council to perform such functions in regard to the political, economic and social matters in these strategic areas as may be deemed appropriate, and subject to the provisions of the Trusteeship arrangements. A State administering any Trust shall be required to ensure that the territory placed under its trust shall play its proper part in the maintenance of international peace and security. For this purpose the State exercising the Trust shall be entitled to make use of volunteer forces, facilities and assistance from such territory, to carry out its obligations and make good its undertakings towards the Security Council, including local defence of the territory and maintenance of law and order therein.

In all cases not designated as "strategic areas", the functions of the Organisation in regard to Trusteeship will be exercised by the General Assembly which will establish a special council, called the Trusteeship Council, to operate under its authority. This Council will consist of specially qualified representatives by selecting one each of the States administering Trust territories; one each of the States which are not administering Trust territories; and one each by a sufficient number of other States. These are chosen for a three-year period, by the General Assembly.

This Council is entitled to avail itself, wherever necessary, of the services of the Social and Economic Council, brought into relationship with the United Nations Organisation in all matters with which they are respectively concerned. The General Assembly as well as the Trusteeship Council is entitled to receive and consider reports submitted by the administering State, and to receive and examine petitions in consultation with the administering States. It is also entitled to send representatives to make periodic visits to the respective territories, at times agreed upon with the administering State ; and to take these and other actions in conformity with the Trusteeship arrangements. The administering authority in each Trust territory under the General Assembly must make an annual report to the General Assembly, in accordance with a specific questionnaire formulated by the Trusteeship Council, and the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples concerned.

Chapter VIII

NEED—A SUPER-SOVEREIGN WORLD FEDERATION

WE have reviewed the purpose, structure, and function of the United Nations' Organisation in some detail to show how, in spite of improvements over the defunct League of Nations, it is still not quite adequate to the situation. If we wish to banish war altogether from the face of the earth, and make every country in the world truly secure against violence, and every individual within it against want ; if we desire to build up international concord and cooperation, needed to restore order, security and prosperity after six years of global, totalitarian war, a radical reorganisation of the entire international system is indispensable. It will not do to patch and tinker. We must build a new order out of chaos, organisation out of dislocation, planned programme of purposeful prosperity out of universal shortage and starvation. The projected organisation is a step towards the goal ; but it is not the goal. Just as in the case of individuals, the basis of unregulated impulse called initiative or enterprise, in search of personal gain, is incompatible with cooperative effort, with a proper division of labour, specialisation of function, and coordination under a common Plan ; so in the case of nations, absolute sovereignty for internal affairs of each State is incompatible with their mutual co-relation and collaboration. There must be some central machinery to regulate, control and make effective the cooperative endeavour.

Before proceeding to suggest improvements, let us summarise here the shortcomings of the projected Organisation for the purpose in view :

- (1) The Organisation is an association of independent units, not a Federation of all world States ;
- (2) It claims to be made up of Equal, Sovereign, Peace-loving States ; but there is marked inequality, in the Organisation itself, as between the bigger and the smaller units.

- (3) The Organisation is made up, at least for the moment, of the United Nations, which exclude all neutral and enemy States, and their satellites. A world Organisation must include all ;
- (4) Absolute sovereignty of member-States in their domestic affairs is postulated.
- (5) The obligations imposed are not equal, particularly in regard to disarmament, including treatment of industries ministering to war. Unless there is complete, allround disarmaments, there can be no final banishment of war from the face of the earth. And unless industries directly ministering to war are internationalised in ownership as well as management, armament will not disappear.
- (6) The Organisation has no Police Force of its own to compel respect for its decisions, and adherence to common policies. Unless adequate force is placed at the disposal of the World Sovereign, international differences will ever run the risk of ending in warfare, no matter how complete the arrangements for adjudicating or arbitration of such disputes.
- (7) An International Court of Justice is established. It is to help settle disputes with due regard to the principles of justice and the rules of international law. But these are vague, indefinite, and would need to be defined before they can be of any use.
- (8) Reference to the International Court is not obligatory ; nor does it comprise all possible disputes between States.
- (9) The Organisation is formed to secure respect for "human rights and fundamental freedoms." But there is no definition provided of these rights and freedoms.
- (10) The Organisation is made up of member "States." There is no mention of countries, or peoples. This may be particularly objectionable from the point of view of backward peoples.
- (11) A Trusteeship Council is attached to administer in trust territories which contain backward peoples, and undeveloped regions. The obligations of the Trustee are much below

its opportunites. The very fact of there being backward peoples and undeveloped regions impede the evolution of a uniform world citizenship, with full freedom of movement and settlement to the individual, along with his guaranteed rights and freedoms.

Comment has already been offered on several of these features, while describing them as provided in the Organisation. Here we shall deal only with two main points: (1) The nature and function of a Super-Sovereign World State; and (2) Definition of Rights and Freedoms of man and citizen. This would supplement and amplify the specific criticism already urged in regard to this Organisation. That is not to say, however, that the Organisation is utterly faulty, and should, therefore, be discarded. On the contrary, it is clear its foundations are truly laid on solid ground; and what needs improvement is, mostly, the superstructure.

If the foundation of peace are to be securely laid, not only must the domination and exploitation of a few nations over others, much larger in number but more backward in equipment, must cease; and their preponderance in the common councils yield place to a real equality; but the place of present-day competition must be taken by cooperation and coordination.

If domination and exploitation as between nations is to cease, forever, the same condition must reproduce itself as between individuals. Exploitation of one individual or class by another, for the exclusive advantage or profit of the former, must also be abolished at the same time. Nations as well as individuals must have equality of status and opportunity, the former for securing their own happiness; the latter to enable them to make the most effective and substantial contribution on the material as well as cultural progress of mankind. The State is an instrument of society to achieve this; and the organisation of all states is a better instrument of the same kind.

A super-Sovereign World Federation is thus indispensable. It must be a paramount sovereign over all constituent States. It can only be a federation based upon the free consent of the federating units. In a federation there must needs be delegation of sovereignty from the constituent unit to the Federation in legislation, judicature and executive. All States must be equal members of the Federation, with the right to

form regional federation among their neighbours or cognate States for common ends.

The Legislature in such a World Federation would be the General Assembly made up of representatives of the member-States. Each State would have only one vote in that body ; but the function of the Assembly would rather be to enunciate broad principles of policy for common concerns than enacting positive legislation in the narrower sense of municipal law. It may, however, help to collect, compile, or codify international law, both substantive and procedural ; and, for that purpose, take such aid from the jurists on the International Court of Justice as it may deem necessary. Its executive must have at its sole disposal the armed forces of the member-States, including the industries, services and utilities directly ministering to war. At the same time every State must be disarmed, and a sort of Arms Act enacted to apply to them. This will have to be by mutual agreement.

The Federation of the World must work mainly on the basis of consultation, conciliation, and coordination, bringing about agreed policies and activity, which can then be carried out by individual members each within its own jurisdiction, in manner and machinery best suited to local conditions or circumstances. Only when any component State or States refuse to enforce the common decisions, or act in a manner likely to imperil the integrity, or obstruct the reasonable activity of any other component part, the central sovereign would need to intervene. On such occasions, it may, if necessary, use force sufficient to stop obstruction or unsocial behaviour.

It is the ardent hope of every progressive person among us that, as civilisation advances, the use of force in any form, and at any hands, will become progressively unnecessary, till it comes to be eventually abandoned altogether. But until that moment is reached, for the supreme function of the World State or its organised government,—the maintenance of peace and order,—force may be necessary to use towards recalcitrant members, or to members who pursue objectionable activity.

The World Federation must be expressly empowered and enabled to intervene in the maintenance of international peace and collaboration ; as well as to secure economic justice to individual citizens, and due observance of their guaranteed rights and freedoms, whenever necessary.

For the latter purpose, it must be entitled to intervene in the international administration of any country, where there is evidence to believe due fulfilment of the guaranteed fundamental rights of individuals, of communities, or minorities, are not realised.

In consequence of this institution, the absolute sovereignty of each country, and the authority of its local government, will have to be restricted. The restriction will apply not only to international relations, but at times also to internal administration. For the common rights of man and citizen affecting daily life, social organisation, economic development, or cultural advancement, must be secured and guaranteed; and intervention may become necessary to make good that guarantee.

This world sovereign will be the creature of its constituents. But once set up, that creature will necessarily be stronger than its constituents. It must have supreme authority, and effective power to keep in check reactionary or refractory elements amongst its creators. It will have to enact a sort of universal Arms Act, prohibiting the making or use of any heavy armaments by any constituent unit for its own exclusive ends. At the same time, the productive resources of weaker communities, which their powerful neighbours have taken possession of for the latter's own benefit, must be reclaimed and returned to the original owners. Likewise, subjugated countries, converted into slaves by imperialist exploiters, must be freed and safeguarded against any recurrence of such alien domination or exploitation. It is then only that every component part or nation of the world will become an equal member of the common consortium, or a Cooperative World Association; and their collective representative alone will have the power, the might and the authority of all its constituent units put together.

The Association of the United Nations, as fashioned at San Francisco, will not suffice by itself to prevent resuscitation of the Imperialist idea. Seasoned veterans of that cult, like Britain or France, would not consent easily to relinquish their local sovereignty or imperialist domination. The ideals of economic self-sufficiency, the cultivation of which by the smaller nations of Europe led to the growth of economic nationalism which was directly responsible for the War, were also first begun by the Imperialist nations, as typified by the British device of Imperial Preference in trade. If all these false goods are to be dethroned the only remedy is a strong, central sovereign World State, coupled

with the largest margin of local autonomy consistent with the existence of a World State.

COMMON WORLD CITIZENSHIP

An important corollary of the establishment of a world sovereign authority would be the creation of a common World Citizenship. A common, uniform allegiance of all mankind to the same supreme authority will go much farther than anything else in driving home and making real the idea of human brotherhood and equality. With the doctrine of absolute national sovereignty discarded, the present-day virtue of patriotism will have to be discounted; and the sentiment of nationalism discredited. A common world citizenship will also do away with, or at least minimise, all those tiresome regulations, re passports and visas, which are today such a heavy handicap on freedom of travel or movement. Better understanding among nations, and greater spread or appreciation of their several cultures will also be effectually promoted by this means.

REDISTRIBUTION OF WORLD POPULATION

This common World Citizenship should be accompanied, if necessary, by an all-round redistribution of the world's population, so as to provide equal opportunities for local development, and individual satisfaction to the utmost possible, all over the world. For the fuller utilisation, by suitable and sufficient labour as well as capital equipment, of the unknown, unexplored, or undeveloped resources of sparsely populated but richly endowed regions in Africa, America, or Australasia, will add materially to the aggregate wealth of mankind. This would mean an all-round increase in the wealth of the world, which, in consonance with the guaranteed rights of human beings, will have to be distributed on a basis radically different from that now prevailing in the Western democracies. Given a juster and more rational system of wealth distribution, man will neither lack in work, nor food, clothing, or shelter. If all the knowledge and equipment the advance of science and progress of technique has provided us with were properly utilised, the economic problem before humanity will not be one of employing all able-bodied and adequately trained persons in work appropriate to their ability, aptitude, and attainments; but rather a problem of how most agreeably and usefully to employ their leisure. It

would take us too far beyond the scope of this work to descant at any length on the serious question of utilising mass leisure, after the present-day leisured class has been abolished as a class of parasites; but the possibility of that problem emerging at no distant date must be recorded even in these pages.

Absolute aquality between the several peoples of the world, in respect of population and area, natural resources or man-made equipment, is unnecessary, even if it be not impossible to achieve. But the redistribution of population suggested above should be effected to secure a decent minimum of civilised living for all, which seems denied by the initial inequality of the present-day competitive world. Modern science can devise methods by which the seeming inequalities of natural endowment and physical environment may be put an end to. In so far as a wholesale redistribution of population needs general agreement,—it can be smoothly achieved only by consent,—and organised facilities of transport as well as settlement, recourse may have to be had in many countries, during the interval, to such scientific devices or expedients to counteract initial disadvantages of nature, or the accident of history. A condition precedent of such a redistribution will be the determination, with reference to each unit area, of the optimum number of people that could be satisfactorily maintained in a given standard of civilised existence from the resources of that area, developed by the original and additional human factor, and supplemented by such additions as rational trading or exchange may bring. Climatic and geographic conditions may militate against such wholesale migrations from the land of one's birth, upbringing, and associations. But man is an adaptable creature; and factors above-named are more psychological than is commonly realised. It is a problem in the radical revision of our system of education, which can be reorientated to make such sentiments obsolete; and mere inertia inoperative.

RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS: (A) PERSONAL FREEDOM.

It is a complex task to define the Rights of the individual in any clear, categoric terminology. In broad principle, however, such rights may be said to be comprised in the so-called Four Freedoms enunciated by the late President Roosevelt. Personal freedom of the individual is regarded as the foundation and mainspring of economic gain. In a cooperative world society, such as has been envisaged above, individual

liberty of action would have to admit certain restrictions in the common interest of all. Absolute individualism is incompatible with civilised human society. Progress in such an organisation would be impossible without mutual cooperation, without some division of labour, and without, therefore, mutual inter-dependence. Such inter-dependence necessarily curtails individual liberty of action. By the biological nature of his being, and the psychological needs of his living, man is, amongst all animals, the least able to be self-sufficient, and so independent. He is designed to be the most dependent upon his fellows, and so forced to be cooperative to counteract the handicap of his being. The restrictions on individual freedom are concealed by voluntary, deliberate, cooperative organisation; and the sting taken out by the individual's own consent to subordinate his personal freedom in the interests, not only of social advancement, but also in making his own effort more effective. The analogy applies on a much larger scale to the establishment of a super-sovereign World State. For it also involves the restriction of local sovereignty of particular States. These restrictions have to be accepted in the common interest. And because they are accepted by the full consent of member-States, the restrictions cannot be irksome or oppressive.

Cooperation of this kind exists at present also. Under the exigencies of the totalitarian war, it has become universal and compulsory. The complete mobilisation of all man-power and all means of work includes not only military conscription, but also conscription for social or national services. Against this wholesale regimentation, there is practically no effective protest from the individual thus deprived of his personal freedom in the larger interest.

What, however, has been done under the impulse of the exigencies of the War for purposes of destruction can also be done with much greater advantage in the days of peace for productive or constructive ends. The only difference would be that, instead of it being imposed from above as a compulsory measure for national security, it will be evolved by individual consent from below. New education will inculcate more fully the value of cooperation as well as the need for self-control, voluntary restriction on undisciplined impulse.

The War has made us all realise that personal freedom must not be confused with individual licence; that national independence does not mean national exclusiveness.

This does not mean that the individual would cease to have freedom to realise the purpose of his being in the world of the future. On the contrary, very precedent of coordination postulated above will facilitate and expedite a better living and a fuller life for each individual. And because each will consent to live in civilised cooperation with his fellows, the Rights of the individual can also operate within the orbit laid down and evolved for achieving any objective.

(b) FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THOUGHT,

(c) OF ASSOCIATION AND MOVEMENT.

Next to personal freedom, the most important of these rights are freedom of speech, thought, and writing, of association and movement. These rights are seldom questioned in any modern community. But, in practice, they are neither absolute nor unqualified. They must not be so exercised as to conflict with or negative the corresponding rights of others, wound their sentiments, or obstruct their work. Nor can these rights be exercised so as to create or emphasize class antagonisms, which it is the primary objective of post-war reconstruction to eliminate altogether.

The right to Freedom of Association should be made an integral part of this reconstructed world to insist, for facility in administering social legislation, that workers in every category of employment, must form themselves into Trade Unions, or Professional Organisations, with a large measure of collective autonomy for such unions, to make self-government by every individual a real and daily experience.

No worker should be permitted to keep away from such professional association or trade organisation ; and no privilege, benefit, or advantage could be shared or allowed to any worker, except through his professional organisation or trade union.

Freedom of movement, in the widest sense, has already been promised and must be assured. The right to free movement from place to place, as well as from occupation to occupation, must, however, be subject to the requirements of the tasks before the community.

Freedom of movement, unconnected with work, must also be permitted. Travelling for pleasure, for sight-seeing, or self-improvement, would be unrestricted and unconditioned, the only condition being a due discharge of allotted duties which earns this right. It would be

exercised in accordance with the regulations for leave or vacation to workers, which would be part of the Labour Code in each country.

(a) FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

A much more complex and delicate item in this list of freedom is that in regard to the Freedom of Belief and Worship. The freedom of religious observances and belief is nowadays an integral part of every civilised society. *It must include the freedom not to believe in any particular system of faith.* In order that such freedom be *equally available* to all, the State itself must be free from any religious bias or concern. It must be an exclusively secular institution, utterly unconnected and unconcerned with any creed, ceremonial or ritual.

For the individual, on the other hand, Freedom of Worship and Belief would be part of his freedom of thought and expression, already premised. The full recognition and guarantee of the individual's freedom of religious belief or worship is intended to discourage religious intolerance or fanaticism, as it is an equally sacred right of all persons; and as there is no uniformity of thought in such matters, the right cannot be enjoyed in peace, and can bring no real happiness even from its exercise, if the followers of any particular brand are in a position, in the least degree, to oppress, overawe, or exclude any other from any trade, profession, privilege, opportunity or enjoyment. Regulations will have, therefore, to be imposed, in practice, over the exercise of this right, so that the equal rights of others, professing different religions, or even those who profess no religion, may not be prejudiced.

FREEDOM FROM WANT GUARANTEED NATIONAL MINIMUM

Freedom from want has been given a very prominent place in the Atlantic Charter, and in the late President's declaration. If this is to be realised in practice, every individual must be safeguarded against lack or starvation; and also assured a standard of living, much above the average available to large sections of humanity today. Though accepted in broad principle, this right in practice cannot be effective in a competitive civilisation motivated by the desire for personal profit. The majority of the people in every country,—except perhaps Russia,—is

still exposed to the rigours,—often a reality,—of sheer starvation. Even in a country like the United States, where resources are so abundant, population limited, technique and equipment highly developed ; where it is the fundamental principle of the constitution that every citizen is equally entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, 10 or 12 years ago, when the Depression was at its highest, the unemployed and starving numbered several millions. The loss involved in the existence of such large numbers of employable unemployed is seldom perceived in its real magnitude in the individualist countries. The relief offered to such unemployed through unorganised individual charity, or uncoordinated endeavour, is often beset with conditions which are more insulting than helpful. Such as it is, if this relief is not accepted, and work unavailable, there is no alternative but to starve. Such a state of things must end in the new post-war world. Given Social Conscription of the type mentioned above ; given also a comprehensive Plan for each region and each country, integrated into a World Plan of all-round development, the problem of the Unemployed ought never to arise.

In countries like India and China,—where famines, epidemics and other such curses are a matter of frequent occurrence,—the spectacle of death by the million through sheer starvation or preventible disease is so common, that people in these parts have become callous and indifferent. Our conscience, however, must be awakened to the point where the realisation should deepen that these are all miseries possible to prevent by human effort and organisation, and so must be prevented.

It must, therefore, be the first condition of the reconstructed world, and every constituent unit of it, that every individual, willing and able to work, should obtain remunerative work suitable to his or her ability, aptitude or training. *To provide such work must be the collective obligation of the community ;* and to do such work must be inescapable obligation of each citizen. No one shall starve ; but no one shall be idle, unemployed, or living on the labour of another as a parasite. Each must contribute his mite to the community equally, in any form suited to his training or aptitude.

SOCIAL SECURITY

Following the same principle, and as a consequence of the Right to Work or the Freedom from Want, there would be the corollary of social security. In so far as human ingenuity and modern science can provide

it, arrangement must be made to secure and safeguard every individual against all those contingencies of human life and work which collectively make up the risks of life. Adequate Insurance must, therefore, be provided against illness, accident, old age, maternity, bodily or mental disability. Such insurance need not take the form only of money payment, leaving it to the individual to dissipate the payments thus received. It would be much more effective and beneficial, if it takes the shape of an efficient service for medical treatment, nursing attendance and convalescence facilities.

These are the outstanding Freedoms, the Rights of the Citizen, or of the Individual. More may be added to the list ; but these will serve to illustrate the nature and content of the Fundamental Rights and Obligations of persons and peoples that may be issued and guaranteed under the central authority. Though at present mentioned with regard to men only, the lower animals should not be wholly excluded. As a Jain, I consider life sacred for every living organism ; and would measure the fullness of our civilisation only in proportion as it respects them all. The organised hunt of inoffensive animals, the battue and the ceremonial slaughter of birds and beasts must stop ; and some institution, like the National Park or Sanctuary for animals, must be set up in every country as a collective responsibility and not like the *pinjrapale*, a single community's idiosyncrasy.

OBLIGATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

Rights without obligations or Responsibilities would be onesided, and an unbalanced arrangement that cannot last. Several of the obligations corresponding to and counterbalancing rights have already been pointed out incidentally while discussing Rights. Let us here sum them up in one place for the sake of convenience. These must also be declared, maintained, and enforced, wherever necessary, in the same manner as the rights of the individuals or communities.

TOLERATION

Of these Obligations, the most considerable are :

(1) the duty to cultivate towards all other individuals of the same world citizenship friendly sentiments, which must include full toleration for differences in views,—political, economic, or religious.

The greatest enemy of the solidarity of mankind's collective progress today is the inherent intolerance between individuals, as well as between communities. Notwithstanding the progress of literacy, or perhaps because of the present system of education, there is a tendency to hold that what we think is the only correct thing; what we do is the only right, proper, or useful activity; and consequently the conduct, belief or behaviour of all others, not in accord with ours, must be treated with tolerance. Such intolerance is worse than competitive individualist greed.

RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE

Of the various kinds of intolerance the greatest is Religious Intolerance. More wars have been caused by religious intolerance than any other single factor. The simplest, straightest and most effective remedy is, of course, to abolish all religion. But it has become so deeply rooted, as one of the props of the existing social order, that it would be impossible to attempt a disestablishment,—except by a revolution, and a Government established by it. All that the slow process of silent evolution and general enlightenment can achieve is to transform the State into a completely secular organisation, leaving religion severely alone. Religion, in other words, must be regarded as the private concern of each individual, and should have no claim to any public recognition, protection, or encouragement. Silent contempt and severe indifference towards Religion would eliminate it much more effectively than any violent persecution. Public persecution is of the same brand as individual intolerance, as it breeds a sense of easy martyrdom in the persecuted, and a sense of sadism in persecutors. As the freedom of thought, expression and worship is the foremost of the Fundamental Rights of individuals and communities, obligation in respect of religious toleration should be similarly reinforced.

RACIAL EXCLUSIVENESS

Another brand of intolerance is in regard to racial pride or exclusiveness. Next to religion, and often born of it, the most offensive type of intolerance is the sense of class, caste, or race superiority. A carefully implanted and sedulously cultivated belief that a given community is the chosen one, specially appointed by some supernatural agency to lord over the destinies of mankind, was at the root of Nazi

aggressiveness. The treatment by European conquerors or settlers of the indigenous population in America, Africa, or Asia bears full comparison with the lot of the Jews in Nazi Germany. The *Herrenvolk* have always felt and maintained their *Brahmindom* in all ages and in every country. It must be scotched out relentlessly. And its place must not be allowed to be taken by any other sentiment of exclusiveness such as was engendered by differences of material wealth. There must not be, in any form or shape, any overt or tacit denial of the fundamental right of equality as between the citizens of the world.

NEW EDUCATION

The best means to implant this sense of equality is education. This is why one of the first tasks the Allies have undertaken in conquered Germany is to re-educate the German people into civilised citizenship of the world; and the same must be done for conservative Britain and France as well as Italy and Japan. Education is a slow process of silent evolution, which takes long to show results. Besides, if it is in the hands of the people suffering from prejudice in favour of class exclusiveness or religious intolerance, their influence in the school, the curriculum, the text-books and teachers will be unavoidable, no matter how liberally the system as a whole is designed. A radical reorganisation of the basic ideals, methods, and contents of public education is, therefore, an urgent necessity, if we desire to rebuild the world on the foundations indicated above. *Religious instruction of any kind must be rigorously excluded from the curricula of schools and colleges; there must be no distinction in the various types of educational institutions, according to the social status or religious denomination of those attending them; all such institutions must be equal, their instruction and training on uniform lines; the instructors and alumni the equal members of a cooperative society. Education, instruction, or training must be exclusively a public utility service in all its stages.* To impart it on accepted egalitarian ideals must be amongst the most important Obligations of the community. At the same time, it must be a duty of individuals to be educated in secular public institutions only.

Only when the foundations of New Education have been surely laid on such social virtues, will there be any hope of the peace and

progress of mankind being maintained and advanced. It is the teacher and the preacher, the author and the editor, who inculcate and keep up in existing societies the sense of superiority or exclusiveness of class or religion. Unless the outlook of this group of workers is radically altered, there would be little hope of the New Education turning out any other material than has been produced so far.

OBLIGATION TO WORK

Another Obligation of the individual is the duty to work, and to cooperate with his fellows. Just as it is necessary to eliminate from the individual mentality any sense of intolerance, so, too, it is necessary to create and foster a feeling of economic equality. The idle rich and unemployed, who consider it their birthright to fatten on the sweat of others, must be categorically abolished without mercy, without exception, without apology. They must be branded as parasites, hunted as vermin, and rooted out wherever the pest is found. Social conscription for all able-bodied adults, irrespective of sex, must be premised as the *sine qua non* of social organisation and human activity.

Corresponding to the guaranteed right of individual to a decent minimum, and to the freedom of movement from place to place and occupation to occupation, there must be obligation to work on any given task, or discharge some allotted duty. Given, however, relatively large number of workers in every community, this kind of Social Conscription could easily be made to function with the minimum of restriction, and maximum of freedom to the individual as regards the place and the kind of work he should do. The employing authority should see, in the interests of efficient discharge of duties, that the work assigned to each individual is equal to the training, aptitude, or inclination of the worker.

To enforce this obligation of the individual, *the duty must be laid on the State to provide work for all* in accordance with each one's physical and mental capacity, training, and aptitude. The important thing is not which occupation shall be pursued by whom; the important principle rather is: that none shall share in the national dividend who contribute nothing towards it; and none shall starve who do their duty and carry out their task as assigned.

MAINTENANCE OF THE AGED AND THE INDIVIDUAL

This does not necessarily mean that, in the society of the future there would be no physical disability, no temporary invalidity, no old age or illness, which incapacitate an individual from working, either temporarily or exempted permanently, from the duty to work, either in recognition of their past services, or because of their present disability. It must be a part of the State's obligation to provide work for all, that these should be maintained at public expense even though they contribute nothing to the national dividend, for the time being. If a really comprehensive plan is prepared in every community, and the aggregate work of the community is carefully distributed amongst the available adult population, suitably trained, in accordance with the Plan, an extremely small proportion of this population would need to be excused or exempted from work, and yet maintained in a prescribed standard.

OF POPULATION BEING EDUCATED

The exemption from regular work of children and adolescents must be justified on another ground. For being educated and trained is as much part of the National Plan, and of the national effort, as working in a factory, farm, or other productive or distributive machinery, service, or utility. All that the population of children and adolescents while at school or college needs must be supplied free to them in anticipation of the contribution such people would make when they have been duly trained and certified as fit for work.

WORK OF HOUSE-WIVES

There is a tendency to consider the work of housewives, and all those who are at present occupied in household care and domestic tasks, as being of no real value. Indeed those who discharge these duties are hardly anywhere entitled, formally or legally, to any prescribed share in the national dividend, as a matter of right. Whatever they get by way of maintenance is more in the nature of sentimental dues than as part of the legal rights of such parties. In planned society, such work must be assigned the same value as any other work. A proper mobilisation of the workers in these categories, and rationalisation of their work, may lead to very considerable economy,—a saving

of time and expense, nervous or muscular energy,—which may well be diverted to tasks more materially productive.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF COMMUNITIES

Just as there are rights and obligations of individuals, so also, there are the Rights and Obligations of communities organised as States. We have already mentioned the right of each nation, country or community to be independent and integral, free from any exploitation, domination, or aggression by its neighbours ; and with every opportunity to develop its own inherent resources. Its equality among nations would be evidence not only in the collective organisation of the World Federation established to maintain peace and harmony, but also in the sharing of the opportunities, advantages, or benefits that close organisation of mankind in all parts of the world may bring.

DUTY TO PROVIDE NATIONAL MINIMUM

As against these Rights, the Obligation may be equally well imposed upon every State member of the World Federation to develop to the utmost possible degree its own inherent resources in men or materials ; and so to provide for its nationals the best available standard of living consistent with such development. The preparation, execution or administration of the Plan would be the function,—the right as well as the obligation,—of the local national government in each unit.

DUTY TO PREPARE A NATIONAL PLAN

In order to bring about such development of local resources to the maximum degree, *every State must take it as a duty to prepare a scientific and comprehensive Plan* or programme of its local development, co-ordinating all activities within its own frontiers, and integrating the comprehensive national Plan with those parts of the World Plan which require to be correlated or mutually supplemented. If this condition is fulfilled any country suffering from a deficit of material, skill or equipment, must be aided by universal cooperation to make up the deficit.

In realising the National Plan, every adult individual would be required to work and cooperate with his fellows. By parity of reasoning, every country would be required to cooperate with its neighbours so as to put into effect the World Plan. Just as each individual would

be required to work in accordance with his physical or mental ability, aptitude, or training, so, too, should each-nation or State be required to cooperate with its neighbours and customers in accordance with its resources, natural or acquired, manpower and technical equipment.

Subject to this obligation to make a proper contribution to the common welfare by the individual as well as community, the rest of the life of the individual and of the community would be free, with the utmost scope for self-expression and self-realisation.

INTERNAL RECONSTRUCTION

Next to this Obligation in respect of a National Plan, and international cooperation arising therefrom, every country participating in the world organisation should be obligated to order its internal system of government and social structure, so as to eliminate class distinctions, social privileges and inequalities. This would mean the universalisation of the republican and egalitarian form of government and society all over the world. Social justice,—particularly in the distribution of wealth and the provision of opportunities for the enjoyment of life in every phase,—must be assured by the code of laws, customs, or regulations. Any infraction of this, calculated to create class distinction, or provide opportunity for exploitation of one group by another, would necessitate and justify intervention by the Federal authority.

DUTY TO GUARANTEE MINORITY RIGHTS

Following the same reasoning, an Obligation would also be imposed upon every community, in the event of there being any ineffaceable minorities within its jurisdiction, to assure and guarantee definite rights to Minority communities, so as to remove any reasonable grievance of such communities, any cause for apprehension of their being wiped out. This would apply to Religious Minorities, such as the Muslims in India, for example ; or to National Minorities,—such as the Germans were in the pre-war Czechoslovakia. The rights of religious communities are comprised in the rights of individuals as regards Freedom of Belief and Worship. But the corollary of this right, whether of the individual or of a community, is equally unquestionable, that such freedom should be exercised with due regard to the equal rights of other members of the same country who may not profess the

same religion. The duty of religious toleration imposed on individuals must, also, go a long way to prevent religious differences which have disfigured many a chapter of human history in the last few centuries in all parts of the world.

After the experience of India, it would be as well if the Rights of Religious Minorities are guaranteed by the world Federation, not only in order to avoid any intervention by immediate neighbors in the affairs of a given State, but also in order to operate justly and reasonably the rights assured, and to remove the doubts, distrust, or misgivings of such Minorities.

CHAPTER IX

PLACE OF INDIA IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION

In the foundations and superstructure of permanent peace, so far considered, attention has been rivetted mostly to European or American countries, and their more important allies, like China in Asia. The place of India is not entirely insignificant in international relations. The organisations hitherto set up or contemplated have had to accord a place to that country, which may not be all that our national sentiment demands, but which unmistakeably points to a recognition of the problem presented by India that the dominating influences of today would like very much to be ignored or minimised in international gatherings.

Less important, perhaps, than India is the case of the backward countries of Asia; and, of the indigenous populations of Africa and Pacific islands, which demand a recognition that the leading members of the United Nations have seldom considered in their full proportion. The U.S.S.R. has led the way by according complete local autonomy to the several constituent regions and nationalities of the Union, which not only secured more or less an equal recognition to these federated units of the U.S.S.R. at international gatherings: but has also set a model that the imperialist powers of Europe cannot ignore.

The Russian precedent is essentially different from the British model, in regard to the so-called self-governing Dominions, which only concerns the white settlers and their descendants in those parts; and which perpetrates the root evil of imperialism in those parts as well. For the interests of the native populations in those territories are wholly ignored, or made entirely subordinate to the demands of the white settlers. The imperialist virus of the mother country has infected the British Dominions in Australia and Africa, if not in Canada, Newfoundland, or New Zealand as well. They seek Mandates, Trusts, or Dependencies, which would only add to the woes of the backward

populations, indigenous to the territories, whose very name is hardly mentioned ; and whose future is thus at the mercy of this small fraction of the total population of those territories.

The problem may not be quite so acute, at least at this moment, in regard to the local population of American countries, both in the Northern and the Southern half of that continent. Red Indians are practically exterminated ; and such as remain have been forced to be assimilated with the dominant race. Even the Negro is claimed to be a full-fledged citizen of the United States and other countries on that continent, though the rights of the coloured population, even in the most advanced democracy of America, are in practice little more than nominal.

In Asiatic countries, like Iran or Iraq or the Arabian federation, which are not really on a par with American or European countries, the conflict with the present-day imperialist powers, like France or Britain, which had a political domination and economic exploitation over them, will continue. Technically, no doubt, these are independent sovereign States, who may have some sort of a place in the international organisations that may be set up after peace is finally established. But whether those arrangements will conform freely and harmonise effectively with the yet unrelinquished imperialist notions of countries like Britain or France, Holland or Belgium, remains to be seen.

In Siam, or Thailand and the Malaya States, not to mention Burma or Ceylon, the same problem stares us in the face. Local nationalism in those parts,—particularly in Burma or Ceylon,—is by no means silent. It has been whipped up in recent years to a fury by Britain for her own purposes in antagonism to the Indian vested interests in those countries. It is highly doubtful if at the Peace Conference the claims of these countries to national independence will be conceded.

If we are to judge, however, from the doctrine of Trusteeship, recently evolved ; and the effective camouflage it provides for ensuring by that means national security of the most powerful countries, like America or Russia, in the shape of naval and air force bases, it seems clear that the fate of the colonial peoples will not conform in practice to the high-sounding ideals enunciated, either in the Atlantic Charter or in the other declarations and arrangements made by the United Nations.

Even in China, the suggestion that Manchuria and Korea might be ceded to Russia, or made into Russian Protectorates as a price for the Soviet mediation with Japan will, if carried out, be in clear violation of the principles hitherto announced. The complete elimination of Japan from the Pacific may result in a domination of the United States, or of Russia, in those waters which neither would desire. The fact, however, that the great block of Chinese territory is proposed to be parcelled out, whether in the name of local autonomy for Korea or Manchuria, or in a much more open dismemberment as the price for support to the Chinese nationalist, is enough to show that the principles laid down or implied in the documents analysed in the foregoing pages are not likely to be rigorously given effect to.

All these points are, however, nowhere so fully exemplified as in regard to India. India has unquestionably been an imperial possession of Britain, which the latter is still unwilling to enfranchise and declare to be a fully independent State. The Indian people's demand, however, for complete independence and full sovereignty,—so far as that is allowed under the new world order to be established at the peace conference,—is as unmistakeable as it is undeniable. Britain has tried, as is evidenced at several international gatherings even during the war,—e.g. at Bretton Woods or at Dumbarton Oaks Conference,—to leave India out of such gatherings; and to treat her as a purely domestic issue of the British Empire, in which no outsider had any right to intervene. At the San Francisco Conference, drafting the new world charter, however, the Government of India have been accorded a separate delegation apparently as a distinct political unit. But the claim of this official Delegation to speak as for an independent India has been challenged, not only by Indian nationalist opinion, but also by some of the principal allies, led by Russia. An unofficial spokesman of this country raised her voice, in the close vicinity of the Conference, which also cannot be disregarded. What the eventual fate of this country would be, as a result of so many forces bearing upon her future, cannot be seen at this moment. But that the country demands and expects, in sheer justice and in conformity with the principles already enunciated by the Allies themselves, may be very briefly stated as the *sine qua non* for the continued maintenance of universal peace. For while India remains dissatisfied the very size of the country and its population will

make it a sore spot that the close vicinity of powerful neighbours like Russia on the one hand, China on the other, the British Dominions on the third, will mean a standing menace to continued peace all over the world.

The national demand of this country may be briefly stated as follows :

- (1) India must be an independent sovereign State, free from any control or influence from outside. This must be conceded and declared by Britain, the present dominating influence in this country ; and recognised and accepted by all other members of the comity of nations.
- (2) As an equal, independent, sovereign State, India must have the same place in any international organisation that may be set up for maintaining peace, and working the institutions of international cooperation, that her size, population, and possibilities would entitle her to.

No invidious demands, like extra territoriality of the citizens of particular nations, nor any bar against Indian special immigration in other countries, should be made. No special safeguards as those in the Government of India Act, 1935, prohibiting any special discrimination being shown in favour of Indians by the Government of India should be demanded in the interests of any non-Indian residing or working in India. Such consideration or treatment as independent and sovereign India shows to non-Indians settled and working in the country would be a matter entirely in the discretion of the Government of India, of the future.

Subject to the foregoing, such guarantees as are required and accepted by any other constituent unit, regarding the right of non-nationals of one country immigrating into, working or settling in another,—such as Britishers in India, will be granted and accepted by this country of her own free will. These guarantees, needless to add, will also be in conformity with the general policy of a common world citizenship, as laid down by the common consent and agreement of the members constituting the world federation.

- (3) Subject to the independence and equality mentioned above, India would, of course, be willing to fall in with any system of international cooperation calculated to maintain peace and promote human welfare in all spheres, material as well as cultural, and accept such limitation of local sovereignty, as may be consequent upon peace arrangements. To these she would have freely consented as an equal participant. Whatever limitations are placed upon the independence or local sovereignty of any constituent of the World State such as surrendering the right to maintain the country's own armed forces or armament factories; or guarantee of fundamental rights of citizens or minorities, would, of course, be freely accepted by this country. But such acceptance must be by her own free consent as by any other country; and not in virtue of the influence or domination of any outside power or authority.
- (4) In her own territories, she must have the fullest right and opportunity to work out her own constitution, and choose the government under which her people would like to live, as declared in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter.

This is an indefeasible right on which there should be no further question of discussion. India would have to exercise this right in conformity with any such organisation of the world economic development as may be deemed to be in consonance with the maintenance of universal and permanent peace. This means that India, like other participants, will have to have a democratic form of government, and abjure any ambition that has any taint of imperialist domination or exploitation of her neighbours, even though any such neighbour, like Burma, may have, in the near or remote past, been integral part of the country.

- (5) Framing a suitable constitution for India by Indians must be accepted as a consequence of her independence and sovereign status. The difficulties in the way of framing such a constitution should afford no cause for outside intervention or influence, except such as may be necessitated under the basic principles of the new world order, accepted

and agreed to by all as equal members of the comity of nations.

- (6) The absorption in a single framework of government of the Indian States, and reconciliation of minorities demanding partition of the country, must be left as a problem for Indians themselves to settle, without any outside interference or influence on any pretext, like trusteeship of minorities or pledges to them.
- (7) With the complete exclusion of any outside influence, domination or authority, from the local concerns or international relations of this country, the problem of the integrity of this country, will be a matter for her to determine. In the event, however, of the integrity of the country being modified, by agreement amongst her own people, the several parts set up thereafter may be guaranteed their local independence and integrity, in the same manner that the new States that come to be set up in Europe after every trace of Nazi influence has been removed, are guaranteed.

Such Partition of the country, if it occurs, would be an exercise of the principle of self-determination by any region and the people living therein. Apart from this, however, it must be agreed that disputes of any kind should be settled by mutual persuasion, conciliation or arbitration, but never by force, whether such units remain part and parcel of a single undivided India, or are the result of some sort of an agreed partition.

In the opinion of the present writer, however, the present demand for partition, or Pakistan, is political rather than a practicable necessity; more a bargain counter than an article of political credo. Economic forces, knitting the several parts of India more closely together than the political factors or personal ambitions divide them, will assert themselves, once India is an independent sovereign State. Provision must therefore, be left in the constitution of this country not only to promote an amicable partition, should there be an unquestionable demand for the same, but also for the re-entry, and absorption or amalgamation of the partitioned units, as well as other neighbouring countries, if they find closer cooperation and association in a larger political unit of

India more to their interest. There is much in the situation and possibilities of countries like Nepal, Afghanistan, or Ceylon to induce them to become autonomous parts of a larger and independent India, which at the present moment would be unthinkable. If room is left in the new constitution or independent India, the chances for more effective cooperation and intensive development of the resources of all parts would be very much increased, and the consequent welfare of the peoples living in those parts proportionately enhanced.

This opinion is based on the conviction that there is a much greater and more fundamental unity and harmony which will be emphasised in course of time by the recognition of the advantages of cooperation and all-round development. The forces of disintegration, such as there may be today, will fall away before those of cooperation, and closer association in the interests of the parts as well as of the whole. But the chances for such forces to assert themselves will be lost if an attitude of *non-possumus* is adopted at the start, or of refusal to consider the very idea of any separation of any constituent parts of the country from other parts. For such a refusal would only result in a corresponding intransigence of the Partitionists.

PROCEDURE FOR PARTITION

8. The right must, therefore, be recognised, and provided for in the constitution of India, both to dismember existing units into more convenient separate entities, if the people comprising such a unit so desire; and provide for existing separate entities to combine into a large unit; if the people of those units find it more economical to organise such a combination. By the term "people" in the above provision is meant, of course, a specified majority of the whole population of the unit affected. In the event of the sentiment for or against partition in any unit going on communal lines, the vote may be taken community-wise provided that if one community wants to secede from the mainland by a majority and the other does not, the latter must be allowed to secede from the seceder if they express such a desire by a clear majority of their own votes. The only exception that need be made to this otherwise fair position would be that, if the minority community in any unit is so small (e.g. less than a third), and so scattered through-

out the unit, that their partition would be impracticable, they must be content with their cultural position being safeguarded fully, but have no right to insist on territorial partition.

In such cases it is also desirable that definite criteria and machinery be agreed to and laid down for carrying out secession. A minimum of proportion as well as a prescribed extent of territory should be agreed to and prescribed as indispensable for such decision. The use of force in any case is futile, whether in forcing a separation or in maintaining an integrity when any considerable proportion of the people concerned are opposed to either course.

The combination of hitherto separate units may be for a limited or specified purpose, or for all the aims and objectives of a single State.

Both these aspects of the same principle may be left to operate simultaneously ; so that it should be equally possible for certain parts of the country to separate and form a new State of their own as for other States now existing as independent units to coalesce and combine for better cooperation and larger opportunities of their own local development. In any event every such act must be by the free consent of the people concerned,—whether in seceding or in coalescing.

AGREEMENT ON COMMON CONCERNS

9. Assuming that any dismemberment or partition of the country becomes inevitable, it does not necessarily follow that the partitioned units or parts, separating from the single entity existing before the separation, should be antagonistic or non-cooperative towards one another. Arrangements can and should be made, by which, though for purposes of day to day administration they are separate, they may nevertheless form a combine, or make an alliance by special treaties between themselves for all matters of common concern. In the administration of such matters of common concern, joint councils may be set up with equal or agreed representation of each combining unit. If that device is found not practicable because of possible friction between members, agreed principles may be laid down for the conduct of the administration, and each may assure the other that in the actual day to day administration those principles will be given effect to.

By this means any interruption of the process of national development would be avoided, notwithstanding separation. Such tasks, as the economic development and industrial progress of the country, a rationalised system of distribution and coordinated transportation, as well as all other accessory services in connection with national economy, may be carried on and permitted without any hindrance to benefit equally all the parts. The only difference would be that instead of one, two equally independent authorities will function as the organised central authorities for these parts. Calling them governments would make no great difference, since these two governments agree to cooperate on certain pre-determined lines, and for common purposes. If this arrangement is accepted, the lack of a common central authority would be no great cause for alarm, particularly if there is a central international organisation whose authority would be common for all units that become members or constituent parts of the world organisation. It would be always available to adjust, arbitrate, or adjudicate upon, any issue between any two or more units that is impossible to settle amicably by themselves.

FEDERATION OF SECEDERS

10. The plan also presupposes that the seceding units or provinces of this country may themselves combine into a federation of their own. It stands to reason that any single unit, or even two or three units, separating from the present entity called India, would be needlessly handicapped if such units insist upon remaining individual and separate each by itself. Cooperation between these and the earlier organisation of the whole country would be seriously obstructed, it not made impossible, if each such unit refuses to combine into another common organisation, and set up their own central federal government.

It is possible, however, that, if the secessionist forces prevail, the India of today may be split up into more than two units, without reckoning the Indian States in each. The principles of the largest measure of local autonomy, side by side with the federation of contiguous and mutually sympathetic units, may nevertheless be applied to these several units as a whole.

The governing principle, however, of such regrouping and re-organisation would be : that each unit is autonomous as much as possible. That is to say the actual administration of even the agreed common concerns should be left to the local authority, while the largest possible scope be provided for the autonomy of the units in matters primarily of local concern. In the economic organisation we are familiar with today, it may be that hardly any concern may be singled out as exclusively of local or even of common concern. A division must nevertheless be made of the functions of government, some of which must be recognised as primarily of local, and other as primarily of common, concern. This division may not be exhaustive : and so, in any undefined or debatable matters, the constitution (or treaties) should lean on the side of local autonomy rather than on the side of centralisation.

This is also in accordance with the basic postulate made above ; that the form of government and machinery of administration should be democratic. That is to say as much scope be allowed for every individual citizen to understand the responsibility and to execute it to the best of this knowledge, ability and aptitude.

Though the central federal authority would thus be left with relatively a small margin of functions or activities, its power and influence would nevertheless be comparatively much greater than that of any single unit or even a combination of units within the federation. This is due to the peculiarity of our present-day economic organisation and the forces necessary to work that organisation. The pull of the central authority would be great both on the component units as well as on the individual citizen. National sentiment will replace, even if it has not already done so, the sentiment for local allegiance. The need to collaborate in economic matters, both in production and in distribution, would reinforce the less tangible forces working in that direction.

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION OF MINORITIES PROBLEM

The separating units of the present-day India would still have minorities, with communal or religious allegiance to the majority in the other units. The proposal to partition the country originates from the apprehensions of communal minorities about receiving just and equal treatment at the hands of an immutable majority. Partition is

really no final solution of the problem of Minorities as they exist in this country. The solution lies in an agreement, defining the rights of citizens as well as of minorities or communities, and guaranteeing their full observance in everyday administration. These fundamental Rights of Citizens as well as Minority communities should be included as integral part of the constitution of each Federation, which should not to be altered except by a special procedure laying down the majority needed for a valid amendment of the constitution in this behalf.

INDIAN STATES

11. We have dealt with what are called British Indian provinces. In India, however, one third of the area and one fourth of the present population is comprised in what are called the Indian States. Theoretically, they are independent units allied to the Government of India by treaty and usage, which now stretch over more than a century and a half in some cases. The precise juridical position and political organisation of these areas are difficult to define. But in all probability they will have to fall in with the general federation of the country ; or, if the country is partitioned, they may have to do with the federation next adjoining to them with which they may have the greatest economic or political affinity. If the problem of India's economic development is to be tackled satisfactorily in all parts of the country, it is inevitable that the States as much as the Provinces should fall into line, and carry on, in cooperation and consultation, the plan or plans that may be formed for allround advancement of the country and the betterment of its people.

With the disappearance of the British power from any effective authority in this country, some agreed arrangements will have to be made for the succession to the rights of the Paramount Power, which the present Government of India has exercised over the Indian States. Whether it is done by agreement between the central Indian authority (or authorities) and the adjoining States, or by mediation of the British Government, or by international arbitration, the States cannot be allowed to continue as isolated units, each functioning in its own small area and population, notwithstanding the closest possible bonds between them and their neighbours in British Indian territories of social and economic character.

Many political thinkers in India also believe that, with the disappearance of the British power from any effective authority in this country, the forces which have brought about the present pre-eminence of communal complexion in Indian political Parties will also disappear. Political Parties will be formed on more objective or real issues of an economic character. Social reform in India has a meaning not quite identical with that which prevails in western countries. Nevertheless in Indian schemes of social reform, the economic factor is beginning to assert itself more and more, whether we think of the amelioration of the depressed classes, backward areas, or even the rights of woman.

DECENTRALISATION AND DEVOLUTION

12. Whatever the future political organisation of this country,—whether a single entity, as it now is, or any other form, that may be agreed upon by its people hereafter,—it is certain that, for purposes of a real working democracy and actual self-government of the *people* by the *people* for the *people*, the unit of self-government would have to be necessarily much smaller than even the larger provinces of India today. For the purpose of enabling each region, fairly homogenous in population, material resources and economic characteristics, to realise its own contribution to the general advancement; as also for convenience in administration, each local entity will have to be vested with much larger powers of government or administration in local concerns than is the case with existing component parts (provinces) of the country.

Given these principles of a reconstructed India, the details of its actual constitution and framework of government must needs be left to a Constituent Assembly, which will truly represent the people, and carry out their wishes regarding the form and government they want to live under. There is nothing sacrosanct, nothing final and eternal, in any particular form of government. Forms of government are but in response to the needs of the moment, and may change as the exigencies of each changing situation may demand. For the moment, however, the democratic form seems to be the most suitable; and if it is employed with the necessary limitation imposed by the need to cooperate and advance any State towards pre-determined goals in accordance with pre-determined plans, it is likely to bring about the greatest good of the greatest number.

The Constituent Assembly would, of course, not be competent to prepare a constitution for all parts of India, if the present agitation in favour of partition succeeds. But, in that case, agreement will have to be made between the seceding and remaining units after the main issue of partition has been satisfactorily settled. Very likely more than one Constituent Assembly may have to be set up to devise the appropriate constitution and administrative arrangements for each of these federations, and their component units. But even if the constitution of either part is framed by a separate Constituent Assembly,—or any other agreed machinery,—the constitution must provide :

- (a) adequate and effective guarantees for cultural rights of Minorities in each, endorsed, if necessary, by the guarantee of the World State.
- (b) a basis for some working agreement, even after separation, to manage conjointly the common concerns of both parts, such as posts, telegraphs, railways, telephones, roads, rivers, and even currency and credit, if not defence.
- (c) democratic forms, methods and institutions of actual working, as calculated best to minimise the apprehensions of minorities on either side of the border, and permit political parties being formed on material instead of religious basis, so that the minority of today may have a chance of becoming a majority of tomorrow ; and
- (d) must accept the general ideals or principles constituting the foundation of the reconstructed world, as outlined above, including a common world citizenship, guaranteed fundamental rights of individuals, limited local sovereignty of each State and all-round collaboration of the rest of the world on an equal footing for each component unit.

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF CITIZENS AND MINORITIES

13. The Fundamental Rights of individuals laid down in the constitution, should include a special chapter on the Rights of Minorities, if any considerable number of people desire it. But these rights of minorities must not be incompatible with the basis of the reconstructed world. Needless to add that the obligations corresponding to these rights must also be similarly codified, guaranteed, and enforced. The

exercise of these rights must in no way serve as an obstruction or impediment to the realisation of the national plan in regard both to production and distribution of the new wealth.

In the development of the country's resources, in the production of new wealth and in its distribution, these rights and obligations, whether of individuals or of groups must be fully attended to, so that social justice may be realised in the largest possible degree, and human welfare achieved in proportion.

NEEDED—A NATIONAL PLAN

India, like every other unit, must have a national plan of simultaneous all-round development. That Plan must be integrated or coordinated with similar plans of other units in the international organisation. Its execution should be the most palpable guarantee of improving the standard of living of every citizen of this country. If India is broken up into several parts, there may have to be more than one such plan ; but, even so, it would not be impossible to integrate and coordinate these plans so as for all effective purposes to make it a single plan of national development.

INDIA—EQUAL PARTNER IN WORLD ORGANISATION

14. With these changes in her own constitution, India would be a single (or as a partitioned) State, equal and independent member of the international organisation to be formed after the war. Equality in this case is in respect of the internal sovereignty of each member-State, and not in regard to the importance that each State enjoys in the new organisation. That status varies with the contribution made in the present war, as also in accordance with the resources and potentialities of the several members, in the future.

So far as India is concerned, her equality and independence mean, for the time being, her complete and final emancipation from British domination and exploitation of today. That does not mean, however, that, in view of her area, resources, and population,—not to mention also her contribution in the present war in men (over two million combatants) and money (over Rs. 3000 crores at least), she should not

be entitled to equality also in respect of the rights of members for representation on the Security Council, or any other organisation, including the International General Staff, that may be established under that organisation in the future. This is the main weakness of the Charter worked out at San Francisco wherein equality of status is only nominal.

LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY FOR ALL STATES

15. Sovereignty, also, of member-States in the organisation would be not absolute. It will be limited in the sense that the pledges, if given freely and voluntarily, in respect of peace and for working the International Organisation, will involve some restriction on the absolute sovereignty of every individual member-State. India would, of course, accept these restrictions, in so far as they are of her own free choice and consent.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

16. As an equal member of the International Organisation, and with a comprehensive national Plan of her own, India would be entitled to demand the working of the world economic machinery in full cooperation and coördination with all member-States. If one ingredient of that cooperation and coordination is a free and equal access to the raw materials and markets of the world, as laid down in the Atlantic Charter, another equally important ingredient should be the right to develop, primarily by one's own capital and labour, a country's own resources, so as to attain in actual every-day life the best possible standard of living for the masses of one's own country. The contribution, expected from allround cooperation by India, working or supplementing her national plan, would be in the shape of making up such deficiencies as are absolutely impossible to meet by her own effort from her own resources, e.g. plant, machinery, equipment and skilled labour needed to speed up her wholesale, all-round industrialisation in order to improve the standard of living for her masses. This would be facilitated by her accumulated Sterling Resources; and would, in its turn, help to improve her trade with the world on a more rational basis.

GLOBAL REDISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

17. On the other hand, she has a surplus of population, while

other countries have a deficiency of the human factor. This must be rectified and readjusted, so as to make the human factor adequate and sufficient for the full development of the natural resources of every country. All anti-immigration legislation, or laws preventing permanent settlement of the national of one country in another, will have to be abrogated or repealed ; and their place be taken by facilities for immigration, settlement and assimilation of citizens from one part of the world into another in accordance with the general plan of re-distribution.

RIGHTS COUPLED WITH OBLIGATIONS

18. In the Charter no specific mention is made of the rights of nations or communities or of individuals, and much less of obligations. The Preamble has a vague general reference, which is insufficient. India, however, would expect that the Rights as well as Obligations of World Citizenship, and as member of the International Organisation, will be fully accepted by all member-States, as she would do herself, both as regards individuals and communities (i.e. Minorities).

CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD DEVELOPMENT

19. While the primary claim of each individual State to develop its own resources by its own capital and labour, and improve the standard of living of its own people is uncontested, India will not follow a dog-in-the manger policy, and refuse to share her surplus product after meeting her own needs, with others less advantageously situated. No needless barriers to the movement of goods, capital or labour, will be imposed.

INDIA AND WORLD ORGANISATION

20. On this basis the International Organisation would be a common concern for all member-States. It will not be a super-sovereign World State in the sense contemplated in the earlier pages. Given, however, our present conditions, it will be the next best substitute, likely to be most generally acceptable. Its governing principles would be to facilitate the fullest cooperation, including exchange of the surplus or speciality of any region so as to make good the deficit or lack

in any other. Countries so exchanging their surplus or speciality, in full freedom and without any trade barriers or fiscal impediments, would be more or less equally developed so as to be able to trade on truly equal terms.

India's commerce, together with all the accessory services, will be more advantageous by the reconstruction envisaged above. Not only the volume but also the direction and the trend of our foreign trade will be radically altered. If the element of private profit is eliminated from the trade of the world, and, therefore, of any component part of it, the present-day handicap of unequal opportunities or benefit from foreign trade will be absent. No objection need be raised to such freedom of trade as is necessary more fully to develop the resources of each component part.

As part of the new system of trade and exchange, instruments or medium of exchange or mode of settling international obligations, will likewise wear a wholly different form from what we are accustomed to so far. The Indian currency and exchange system will be completely freed from any connection with or dependence upon the corresponding British system. India will naturally, have no objection to become a part of the world monetary organisation by her own consent on equal terms. If the individual ambitions of this country are realised, India would be able to aid very substantially the aggregate wealth of the world, and so contribute materially to the increase of happiness of mankind.

APPENDIX

TEXT

of

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED

—to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

—to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

—to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

—to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

—to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

—to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

—to insure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

—to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

CHAPTER I

PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article I

The purposes of the United Nations are :

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end : to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of

international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace ;

2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace ;

3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ; and

4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The organization and its members, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article I, shall act in accordance with the following principles.

1. The organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members.

2. All members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present charter.

3. All members shall settle their international disputes by means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.

4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

5. All members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.

6. The organization shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

7. Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter ; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

CHAPTER II

MEMBERSHIP

Article 3

The original members of the United Nations shall be the states which, having participated in the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco or having previously signed the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the present charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.

Article 4

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

Article 5

A member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The exercise of these rights and privileges may be restored by the Security Council.

Article 6

A member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the principles contained in the present charter may be expelled from the organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

CHAPTER III

ORGANS

Article 7

1. There are established as the principal organs of the United Nations: a General Assembly, a Security Council, an Economic and Social Council, a Trusteeship Council, an International Court of Justice, and a Secretariat.

2. Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be established in accordance with the present charter.

Article 8

The United Nations shall place no restrictions on the eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity and under conditions of equality in its principal and subsidiary organs.

CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Composition

Article 9

1. The General Assembly shall consist of all the members of the United Nations.

2. Each member shall have not more than five representatives in the General Assembly.

Functions and Powers

Article 10

The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present charter, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.

Article 11

1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations with regard to such principles to the members or to the Security Council or to both.

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.

4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10.

Article 12

1. While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.

2. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the Security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each session of any matters relative to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the Security Council and shall similarly notify the General Assembly, or the members of the United Nations if the General Assembly is not in session, immediately the Security Council ceases to deal with such matters.

Article 13

1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of :

A. Promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification ;

B. Promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

2. The further responsibilities, functions, and powers of the General Assembly with respect to matters mentioned in paragraph I (B) above are set forth in Chapters IX and X.

Article 14

Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present charter setting forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. The General Assembly shall receive and consider annual and special reports from the Security Council ; these reports shall include an account of the measures that the Security Council has decided upon or taken to maintain international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly shall receive and consider reports from the other organs of the United Nations.

Article 16

The General Assembly shall perform such functions with respect to the international trusteeship system as are assigned to it under Chapters XII and XIII, including the approval of the trusteeship agreements for areas not designated as strategic.

Article 17

1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the organization.

2. The expenses of the organization shall be borne by the members as apportioned by the General Assembly.

3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.

Voting

Article 18

1. Each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, the election of the non-permanent members of the Economic and Social Council, the election of members of the Trusteeship Council in accordance with paragraph I (C) of Article 86, the suspension of the members to the United Nations, the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership, the expulsion of members, questions relating to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.

3. Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Article 19

A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the member.

Procedure

Article 20

The General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council or of a majority of the members of the United Nations.

Article 21

The General Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure. It shall elect its President for each session.

Article 22

The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

CHAPTER V

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Composition

Article 23

1. The Security Council shall consist of eleven members of the United Nations. The Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect six other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, however, three shall be chosen for a term of one year. A retiring member shall not be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. Each member of the Security Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.

3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

Article 25

The members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter.

Article 26

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the members of the United Nations for the establishment of system for the regulation of armaments.

Voting

Article 27

1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Procedure

Article 28

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. Each member of the Security Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times at the seat of the organization.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the government or by some other specially designated representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at such places other than the seat of the organization as in its judgment will best facilitate its work.

Article 29

The Security Council may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions.

Article 30

The Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

Article 31

Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council

whenever the latter considers that the interests of that member are specially affected.

Article 32

Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council or any state which is not a member of the United Nations if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a member of the United Nations.

CHAPTER VI

PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

Article 34

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any member of the United Nations may bring any dispute or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like

nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 33-37 the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and members or between the Security Council and members or between the Security Council and groups of members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that member, if the member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, members shall hold immediately available

national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

2. The members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without

the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the organization may, on request of the governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

CHAPTER IX

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COOPERATION

Article 55

With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote :

A. Higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development ;

B. Solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems ; and international cultural and educational cooperation ; and

C. Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Article 56

All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 57

1. The various specialized agencies, established by inter-governmental agreement and having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.

2. Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as specialized agencies.

Article 58

The organization shall make recommendations for the coordination of the policies and activities of the specialized agencies.

Article 59

The organization shall, where appropriate, initiate negotiations among the states concerned for the creation of any new specialized agencies required for the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Article 60

Responsibility for the discharge of the functions of the organization set forth in this chapter shall be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the General Assembly, in the Economic and Social Council, which shall have for this purpose the powers set forth in Chapter X.

CHAPTER X

THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

Composition

Article 61

1. The Economic and Social Council shall consist of eighteen members of the United Nations elected by the General Assembly.

2. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3, six members of the Economic and Social Council shall be elected each year for a term of three years. A retiring member shall be eligible for immediate re-election.

3. At the first election, eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council shall be chosen. The term of office of six members so chosen shall expire at the end of one year, and of six other members at the end of two years, in accordance with arrangements made by the General Assembly.

4. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one representative.

Functions and Powers

Article 62

1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to international economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General Assembly, to the members of the United Nations,

and to the specialized agencies concerned.

2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

3. It may prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly, with respect to matters falling within its competence.

4. It may call, in accordance with the rules prescribed by the United Nations, international conferences on matters falling within its competence.

Article 63

1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

2. It may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the members of the United Nations.

Article 64

1. The Economic and Social Council may take appropriate steps to obtain regular reports from the specialized agencies. It may make arrangements with the members of the United Nations and with the specialized agencies to obtain reports on the steps taken to give effect to its own recommendations and to recommendations on matters falling within its competence made by the General Assembly.

2. It may communicate its observations on these reports to the General Assembly.

Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

Article 66

1. The Economic and Social Council shall perform such functions as fall within its competence in connection with the carrying out of the recommendations of the General Assembly.

2. It may, with the approval of the General Assembly, perform services at the request of members of the United Nations and at the request of specialized agencies.

3. It shall perform such other functions as are specified elsewhere in the present charter or as may be assigned to it by the General Assembly.

Voting

Article 67

1. Each member of the Economic and Social Council shall have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Economic and Social Council shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting.

Procedure

Article 68

The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be required for the performance of its functions.

Article 69

The Economic and Social Council shall invite any member of the United Nations to participate, without vote, in its deliberations on any matter of particular concern to that member.

Article 70

The Economic and Social Council may make arrangements for representatives of the specialized agencies to participate, without vote, in its deliberations and in those of the commissions established by it, and for its representatives to participate in deliberations of the specialized agencies.

Article 71

The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations after consultation with the member of the United Nations concerned.

Article 72

1. The Economic and Social Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, including the method of selecting its President.

2. The Economic and Social Council shall meet as required in accordance with its rules, which shall include provision for the convening of meetings on the request of a majority of its members.

CHAPTER XI

DECLARATION REGARDING NON-SELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES

Article 73

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples

have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end :

A. To ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuse ;

B. To develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.

C. To further international peace and security ;

D. To promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this article ; and

E. To transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.

Article 74

Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

CHAPTER XII

INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

Article 75

The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter referred to as trust territories.

Article 76

The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present charter, shall be :

- A. To further international peace and security ;
- B. To promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement ;
- C. To encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world ; and
- D. To ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all members of the United Nations and their nationals, and also equal treatment for the latter in the administration of justice, without prejudice to the attainment of the foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.

Article 77

1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories as may be placed thereunder by means of trusteeship agreements :

- A. Territories now held under mandate ;
- B. Territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War ; and
- C. Territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration.

2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

Article 78

The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality.

Article 79

The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system, including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under mandate by a member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for in Articles 83 and 85.

Article 80

1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under Articles 77, 79, and 81, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which members of the United Nations may respectively be parties.

2. Paragraph I of this article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in Article 77.

Article 81

The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the administering authority, may be one or more states or the organization itself.

Article 82

There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.

Article 83

1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment shall be exercised by the Security Council.

2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area.

3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political, economic, social, and educational matters in the strategic areas.

Article 84

It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and

assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.

Article 85

1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by the General Assembly.

2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

Composition

Article 86

1. The Trusteeship Council shall consist of the following members of the United Nations :

A. Those members administering trust territories ;

B. Such of those members mentioned by name in Article 23 as are not administering trust territories ; and

C. As many other members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly as may be necessary to ensure that the total number of members of the Trusteeship Council is equally divided between those members of the United Nations which administer trust territories and those which do not.

2. Each member of the Trusteeship Council shall designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein.

Functions and Powers

Article 87

The General Assembly and, under its authority, the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their functions, may :

A. Consider reports submitted by the administering authority ;

B. Accept petitions and examine them in consultation with the administering authority ;

C. Provide for periodic visits to the respective trust territories at times agreed upon with the administering authority ; and

D. Take these and other actions in conformity with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.

Article 88

The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a questionnaire on the political, economic, social and educational advancement of

2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.

Article 95

Nothing in the present charter shall prevent members of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in the future.

Article 96

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities.

CHAPTER XV THE SECRETARIAT

Article 97

The Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such staff as the organization may require. The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. He shall be the chief administrative officer of the organization.

Article 98

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the organization.

Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect

on their position as international officials responsible only to the organization.

2. Each member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article 101

1. The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly.

2. Appropriate staffs shall be permanently assigned to the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and, as required, to other organs of the United Nations. These staffs shall form a part of the Secretariat.

3. The paramount consideration in the employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible.

CHAPTER XVI

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 102

1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by any member of the United Nations after the present charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat and published by it.

2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this article may invoke that treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations.

Article 103

In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present charter shall prevail.

Article 104

The organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.

Article 105

1. The organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its members such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes.

2. Representatives of the members of the United Nations and officials of the organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the organization.

3. The General Assembly may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article or may propose conventions to the members of the United Nations for this purpose.

CHAPTER XVII

TRANSITIONAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Article 106

Pending the coming into force of such special agreements referred to in Article 43 as in the opinion of the Security Council enable it to begin the exercise of its responsibilities under Article 42, the parties to the Four-Nation Declaration, signed at Moscow, October 30, 1943, and France, shall, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of that declaration, consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

Article 107

Nothing in the present charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the governments having responsibility for such action.

CHAPTER XVIII

AMENDMENTS

Article 108

Amendments to the present charter shall come into force for all members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 109

1. A general conference of the members of the United Nations for the purpose of reviewing the present charter may

be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council. Each member of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference.

2. Any alteration of the present charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly following the coming into force of the present charter, the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the Security Council.

CHAPTER XIX

RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE

Article 110

1. The present charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

2. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the Secretary-General of the organization when he has been appointed.

3. The present charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the ratifications deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.

4. The states signatory to the present charter which ratify it after it has come into force will become original members of the United Nations on the date of the deposit of their respective ratifications.

Article 111

The present charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall remain

deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that government to the governments of the other signatory states.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the governments of the United Nations have signed the present charter.

Done at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and forty-five.

(The text of the Statute of the International Court of Justice could not be included in this Appendix as it was not available in this country until the book was finally printed).

